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Chapter 1 
 
“It's not a question of ‘enough’, pal. It's a zero-sum 
game. Somebody wins, somebody loses. Money itself 
isn't lost or made, it's simply transferred... from one 
perception to another, like magic.” 
Gordon Gekko, from “Wall Street” (by Oliver Stone) 
 
Introduction 
Public securities markets are among the most important source of external 
financing for companies and entrepreneurs. In the last three years a total of over 2.4 
trillion U.S. Dollars in over 9,900 issues have been raised globally in equity and 
equity related transactions, of which 520 billion has been from initial public 
offerings of common stock. Still, this constitutes only around 10% of external plain 
vanilla sources of capital1. The evolution from a start-up firm to a large company 
requires expansion and ongoing refinancing of operations by the generation of 
capital – either from internal or external sources. Raising capital from equity 
markets is by no means an imperative step in a company’s development as examples 
of long-standing private multinationals such as Fidelity Investments and Cargill 
clearly demonstrate. The recent wave of firms “going dark” shows that public equity 
markets also bring along a cost: namely the loss of managerial autonomy and market 
pressures (Boot, Gopalan, and Thakor, 2008).  
Any outside financing decision with equity generates a separation of 
ownership and control, which gives rise to a principal-agent conflict (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). A financing mix of debt and equity creates a further conflict 
between shareholders and bondholders. When managers or corporate insiders 
require outside financing, they turn to capital markets. The issuance and distribution 
of securities is usually commissioned to financial intermediaries – so-called 
investment banks, which produce information to assure valuation, to assess and 
                                                          
1 Source: Thomson Reuters volume trends last three years-to-date (8 April 2010) 
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solicit demand, and the allocation of securities to potential investors. In order to 
succeed in raising capital of any kind to begin with, the manager has to make 
corporate decisions in order to signal a healthy firm condition to the market, steady 
cash flows and prosperous growth opportunities. This is a necessary condition in 
order to stimulate demand for the firm’s securities in the first place. Capital markets 
are constituted by subjects, who trade assets either on regulated exchanges or over-
the-counter, where a market price is assigned to the traded good, based on the 
available information set and expectations. In turn, these expectations of public 
capital markets and their constituents affect the ways, in which managers steer 
corporations. These expectations are not homogeneous across investor types because 
shareholders prefer risk, whereas bondholders prefer a low probability of default. 
Research suggests that there are also clienteles within these two groups (Miller, 
1977). After raising external capital from equity markets, managers do not act as 
sole proprietors anymore, which causes their interests to potentially diverge from 
new owners of the firm: the shareholders. Not only has the recent and ongoing 
global financial crisis underscored the importance of transparency, managerial 
accountability and the degree to which investors are able to exert control – it has 
also shown limits to the regulatory framework. 
The early finance literature advocates frictionless capital markets, which – 
among other elements – assumes that every market participant has the same access 
to information (Miller and Modigliani, 1958). A later strand of research has 
challenged this view, which has led to the emergence of early signaling models 
(Akerlof, 1970, Spence, 1973). These have been further developed in all kinds of 
theoretical settings. In reality though, any securities market bears frictions because 
information availability is not universally equal. The phenomenon that insiders 
know more about the financial condition and the growth prospects of a company 
than prospective investors do is commonly known as asymmetric information 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984; Miller and Rock, 1985).  
This does not necessarily undermine or prevent the optimal operation of 
securities markets: participants merely respond differently, which alters the rules of 
the game and enables the emergence of alternative market mechanisms – partially 
because of regulatory intervention. Probably the most prominent market mechanism, 
which assures the functioning of capital markets and the return that investors get, is 
known as corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The interpretation of 
this mechanism differs globally and both regulatory amendments advances have 
been made in each country – most prominently with the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act in the United States in 2002. This was enacted in response to managerial 
misconduct and highly politicized governance scandals. 
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The title “Stock Market Manipulation” of this dissertation by no means is 
supposed to connote forensic or criminal backgrounds. I strongly acknowledge that 
managers signal their proprietary information to capital markets in order to augment 
informational efficiency, to become more transparent and for investor relations 
purposes to stimulate demand for corporate securities. However, the presence of 
asymmetric information also enables managers to potentially capitalize on their 
access to inside information and to violate the terms of the contract under which 
control rights to the company’s assets and cash flows have been pledged to the 
shareholders (Hart, 1995). The questions that I seek to explore in this dissertation are 
threefold. Firstly, what are potential situations where asymmetric information has 
been exploited, where subjects have acted in self-interest and what has caused this 
behavior? Secondly, what are the consequences of these situations? Lastly, can 
market participants, the social planner, or the regulator prevent these situations from 
happening? And if so, how should preventive and corrective action look like? 
In this dissertation, I will give answers to each of the questions with 
empirical analyses of both American and European stock market and company data. 
Chapters 2 and 3 will argue for shareholder litigation to be one credible corporate 
control device, which shareholders can resort to, once insiders have allegedly 
violated managerial duties. I measure shareholder litigation through the filing of 
class-action lawsuits and investigate their causes and consequences. According to 
my results, causes are an “excessive” managerial compensation with stock option 
combined with managerial discretion. Consequences are underperformance or 
reversals of stock price performance conditional on the allegations affecting 
individual directors only rather than the corporate entity. I conclude a disciplining 
effect from the threat of shareholder litigation due to adverse stock price effects for 
the equity-aligned manager.  
Whereas Sarbanes-Oxley seems to constitute an effective regulatory 
intervention, which substitutes costly litigation, Chapter 4 points out a part of 
regulation, which is less likely to be successful. I observe situations of stock market 
manipulation in the process of initial public offerings during the hot issue period 
between 1998 and 2000 in the United States. The practice of soliciting demand for 
shares and eventually allocating shares in public equity markets is delegated from 
the issuer to the underwriting investment bank. This creates an agency problem 
because the financial intermediary holds superior information. There is a 
mechanism, which the underwriter can exploit this to manipulate demand, 
allocation, and the aftermarket pricing of shares in order to please the issuer. This by 
itself is not unlawful. The investment bank does so however, at the expense of 
uninformed minority investors, which are not in the eligible circle of the investment 
bank’s client base. The practice does not assume implicit collusion between the 
underwriter and corporate insiders. I provide indicative evidence of underwriter 
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involvement, price stabilization, and stronger insider selling activity – even aside of 
regulatory notice. Besides finding support of “captive regulation”, I also contribute 
to the emerging and politicized literature on coordinated behavior of financial 
conglomerates.  
Chapter 5 shows how shareholders can enforce corporate control in the 
form of either selling the shares (following the “Wall Street Rule” or “voting with 
their feet”) or to file proposals (to use “voice”) affecting the corporate strategy at 
shareholder meetings. In the absence of industry competition or an active market for 
corporate control, shareholders will resort to filing proposals and to undermine a 
managerial “quiet life”. I show that the probability and the extent of the enforcement 
of governance via “voice” is also a function of ownership structure. Because 
managers in these types of firms are predominantly equity-aligned, they will find it 
optimal to actively use their voting rights in order to block shareholder proposals.  
In my last chapter, I provide international evidence of how corporations 
respond to an increasingly changing landscape of corporate governance and 
institutional shareholder expectations. Using European data and distinguishing three 
corporate governance regimes by legal heritage and shareholder value approaches, I 
show that Continental European firms – from a long-term large investor system –are 
increasingly sensitive to complying with Anglo-Saxon principles – a market-based 
system. These comprise a dominant focus on short-term shareholder value creation 
at the expense of long-term capital expenditures. Using investor-sensitive corporate 
governance ratings between 1997 and 2005, I find that (also because of regulatory 
intervention) Continental European firms increasingly converge to their peers in the 
United Kingdom in terms of corporate governance. The extent to which corporations 
can manage to please developments in their shareholder base therefore constitutes a 
form of stock market manipulation as well. 
In the next sections, I will outline each chapter shortly by mentioning major 
building blocks from the theoretical and empirical literature. This introduces the 
main problem statements and research questions, which precede the actual findings 
of each chapter. 
1.1 Long Term Performance of Shareholder Litigation 
What happens to firms that get sued by their shareholders and does 
litigation have any merits beyond settlement amounts? In this chapter I argue that 
shareholders can effectively use shareholder litigation to discipline managers. I 
measure litigation activity with the filing of class-action lawsuits. In 1995, the U.S. 
Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) that enables 
(private) shareholders to allege any violation of 10(b)-5 of the 1934 Securities 
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Exchange Act. This rule prohibits among other things any manipulative and 
deceptive practices by managers and corporations and it prescribes managerial 
duties. Essential to my analysis is the distinction between allegations of violations of 
duty of care versus violations of duty of loyalty. I posit that only for lawsuits, which 
affect individual directors, there is potential for a disciplining effect, which 
translates into long-term reversal of performance. By contrast, lawsuits affecting the 
corporate entity will be disruptive and will result in long-term underperformance due 
to loss in investor confidence. Before litigation, sued companies behave like large 
growth stocks, which transform into small value firms post litigation. This finding is 
consistent with the theoretical model by Kedia and Philippon (2009). I find that if 
violations of duty of loyalty are alleged – exemplified by insider trading or related 
party transactions – negative stock price performance reverses over medium- to 
long-term horizons and generates significantly positive alpha. This finding is not 
present for allegations of violations of duty of care. This resembles indicative 
evidence that individuals can be disciplined – corporations cannot.  
However, shareholder litigation cannot be an effective governance 
mechanism if it erodes the corporation’s financial health and puts it nearer to 
financial distress. If it will, then this outcome is merely a wealth transfer from 
bondholders to shareholders. I measure the possible occurrence of financial distress 
with an approximation of Merton’s distance-to-default (1974) model following 
Bharath and Shumway (2008). Even though default probabilities of 12.08% in sued 
firms range higher than the unconditional average of 8.07%, they do not increase 
after the filing of a lawsuit. My results aid and steer institutional investors’ decision 
making of whether to use shareholder litigation and to join class-action lawsuits. A 
dual holding of bonds and equity in the firm should not affect this decision. 
1.2 Shareholder Litigation and Executive 
Compensation 
Turning to the antecedents of shareholder litigation, I focus on CEO 
compensation and (dysfunctional) corporate governance mechanisms. Departing 
from established models of executive compensation I offer an alternative 
interpretation of the occurrence of class-action lawsuits: the emergence of a 
governance mechanism if other mechanisms are unavailable or have failed. It is 
widely understood that the market for corporate control as a disciplining device can 
be undermined with the use of takeover defenses (Comment and Schwert, 1995). 
Further, in a system of dispersed ownership, changes in corporate governance are 
often difficult to attain – even for blockholders. Lastly, selling the stock and thereby 
depressing the stock price is often not an option for large shareholders with indexed 
portfolios. These shortcomings might suggest that CEOs have a blank check for 
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selfish behavior and increasing firm risk. So which option of corporate control can 
minority shareholders resort to? And who should set executive compensation in a 
system of dispersed ownership where blockholders can pursue different objectives 
and CEO behavior with discretion can be problematic?  
I argue that shareholder litigation is an available ex ante threat and ex post 
disciplining device in response to excessive managerial risk taking. Due to 
asymmetric information and the presence of discretion, a CEO will negotiate for 
option compensation. I measure “excessive” as the component of CEO 
compensation, which is determined by managerial discretion rather than economic- 
and firm variables. I find out that consequences of “excessive” option compensation 
are an increase in firm risk, which increases the likelihood of shareholders resorting 
to class-action lawsuits as a control mechanism. This is because options have a non-
linear payoff function, whose value also increases with the volatility of the stock. 
Not only does it increase the likelihood, it also increases the potential severity and 
the accompanying stock price impact. Because the filing of lawsuits can be a costly 
endeavor not only for a dispersed shareholder, it is intriguing to seek for a more 
cost-efficient alternative ex ante control mechanism. I find this in the passage of 
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) personal liability section, which resembles an exogenous 
shock to the U.S. corporate governance landscape. CEOs could already be sued 
personally before SOX but can now be held personally liable to a higher extent. 
Hence, I offer an alternative interpretation to the occurrence of class-action lawsuits: 
not merely as a consequence of negative performance but as a response from 
shareholders to excessive compensation. 
1.3 Underwriter Manipulation of Initial Public 
Offerings 
Which role does regulatory intervention into financial markets play and 
why do we observe it? Using data of initial public offerings (IPO) between 1995 and 
2007 and identifying causes and consequences of shareholder litigation against 
issuers and underwriting investment banks, I give answers to the paramount degree 
of underpricing in hot issue markets. I study a notorious investment bank practice on 
Wall Street known as tie-in agreements (“laddering”, henceforth). It is likely that 
this only works for initial public offerings and not for seasoned offerings because 
information asymmetry is lower in listed companies. The mechanisms are the 
following. With book-building the underwriting investment bank has sole discretion 
upon the allocation of IPO shares as soon as demand exceeds supply (the issue is 
oversubscribed). The underwriter will then allocate the IPO shares to investors at the 
offer price conditional on these same investors committing to purchase additional 
stock in the aftermarket on predetermined dates. This practice is deceitful to those 
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investors unaware of this stock price manipulation and undermines the integrity of 
financial markets. This practice has substantial effects on the first day return of the 
IPO: the underwriter levers its reputation in the IPO market in order to entice 
prospective investors to participate in the illegal scheme. More than that, there is 
also a substantial degree of underwriter post-IPO involvement in the form of 
ownership through the financial conglomerate’s asset management arms. This is 
further evidence to coordinated behavior of financial conglomerates (Acharya and 
Johnson, 2007; Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov, 2009; Ritter and Zhang, 2007). The 
consequence of that is a stabilized stock price, which does not statistically 
underperform a matched non-manipulated sample and outperforms the average IPO 
firm. Potential beneficiaries (with or without direct awareness of laddering or 
implicit collusion with the underwriter) are corporate insiders and pre-IPO investors, 
which can exit more easily and at higher prices. And indeed, I find that insiders of 
laddered IPOs sell their shares earlier, at higher volumes and to a stronger extent: 
irrespective of which insider type I consider or whether I put restrictions on 
minimum trading amounts I find that laddered firm insiders are significant net 
sellers. This holds over almost all medium term time windows after the IPO that I 
consider.  
Given the lucrative nature of this practice, it appears astonishing why 
laddering allegedly ceased to occur after 2000. Decreasing stock markets and an 
increasing awareness of the financial press have caused an exogenous change in the 
degree of the enforcement of Regulation M, which intends to proscribe actions of 
market manipulation. Using a Probit model of laddering occurrence between 1995 
and 2000, I estimate coefficients to calculate the out-of-sample probability of IPOs 
to be laddered post 2001. Based on these probabilities, I find IPO firms, which share 
the same characteristics of underpricing, underwriter involvement and insider 
trading activity like de facto laddered IPO firms. This suggests that in spite of 
regulatory intervention, a practice similar to laddering still takes place. The fact that 
regulatory change did not cause different behavior of the regulated subjects is an 
evidence of “captive regulation”. In August 2009, U.S. courts have proposed a 
global settlement amount of USD 586 million relieving 309 issuers and over 40 
involved underwriting investment banks from any further legal liability – without 
legally admitting wrongdoing. 
1.5 Shareholder Activism and Ownership Structure 
In the broad spectrum of corporate governance and its available 
mechanisms, “exit” and “voice” constitute two widely used forms, which will 
become more prominent in the future (Gillan and Starks, 2007). Owing to the 
increasing fraction of institutional ownership since the mid 1990s, investors become 
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more and more influential when it comes to having a say in the corporate strategy. 
At the same time, this coincides with shifts in the proportions of the institutional 
shareholder base between “transient” (high turnover, short-horizon), “dedicated” 
(concentrated long-term holdings), and “quasi-index” (low turnover, high 
diversification) investors.   
Shareholder proposals can take a variety of facets on terms of proposal 
content and motivation. I find that both content and sponsor identity strongly affect 
the outcome and success of shareholder proposals. In this chapter, I argue that 
(institutional) investors will – in the absence of the “exit” option – file shareholder 
proposals to those firms, which are insulated from the market for corporate control 
and where industry competition is absent. Managers in these firms lack punishing 
devices (“sticks”) and downside risk in case of below-average performance, which is 
why they need to be incentivized with equity participation (“carrots”) to exert 
optimal effort. Controlling for the endogeneity of the shareholder base, I argue that 
the emergence and the magnitude of shareholder proposals are strongly related to 
both ownership- and governance structure of the firm. However, the outcome and 
the effectiveness of shareholder proposals are most likely driven by insider holdings. 
Since managers in firms with weak governance and non-competitive industries are 
likely to enjoy a “quiet life”, I argue that managers in these firms will negatively 
affect the outcome of proposals to obstruct any outside shareholder intervention into 
corporate policies. Proposals in this group of firms are therefore less likely to be 
successful. I explain the lower stock market valuation of these firms with a “lack of 
control discount” similar to the “dual-class discount” established by among others 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2009), Zingales (1995). But there is negative publicity 
of filed shareholder proposals and significant opportunity costs to deal with them 
from the managers’ side. In spite of discretion, managers in these firms are not able 
to shirk and exert suboptimal effort; therefore shareholder activism is effective. 
1.6 European Corporate Governance and Shareholder 
Value 
The question of corporate governance and control mechanisms available for 
shareholders cannot be unambiguously answered without expanding the American 
perspective to European stock markets. Corporate governance regimes and legal 
heritage can be classified into market-based and a long-term large investor-based 
system and common law and civil law, respectively (Becht, Bolton, and Röell, 
2003). The Anglo-Saxon system of corporate governance defines a corporation’s 
goal as the creation of value for shareholders – the ultimate owners of the firm. The 
continental European (German-Japanese) system however sees a corporation’s 
duties in the creation of value for all stakeholders, which ultimately affects a 
9 
 
company’s approach to shareholder value and investment horizons (Tirole, 2001). 
The motivation for this study stems from findings of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003), who find a tendency of poorly governed firms to overinvest. This however 
holds for the U.S. market – a uniform region of corporate governance and 
regulations. Internationally, anecdotal evidence from the Dutch retailer Royal Ahold 
and German automotive multinational Daimler Chrysler (after divestment of 
Chrysler in 2007 named “Daimler AG”) exemplified how shareholder pressures can 
manipulate corporate investment strategy.  
Because institutional investors show an increasing aptitude and penchant 
for the Anglo-Saxon system of corporate governance, I argue that continental 
European firms will increasingly converge towards the Anglo-Saxon model of 
corporate governance. In order to empirically test my argument, I use a unique 
dataset of investor-sensitive corporate governance quality of Europe’s 300 largest 
(FTSE EuroTop) corporations between 1997 and 2005. The European market proves 
to be an ideal experimental setting due to heterogeneous governance structures and 
regulations. I regress the investment activity of company i in region j in year t on a 
number of control variables and the corporate governance quality and find similar 
effects. This result holds in spite of differences in legal heritage and ownership and 
is robust to serial correlation. The finding is strongest for that element of corporate 
governance, which is the least regulated on a European level: the range of takeover 
defenses. Because continental European managers have to adhere to expectations of 
an international institutional shareholder base, which abides to Anglo-Saxon 
governance standards, they steer corporations more towards delivery of short-term 
value. Managers respond to this by cutting on capital expenditures and manage for 
retained earnings. 
The following chapters of this dissertation will more fully address each of 
aforementioned topics in greater detail. Both databases and the empirical testing 
methods will be thoroughly explained together with findings and discussion of 
implications of each chapter. Chapter 7 concludes this dissertation with inference 
from my research and avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Long-Term Performance of Distressed 
Firms: the Role of Class-Action Lawsuits 
and Expected Default Risk1 
 
Does shareholder litigation pay off for investors over long horizons and how much 
does the type of allegation matter? We study whether a disciplining effect occurs for 
distressed firms and their managers and examine two different groups of allegations. 
Allegations of violations of duty of loyalty effect individuals only, but duty of care 
pertains to the corporate entity. After litigation we observe a general transformation 
in firm characteristics and risk exposures, which is consistent with theory. Although 
generally negative, short- and long-term performance effects differ substantially 
between types of allegations. We observe performance reversals only in firms with 
individual directors accused of insider trading. Effects are similar for firms with 
triggering events that precede the initiation of a lawsuit. At the same time we fail to 
observe a simultaneous decrease in financial health in the form of their expected 
default frequency. Our results have important implications for regulator and 
institutional investor decision-making and monitoring strategies: whether to use 
litigation to exert control on managers, even in the presence of dual holdings of debt 
and equity.  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Corporations can obtain external financing via a contract between the firm 
as a legal entity and its prospective financiers. In the process of raising external 
capital the firm pledges its assets vis-à-vis control rights for the investors (Hart, 
1995). If a firm violates the terms of the agreement in any form, then the 
claimholders can legally enforce their rights in court. Shareholders in the United 
States—as one major group of external financiers—have the right to resort to class-
                                                          
1 This chapter is based on Bauer and Braun (2010), which is forthcoming at the Financial Analyst Journal 
under the title “Misdeeds Matter: Long-Term Stock Price Performance of Firms after the Filing of Class-
Action Lawsuits” 
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action lawsuits when they believe that their agents have violated the duty of loyalty 
or the duty of care (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Typically, regulators in the U.S. are 
fairly strict in the interpretation of managers’ duty of loyalty. The question that we 
ask in this paper is what happens to financial claimholders if these duties are 
allegedly violated.   
Recent developments in financial markets have accelerated the rate of 
class-action lawsuits. Stock market valuations, significantly above fundamental 
levels between 1998 and 2001, have resulted in the burst of the internet bubble and 
consequently a large number of dissident shareholders. Allegations during this time 
period focused on inflated stock prices, shareholder wealth-destroying mergers and 
acquisitions, false IPO prospectuses, and managerial insider trading. After 2001, the 
cases of Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and Adelphia resulted in a large 
number of governance-related lawsuits. In 2005, two of Adelphia’s family members 
were sentenced to prison and a settlement fund of $2.5 billion was established to 
benefit the plaintiff class. More recent observations include the option-backdating 
scandals and excessive risk-taking in the subprime crisis. According to The 
Economist (19 December 2007), shareholders filed class-action lawsuits on an 
“annual pace of around 270 between August and October 2007.” In 1995, the U.S. 
Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) that enables 
(private) shareholders to allege any violation of 10(b)-5 of the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act. This rule prohibits among other things any manipulative and 
deceptive practices by managers and corporations and prescribes managerial duties. 
According to Romano (1991), these can be subdivided into duty of care and duty of 
loyalty. The latter term describes fiduciaries’ conflicts of interest and requires them 
to put the corporation’s interest ahead of their own. Typically, this includes self-
dealing and related party transactions. The focus of this paper is the alleged violation 
of the duty of care, which requires the execution of “reasonable skills, diligence and 
especially taking care in board actions.” The allegation of self-interested managerial 
misconduct and the post-evaluation of poor business decisions both fall under the 
violation of duty of care (Loss and Seligman, 2004). 
Becht, Bolton, and Röell (2003) classify the threat of shareholder litigation 
as a governance mechanism. If this is true, shareholders are able to exert control 
with the initiation of lawsuits. An unresolved issue so far is the actual credibility of 
the threat and its reputational and financial costs for managers. Given that equity-
linked incentives constitute a major part of American directors’ and officers’ total 
compensation (Hall and Liebman, 1998), shareholder litigation also materially 
affects their overall pay package. According to Fich and Shivdasani (2007), there is 
also a significant amount of reputational risk at stake for managers of sued 
corporations. Can managers actually fear shareholder litigation due to materially 
longer term adverse stock price reactions?  
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In this paper, we analyze various types of allegations brought forward in a 
class-action lawsuit and their short- and long-term effects on shareholder value. In 
particular, this paper addresses the following questions. When are class-action 
lawsuit filings likely to occur and what are the immediate stock price reactions to 
them? Can we discriminate between different types of allegations and do they differ 
in returns across event windows? How do sued firms perform over a longer term and 
what is the role of a triggering event before the filing of a lawsuit? Can shareholder 
litigation discipline managers ex post and should they fear the ex ante threat? We 
adopt the perspective of an investor in a firm, who has become disgruntled with the 
firm’s stock price performance and/or who suspects illegal actions and faces the 
question of alleging violations of Rule10(b)-5 to file a lawsuit. Under what 
circumstances does it pay off for the investor and how much time has to elapse until 
performance reverses and the investor profits in the long term? Does any long term 
recovery occur at the expense of the firm’s creditors or is litigation a pure 
disciplining device? 
We document several results. Shareholder litigation occurs frequently in the 
United States. In many cases poor stock performance triggers litigation, which is 
why shareholders actively monitor managers and seek to claim damages. 
Shareholders sue corporations for a variety of reasons, which all differ in terms of 
short- and long-term shareholder wealth effects. This result is robust to alternative 
specifications and holds for a variety of event windows. Using a feasible investment 
strategy of calendar-time abnormal returns we show that a portfolio of all sued 
companies underperforms over long horizons of up to 48 months after litigation, 
after correcting for conventional risk factors. However, if shareholders sue only 
selected directors rather than the entire corporate entity, then we do not observe this 
underperformance. We explain this result as direct evidence of a disciplining effect 
on individual corporate decision-makers. Our result does not come at the expense of 
creditors in the form of a higher probability of default. The financial literature 
frequently advocates our method to produce unbiased long-term performance results 
subsequent to any form of corporate events. To the best of our knowledge, we are 
the first ones to empirically establish credible long-horizon performance of 
distressed firms facing litigation using a feasible investment strategy, which closely 
resembles shareholders’ short- and long-term horizons. 
We contribute to the literature of corporate governance, shareholder 
litigation, and long-term performance in various ways. The fact that lawsuits occur 
in response to bad stock price performance supports the empirical predictions of 
Povel, Winton, and Singh (2007). Incentives for directors to manipulate and to 
defraud are highest in boom times because shareholders’ degree of monitoring and 
vigilance is lowest. Our analysis shows that a class-action lawsuit filing against 
firms is a materially adverse event in the sense of short- and long-term performance 
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effects. Unlike Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008a&b) and Fich and Shivdasani 
(2007), we do not only measure losses borne by shareholders of firms being de facto 
charged with an SEC or AAER investigation, respectively, but focus on all firms 
sued by their shareholders. This way we can document a pure filing effect 
irrespective of the allegations’ legitimacy. Moreover, we discriminate between the 
type of allegation, which the corporation faces, and document significant 
differences. We propose a method to measure the long-term performance of sued 
companies and note that results are also highly sensitive to momentum.  
Whether and how distressed firms fare over the long term in litigation has 
important policy implications with respect to the actual costs borne by shareholders 
in the market. If stock prices do not recover over medium to long horizons this 
implies that shareholders in the aggregate market lose out and only plaintiffs and 
lawyers gain. If share prices recover but bankruptcy risk increases, then we conclude 
that there is a wealth transfer from creditors to shareholders. A major conclusion that 
emerges from our results is that class-action lawsuits appear to be a powerful tool to 
discipline managers and it has a reasonable ability to exert influence on distressed 
firms without any wealth transfer involved. Practical contributions are to help and 
steer the decision-making process of institutional investors: even the presence of 
dual positions need not deter them from using litigation as a means of exerting 
control. 
We organize this paper as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of our data 
sources and outlines our methods, which we explain further in section 3. In this 
section we also show our results of various types of long-term performance and a 
naïve version of the Merton-KMV distance to default measure. Section 4 discusses 
our findings from a corporate governance perspective and contrasts subsample 
results. Section 5 is the conclusion. 
2.2  Data and Methodology 
Our primary source of data is the securities class action clearinghouse 
maintained by Stanford Law School in collaboration with Cornerstone Research.2 In 
existence since 1996, the database includes more than 2800 companies that list 
either on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. The database also includes private and 
OTC-traded companies as well as foreign issuers (who also fall under U.S. securities 
law regulations). We hand-collect case by case information and identify seven main 
reasons for shareholders to go to court against the corporation. Table 2.1 lists these 
reasons below. In the Appendix, we provide a sample of firms in order to clarify our 
coding and grouping methods. These allegations are not mutually exclusive and can 
                                                          
2 This database is available online via http://securities.stanford.edu    
 amount to a theoretical maximum of seven allegations at the same time. We 
deliberately decide to retain cases on insider trading and related party transactions. 
Allegations of this type fall under the violation of duty of loyalty and are less likely 
to affect the whole firm. Our source of data for daily and monthly stock returns is 
CRSP. Market benchmark return and SMB, HML, and Momentum factors are from 
the website of Kenneth French. For the analysis in Subsection 3.5, we collect 
accounting data from COMPUSTAT in order to compare pre- and post-litigation 
firm characteristics; most importantly expected probability of default according to 
the methods of Bharath and Shumway (2008). 
For the purpose of isolating a true “filing effect”, we also identify whether 
any triggering event has preceded the filing of the lawsuit. We classify triggering 
events as events where a material correction of management’s earnings forecasts 
take place before the filing date of the class-action lawsuit. Alternative triggering 
events can be the initiation of a SEC investigation, self-disclosure of accounting 
problems, resignation of key executives, or severe problems in the auditing process. 
In the final sample of 650 companies during the period of 1996 to 2007, a triggering 
event preceded the filing in over 55% of the cases. In Subsection 3.4 we 
discriminate between firms with and those without triggering events.  
As can be seen in the table the annual number of class-action lawsuits peaks 
in 2002 after the bubble burst. This gives a first indication that class-action lawsuits 
are a response to decreasing stock markets. This is also in line with Povel, Singh, 
and Winton (2007) who state that managers’ incentives to manipulate are largest in 
boom times because shareholders are less vigilant. Following 2002 and the 
enforcement of Sarbanes-Oxley, we also observe a sharp increase in lawsuits related 
to corporate governance. False and misleading statements, often coinciding with 
stock price manipulation are the prime allegations brought forward by shareholders. 
Panel B shows in which industries class-action lawsuits are most prevalent. 
The four most litigation-vulnerable sectors are retail (FF9), manufacturing (FF3), 
consumer durables (FF2), and energy (FF4). Since the business equipment (high-
tech firms, etc.) sector is usually highly dependent on growth opportunities it 
surprisingly does not show up as an exposed sector in terms of litigation risk. A 
possible explanation is that high growth typically does not coincide with firms being 
large in terms of assets. Typically, large firms are sued for their deep pockets 
(DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik, 2004). We stress that our sample does not 
discriminate between ex post meritorious or frivolous lawsuits, which tend to be 
lawyer-driven. Our objective is to find a pure filing effect of a lawsuit against 
companies and to find out if the filing has merits beyond the aimed settlement 
amount. Therefore an analysis of ex post successful lawsuits only, as in Fich and 
Shivdasani (2007), can bias our results downwards. 
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2.2.1 Testable Hypotheses 
We test whether class-action lawsuits have long-term disciplining effects on 
the CEO and the firm. Shareholders use class-action lawsuits as a punishing device 
in response to underperformance and managerial malfeasance. We hypothesize that 
shareholder wealth effects (both over short and long horizons) differ between the 
types of allegation brought forward. If stock price performance does not recover 
from a short-term dip, then investors that sue a firm are better off to dispose of their 
shares and to take the settlement amount only instead of holding on to their shares. 
According to Fich and Shivdasani (2007), an out-of-court settlement is proposed in 
91% of the cases. Out of these settlements, the amounts range between $3 and $40 
million for the 25th and 75th percentile, respectively, whereas the average settlement 
amounts to $22 million. If performance recovers and outperforms the market after 
adjusting for risk over long-horizons, then the lawsuit has merits beyond the 
settlement amount that the plaintiffs originally aimed for. Long-term stock 
performance is highly sensitive to the type of allegations that the corporation faces. 
We discriminate between unlawful activities, which are likely to systematically 
affect the whole entity (violation of duty of care) versus allegations charging 
individuals (violations of duty of loyalty). We argue that individuals are more likely 
to be disciplined for their behavior than the whole firm as a legal entity. In the case 
of a whole firm, a lawsuit filing is a more disruptive and adverse event, which 
sustainably erodes investor confidence. For this group of firms, we hypothesize a 
significant long-term underperformance rather than for a group of firms, where 
individuals are charged for a violation of duty of loyalty. This reasoning results in 
the following hypothesis. 
H1: Only firms, whose individual directors are charged with violation of duty of 
loyalty, experience a disciplining effect from lawsuits. This translates into long-term 
reversal.  
Additionally, we test whether class-action lawsuits have similar negative 
stock price effects irrespective of whether the firm was already facing problems 
before the filing date – a triggering event such as voluntary self-disclosure. The 
filing of a lawsuit therefore resembles a material loss of investor confidence, which 
manifests itself as an inferior stock price performance. In this case, we hypothesize 
that it is the actual filing of the lawsuit that causes long-term performance effects 
rather than self-disclosure before the filing. 
H2: Long-term stock price performance will not differ between firms where adverse 
events trigger the filing of a lawsuit and firms, where such pre-lawsuit events are 
absent. 
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For our last hypothesis, we compare findings from the long-term 
performance of the firm’s equity to the possible expected costs, and to the firm’s 
outstanding debt. We represent this comparison with firms’ expected frequency of 
default. If any possible recovery of the share price subsequent to litigation comes at 
the expense of a significant increase in this variable, then we conclude that there is a 
wealth transfer from creditors to shareholders. We state that class-action lawsuits 
can only work as governance mechanisms and disciplining devices if such a wealth 
transfer is absent. In this case, performance reversal is a result of either management 
turnover or a change in behavior. 
H3: Performance reversals originate in a wealth transfer from creditors to 
shareholders.  
2.3 Long-Term Wealth Effects in Class-Action 
Lawsuits  
We adopt several methods in order to evaluate shareholder wealth effects 
from class-action lawsuit filings. Our general approach is the use of event studies, 
but for different purposes. We evaluate short-term announcement effects of class-
action lawsuit filings with daily returns in the classic style of Brown and Warner 
(1980). For longer horizons up to 36 months we use monthly data. We also propose 
the implementation of calendar time portfolio returns with a Fama-French risk 
correction according to Kothari and Warner (2007) and others. We further suggest 
the importance of augmenting the risk correction with a momentum factor according 
to Carhart (1997). Subsection 3.5 examines a possible wealth transfer from creditors 
to shareholders in the form of a higher probability of default. 
2.3.1 Short-Term Announcement Effect 
The cumulative abnormal returns in Figure 2.1 best depict the immediate 
stock price reaction of a class-action lawsuit filing. Using various types of methods, 
we document a unanimous decline in stock price on the filing of a class-action 
lawsuit. More importantly, we already see a significant dip in stock prices before the 
actual filing, which points at either rumors hitting the market or repercussions from 
triggering events. 
Besides the sharp stock price drop, we also fail to observe a significant 
recovery within two months following the event (up to 40 trading days). This 
finding already hints at the importance of analyzing long-term shareholder wealth 
effects. Short-term wealth effects can be documented as being quite substantial. 
Even though we see a recovery of 200-300bp from shortly after the filing until day 
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40, the cumulative abnormal returns over the whole event window are constantly 
negative. This robustness in negative performance stems from the almost 
monotonous decrease in stock price before the filing date. We could attribute the 
sharp decline in stock prices before the event day purely to triggering events. But, in 
Figure 2.2, we split the sample into firms where a triggering event has preceded the 
filing of the lawsuit versus those firms where it has not, and compare the shapes of 
the graphs. In the graph, it becomes clearly visible that firms where a triggering 
event has preceded the filing are not the only cases with a pre-event day decline in 
performance. Though somewhat weaker in magnitude, firms’ share price 
performance declines correspondingly before the event if a lawsuit comes as a 
surprise to the market. 
This case implies that we are not purely examining firms that have already 
suffered from adverse events before the lawsuit. Our findings are robust to all types 
of specifications in event study methods. We obtain qualitatively similar results 
using equally-weighted benchmarks. An attractive property of event studies that uses 
the Fama-French two-step procedure is that we can use the estimated coefficients 
and their loadings on the factors from the estimation period of daily return data. We 
use these coefficients for the computations of the expected returns during the event 
window in order to further characterize sued companies by their factor loadings. We 
do so to distinguish between firms by their magnitude of exposure to conventional 
risk factors. 
In Table 2.2 we further break down the sample by the types of allegation 
that each firm faces in court. Firms being accused of accounting fraud (Panel C) 
have by far the lowest loading on HML, which we interpret as these being extremely 
high growth firms before the filing. This stellar growth might be fueled by allegedly 
wrong accounting data. Similarly, firms facing insider trading (Panel E) allegations 
have a negative exposure to small firm risk (SMB coefficient of -0.98). This 
observation can be due to the fact that directors and officers in larger capitalized 
firms have steeper incentives (Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999). That is, if 
directors and officers can capture more upside potential from inside information, 
they are also more likely to use it. Overall (Panel A), one can conclude that sued 
firms are growth firms, which tend to be large. The latter is consistent with the 
literature on litigation, which states that shareholders target companies with deep 
pockets. In Subsection 3.4 we investigate whether these coefficients experience a 
transformation and whether stock characteristics change subsequent to the litigation. 
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As a next step to distinguish between allegation types we look at the same 
subsamples but during five separate event windows. Table 2.3 uses five different 
event windows from (-1; +1) to (-10; +10). Since average abnormal returns are 
likely to be affected by extreme values (upward or downward), we also report 
median values in parentheses to be more conservative. We check for statistical 
significance of difference of mean (median) values from zero with t-statistics 
(Wilcoxon). 
In Panel A, we can observe that “illegal business practices” show the most 
negative abnormal returns in all settings. Allegations, which are governance- or 
compensation-related (similar for “insider trading”) also result in a nontrivial 
negative announcement return. Over longer horizons abnormal returns become 
increasingly negative. We explain these findings by shareholders losing confidence 
in the firm they invest in as soon as corporate governance failures or a manager 
taking advantage of private knowledge is disclosed to the investing public. In Panel 
B, we highlight that for several event windows the stock price reaction to an 
increasingly severe lawsuit (approximated by the number of allegations brought 
forward) becomes more negative. We conclude that a more negative stock price 
reaction with more allegations brought forward can yield harsher personal 
consequences for the CEO and for the firm. If we focus on the first three rows (up to 
three allegations), the picture of decreasing cumulative returns is consistent among 
all event windows 
Table 2.2: Exposure to Risk Factors during Estimation Period 
In the table below, we depict the statistics of the exposures to the Fama-French risk factors and 
Momentum. Panels B to H comprise different types of allegations. The market benchmark for beta is the 
equally weighted CRSP universe of stocks. For details on the construction of the variables, please refer to 
Kenneth French’s website: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.   
   Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Max.  Min.  N 
Panel A: Entire Class-Action Lawsuit Sample 
BETA 1.307*** 1.290*** 0.601 4.100 -1.060 649 
SMB -0.562*** -0.440*** 1.100 2.990 -5.210 649 
HML -0.433*** -0.510*** 0.675 1.920 -1.980 649 
UMD -0.032 0.030 0.696 2.280 -3.420 649 
Panel B: Stock Price Manipulation 
BETA 1.267*** 1.260*** 0.596 3.110 -1.060 327 
SMB -0.625*** -0.460*** 1.159 2.050 -5.210 327 
HML -0.351*** -0.460*** 0.676 1.920 -1.980 327 
UMD -0.043 0.020 0.750 2.280 -3.120 327 
Panel C: Accounting Fraud 
BETA 1.486*** 1.435*** 0.566 2.900 -0.180 92 
SMB -0.457*** -0.445*** 1.007 1.970 -4.830 92 
HML -0.705*** -0.790*** 0.615 1.060 -1.960 92 
UMD 0.071 0.130* 0.449 1.270 -1.140 92 
Panel D: Illegal Business Practices 
BETA 1.342*** 1.360*** 0.547 3.140 -0.410 217 
SMB -0.516*** -0.330*** 1.103 2.050 -4.630 217 
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HML -0.286*** -0.390*** 0.678 1.920 -1.710 217 
UMD -0.065 -0.060 0.643 1.540 -2.360 217 
Panel E: Insider Trading 
BETA 1.208*** 1.235*** 0.670 2.970 -1.060 128 
SMB -0.980*** -0.665*** 1.272 1.290 -5.210 128 
HML -0.412*** -0.510*** 0.630 0.910 -1.980 128 
UMD -0.086 -0.005 0.744 1.780 -3.120 128 
Panel F: False and Misleading Statements 
BETA 1.250*** 1.210*** 0.576 4.100 -0.660 393 
SMB -0.569*** -0.480*** 1.102 2.060 -4.830 393 
HML -0.447*** -0.530*** 0.649 1.720 -1.980 393 
UMD -0.014 0.040 0.679 2.280 -2.860 393 
Panel G: IPO/SEO/Acquisition related 
BETA 1.275*** 1.240*** 0.566 2.710 -0.040 92 
SMB -0.355*** -0.265*** 0.953 2.050 -4.340 92 
HML -0.414*** -0.545*** 0.648 1.540 -1.710 92 
UMD 0.009 0.040 0.635 2.180 -3.120 92 
Panel H: Governance violations 
BETA 1.451*** 1.390*** 0.548 3.140 0.330 127 
SMB -0.398*** -0.450*** 1.009 1.970 -4.340 127 
HML -0.325*** -0.440*** 0.732 1.540 -1.840 127 
UMD -0.071 -0.090 0.669 2.180 -2.150 127 
 
In order to determine which allegations drive the return during our event 
periods, we conduct a cross-sectional regression of our event window cumulative 
abnormal returns on a number of control variables and dummies of the types of 
allegations with “stock price manipulations” as the base level. We also control for 
firm characteristics, which are shown to drive abnormal returns (Campbell, Lo, and 
MacKinley, 1997). Because all of our firms in the sample are experiencing an event, 
we need a base level of allegations to compare results to. Allegation dummies are 
included multivariately and the correlation between them does not exceed 0.32. 
Results are reported in the table below.  
In a multivariate setting, we still observe that “illegal business practices” 
results in significantly lower CAR than for the base case, especially for very short 
run event windows. For “insider trading” however, the pattern is reversed. 
Coefficients on control variables like firm size (log of total assets) and growth 
opportunities (log of market-to-book ratio) are in line with the event study literature. 
The latter as a control variable is consistently negative pointing at a short-term 
correction to fundamental values. Firm size has a mitigating effect on abnormal 
returns because larger firms are more likely to be diversified and have a larger 
shareholder base. After controlling for other factors, allegations of this type do not 
result in significantly lower CARs than in the base case. Still, for longer periods, 
they bear more negative announcement returns. 
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Table 2.3: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns  
 
Panel A in the table below investigates the same abnormal return windows for the seven types of 
allegations, which have already been defined in Table 2.1. Note that these types of allegations are not 
mutually exclusive. For the event study, we require an estimation period window of at least 60 trading 
days and a maximum of 255 for the estimation of Rm-Rf, HML, SMB, and Momentum coefficients. Day 
zero is defined as the day of the class-action lawsuit filing. In Panel B, we distinguish between the 
numbers of allegations that have been filed in the lawsuit. Median values are reported in parentheses. We 
report significance levels for a test (t-stat for mean and z-stat for median) for abnormal returns different 
from zero at 10, 5, and 1% level with *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Abnormal Return per Allegation Type 
 
Type of Allegation 
brought forward (-1,+1) (-1,0) (0,+1) (-5,+5) (-10,+10) N 
Average of all -4.33%*** -3.86%*** -2.03%*** -8.52%*** -11.57%*** 648 
allegations (-1.07%)*** (-0.89%)*** (-0.63%)*** (-4.22%)*** (-5.74%)*** 
Stock price  -5.17%*** -4.65%*** -2.53%*** -8.80%*** -13.46%*** 327 
manipulation (-1.49%)*** (-1.17%)*** (-0.85%)*** (-4.52%)*** (-7.71%)*** 
Accounting  -2.99%*** -2.43%** -1.11%* -5.69%*** -6.44%*** 92 
Fraud (-0.43%) (-0.58%) (0.11%) (-3.44%)*** (-3.80%)*** 
Illegal Business  -6.87%*** -5.95%*** -3.56%*** -12.64%*** -14.17%*** 217 
Practices (-2.41%)*** (-1.89%)*** (-1.30%)*** (-6.12%)*** (-7.29%)*** 
Insider  -4.91%*** -4.39%*** -2.23%** -9.44%*** -14.22%*** 127 
Trading (-1.42%)*** (-1.46%)*** (-0.32%)** (-4.20%)*** (-5.26%)*** 
False/misleading  -3.86%*** -3.86%*** -1.71%*** -8.79%*** -12.96%*** 392 
statements (-0.67%)*** (-0.83%)*** (-0.56%)*** (-4.00%)*** (-6.92%)*** 
SEO/IPO/  -2.78%** -2.90%*** -1.26%* -2.64% -3.94% 92 
Acquisition-  
related (-0.31%) (-0.87%)** (-0.59%) (-1.30%) (-2.14%)  
Governance  -4.58%*** -3.73%*** -1.55%** -9.42%*** -10.65%*** 128 
Problems (-1.00%)*** (-0.82%)*** (-0.45%)** (-3.30%)*** (-4.43%)***   
 
Panel B: Average Abnormal Returns per Total Number of Allegations Brought Forward 
Total # of 
Allegations  (-1,+1) (-1,0) (0,+1) (-5,+5) (-10,+10) N 
1 -2.92%*** -2.37%*** -1.73%*** -7.35%*** -9.42%*** 167 
(-0.32%) (-0.27%) (-0.42%) (-3.56%)*** (-4.75%)*** 
2 -4.47%*** -3.97%*** -1.95%*** -8.61%*** -11.76%*** 268 
(-1.34%)*** (-1.19%)*** (-0.79%)*** (-4.63%)*** (-6.54%)*** 
3 -5.83%*** -5.28%*** -2.54%*** -9.52%*** -13.74%*** 169 
(-1.74%)*** (-1.49%)*** (-0.45%)** (-4.23%)*** (-6.79%)*** 
4 -3.20% -2.77% -2.22% -9.28%* -11.42%* 34 
(-0.95%) (-0.50%) (-0.92%) (-3.66%)* (-3.91%) 
5 -5.38% -9.19% -1.68% -10.43% -9.82% 5 
  (0.70%) (-0.12%) (-0.19%) (-3.77%) (-5.25%)   
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Table 2.4: Cross-Sectional Regressions and Single Allegations 
In Panel A below, we report coefficients from cross-sectional regressions of the abnormal returns from 
the five different event windows. Every regression controls for return on assets (ROA), growth 
opportunities (Log MB), size (Log TA), change in sales over the prior calendar year, change in stock 
price over the calendar fiscal year, whether the firm is a dividend paying firm, and for industry- (Fama-
French 12) and year effects. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses and significance is indicated with 
*, **, and *** for the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. In Panel B, we restrict our sample to those firms 
only facing one allegation to isolate overlapping effects between non-mutually exclusive allegations. We 
report significance levels for tests of mean and median (in parentheses) being different from zero with the 
same annotation.  
Panel A: Cross-sectional Regression of Cumulative Abnormal Return over Different Event 
Windows on Control Variables  
type of 
allegation (-1,+1) (-1,0) (0,+1) (-5,+5) (-10,+10) 
Control Variables 
ROA -0.0200 0.0006 -0.0196 -0.0079 -0.0095 
(-0.6655) (0.0207) (-0.9549) (-0.1537) (-0.1616) 
Log MB -0.0379*** -0.0419*** -0.0189** -0.0742*** -0.0731*** 
(-3.1754) (-3.8359) (-2.3249) (-3.6638) (-3.1553) 
Log TA -0.0027 -0.0029 -0.0020 0.0042 0.0166** 
(-0.7437) (-0.8745) (-0.8103) (0.6806) (2.3214) 
Change in Sales 0.0333 0.0108 0.0421** 0.0568 0.0505 
(1.1526) (0.4079) (2.1426) (1.1586) (0.8993) 
Change in Price 0.0514*** 0.0423*** 0.0283*** 0.0506** 0.0836*** 
(3.4202) (3.0748) (2.7610) (1.9809) (2.8616) 
Dividend Payer 0.0193 0.0168 0.0001 -0.0074 -0.0465 
(1.2744) (1.2093) (0.0054) (-0.2864) (-1.5750) 
Allegation types 
Base: Stock price  
manipulation 
Accounting  0.0042 0.0012 0.0093 0.0109 (0.0222 
Fraud (0.2189) (0.0679) (0.7112) (0.3352) (0.5972) 
Illegal Business  -0.0296** -0.0328*** -0.0132 -0.0593*** -0.0300 
Practices (-2.2757) (-2.7609) (-1.4916) (-2.6914) (-1.1885) 
Insider  0.0175 0.0107 0.0175* -0.0056 -0.0304 
Trading (1.2037) (0.8062) (1.7680) (-0.2256) (-1.0778) 
False/misleading  -0.0001 -0.0154 0.0077 -0.0297 -0.0516** 
statements (-0.0077) (-1.2380) (0.8285) (-1.2861) (-1.9556) 
SEO/IPO/  -0.0013 -0.0091 -0.0020 0.0443 0.0759** 
Acquisition rel. (-0.0782) (-0.5954) (-0.1771) (1.5628) (2.3395) 
Governance  -0.0025 -0.0077 0.0119 -0.0199 -0.0119 
Problems (-0.1657) (-0.5521) (1.1458) (-0.7649) (-0.3994) 
     
Industry controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R2 0.0900 0.0930 0.0525 0.0936 0.1460 
N 512 512 512 512 512 
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Panel B: Average CARs of the Subsample of Firms with only one Allegation (N = 167) 
type of 
allegation (-1,+1) (-1,0) (0,+1) (-5,+5) (-10,+10) N 
Stock price  -3.43% -0.83% -4.88%** -10.21%** -12.93%** 13 
manipulation (-3.51%)** (-1.17%) (-2.86%)** (-6.68%)* (-8.48%)* 
Accounting  0.28% 0.42% 0.50% -2.60% -2.93% 28 
Fraud (0.30%) (0.04%) (0.48%) (-4.24%)* (-2.12%)* 
Illegal Business  -8.14%** -6.76%* -3.54% -15.91%** -13.06%** 20 
Practices (-2.08%) (-0.84%) (-0.52%) (-5.77%)** (-5.99%) 
Insider  -2.27% -1.05% -3.56% 7.34% -13.38% 1 
Trading (-2.27%) (-1.05%) (-3.56%) (7.34%) (-13.38%) 
False/misleading  -2.42%** -2.53%** -1.32% -6.76%*** -10.20%*** 96 
statements (0.23%) (0.02%) (-0.29%) (-1.74%) (-4.37%)** 
SEO/IPO/  NA NA NA NA NA 0 
Acquisition rel. NA NA NA NA NA 
Governance  -6.32% -1.97% -4.62% -6.70% -7.45% 8 
Problems (-2.55%) (-0.94%) (-2.27%) (-6.09%) (-8.25%)   
  
We stress that allegations are not mutually exclusive. Hence, overlap 
between the allegation types might blur our conclusions. In order to isolate 
overlapping effects of allegations, we have to proceed differently. For that purpose 
we also focus on the group of firms (167 in total) that only face one single allegation 
and distinguish between those. We stick to a univariate analysis of mean and median 
values. Thus, we are able to isolate the allegation types from each other so that we 
can discriminate more easily. For those 20 firms being charged with illegal business 
practices only, CARs during event windows [-5; +5] and [-10; +10] turn out to be 
quite significant with -16 and -13%, respectively. Insider trading is inconclusive 
because it almost constantly coincides with an allegation of either stock price 
manipulation and/or false and misleading statements. Therefore the sample size is 
consequently very low, which does not allow for statistically reliable inferences. We 
conclude significant differences in terms of shareholder wealth effects between the 
allegations brought forward, which gives first indications on our test of H1. 
2.3.2 Long Horizon Results 
In Subsection 3.1, we were not able to observe a clear pattern of short-term 
(two months) recovery of the stock price for firms being sued. To gain more insights 
into this result, we conduct the same analysis using monthly data and an event 
window of up to 36 months. We graphically depict the evolvement of monthly 
cumulative abnormal returns in Figure 2.3 using several methods. 
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The development from the event month zero until month three 
approximately confirms the image from Figure 2.1, namely an indication of a slight 
recovery of the stock price, which sharply reverses thereafter. After month three we 
see a gradual decline down to a minimum of -23% CAR over less than three years. 
For the entire sample of 650 sued firms (irrespective of allegation type) this is quite 
puzzling. On average, shareholder litigation does not seem to pay off in terms of 
stock price recovery. If we take the statistical validity in this case for granted, we 
can infer that shareholders aim for the settlement amount and dispose of any equity 
share in the company that they sued in the first place. However, we acknowledge 
potential statistical biases for this type of analysis. Still this preliminary result can 
serve as a crude indication of long-term shareholder wealth effects.  
2.3.3 Abnormal Returns in Calendar Time 
Long horizon event studies are not unproblematic with respect to statistical 
validity since potential misspecification of daily expected returns accumulates over 
long horizons to sizable estimation errors. Moreover cross-correlation becomes 
greater over long horizons (Kothari and Warner, 2007). The buy-and-hold abnormal 
return (BHAR) approach by Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) 
therefore uses matching firms/portfolios to calculate abnormal return for each firm 
and holding period t. Here, risk-adjustment takes place via characteristic-based 
measures. The difficulty in using this approach is that it is not a feasible investment 
approach because the total number of event firms is not known in advance (Eckbo, 
Masulis, and Norli, 2000). So, if we want to compute long-term shareholder wealth 
effects from the time of the filing date and how these shareholders perform on a risk-
adjusted basis compared to the market and conventional risk factors, we need to 
proceed differently. 
Instead, we suggest the implementation of a calendar time portfolio 
approach (Fama, 1998), which works the following way. Suppose a group of firms 
experience some common corporate event. In the sample period, firms are facing 
events that might be spread over time (T = months).  
Further assume that we want to compute price performance over period T 
following the occurrence. To do so, in each calendar month over the entire sample 
period, we construct a portfolio containing securities that experience an event during 
the previous time T. Due to the nature of the construction, the number of firms in the 
portfolio is not constant: firms exit and new firms enter each month. In this way, we 
account for all the cross-correlations of event firm abnormal returns in the portfolio 
variance. The net of risk computation of abnormal returns takes place differently. 
We regress the resulting time series of monthly returns on the Fama-French factors 
plus a momentum factor (Carhart, 1997). 
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Rpt – Rft = ap + bp * (Rmt – Rft) + sp * SMBt + hp * HMLt + up * UMDt + ept. (1) 
Where Rpt is either the equal or value-weighted return for calendar month t for 
portfolio p, which has experienced an event during the prior time T, Rft is the risk-
free rate, and Rmt is the return on the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio. The 
SMBt is the differential return between a portfolio of small stocks vs. big stocks, 
HMLt is the return differential between value and growth stocks (high vs. low book-
to-market), and UMDt is the difference in returns between prior year’s winners and 
losers. The critical variable in equation (1) is ap, which is the average monthly 
abnormal return on our portfolio of event firms over the T post event period. The bp, 
sp, hp and up are the sensitivities to market, small firm risk, the value-premium, and 
momentum, respectively. Prominent applications of this approach are Mitchell and 
Stafford (2000) and Brav and Gompers (1997). We adopt seven different holding 
periods that start from zero to six months and go up to zero to 48 months. This setup 
reflects that performance does not include the announcement return of the class-
action lawsuit filing. The first return of a company being included is always between 
the end of the filing month and the end of the subsequent month. The results are 
shown in Table 2.5 below. 
It is important to note that our results are highly sensitive to the 
incorporation of Momentum.4 As can be seen in the table, up is significant and 
negative on Momentum in all of the regressions, which seems straightforward. Our 
portfolio is strongly tilted towards prior losers, which, in the light of sued 
companies’ negative performance history, is logical. For Panel A, we note that 
underperformance diminishes over time after 18 months but still persists. For 
holding periods of six months, we observe a strongly negative monthly alpha, which 
translates into an annualized alpha of the investment strategy of almost -20%. For 
longer periods, underperformance becomes less negative. Concerning SMB and 
HML coefficients, we observe a remarkable pattern. The coefficients from the pre-
event window estimation are still both negative, which hints at sued firms being 
large firms with low book-to-market ratios (growth firms). After the event however, 
we note that these turn positive for our portfolio of sued firms. A intermediate 
conclusion emerging from this observation is that subsequent to their litigation 
charges, sued companies now behave like smaller and high book-to-market firms (an 
interpretation could be that these distressed firms are “fallen angels” in the context 
of Rauh and Sufi, 2009). Hence, not only do we observe a significant effect on stock 
prices, there is also a change in firm risk with respect to exposures to market factors. 
  
                                                          
4 Calendar time portfolio regressions using only Fama-French’s three-factor model (or CAPM only) are 
available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 2.5: Long Term Performance in Calendar Time 
In the table below, we perform Fama-French calendar time portfolio return regressions as advocated by 
Fama (1998). Panel A uses 132 observations from January 1996 until December 2006. Panel A restricts 
our sample to the all the companies sued during the time period. Panel B involves firms with lawsuits 
related to “accounting fraud”. In Panel C, the sample is the firms being sued for illegal business practices.  
Panel D involves firms facing allegations of insider trading. Panel E includes firms with governance 
problems. Characterizations are illustrated in our Appendix. Our return windows are depicted in row 1 of 
the table. Alpha represents the intercept of a regression of abnormal returns of a strategy that invests in 
litigation firms versus the market benchmark, size-, book-to-market and Momentum factors. The 
dependent variable is the equally weighted monthly percentage return on a portfolio of firms facing 
litigation during the prior 6, 12, 18, 24, 30, 36, or 48 months.  
Rpt – Rft = ap + bp * (Rmt – Rft) + sp * SMBt + hp * HMLt + up * UMDt + ept 
Where Rpt is the return on our portfolio of sued companies, Rft is the risk free rate, Rmt is the return on the 
market. The SMB and HML capture the size, book to market. The a is the intercept of the regression and 
the abnormal return of the trading strategy. The $, *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10, 5, 1, 
and 0.1% level, respectively. The t-statistics (below the coefficients) have been adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity using the White correction. 
Panel A:  
all Lawsuits 
(n=648) 
[0; 6  
months] [0; 12] [0; 18] [0; 24] [0; 30] [0;36] [0;48] 
 Parameters               
Alpha -0.017 -0.006 -0.007 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
-4.46*** -1.71* -2.02* -0.330 -0.720 -0.650 -0.600 
Beta 1.305 1.256 1.213 1.058 1.089 1.117 1.133 
13.10*** 15.30*** 16.92*** 9.91*** 14.10*** 17.64*** 19.62*** 
SMB 0.617 0.558 0.554 0.489 0.578 0.597 0.598 
5.00*** 5.09*** 5.91*** 4.37*** 7.15*** 7.93*** 8.13*** 
HML 0.353 0.341 0.396 0.140 0.208 0.241 0.241 
2.07* 2.16* 3.28*** 0.850 1.83* 2.39** 2.42** 
UMD -0.569 -0.516 -0.463 -0.427 -0.414 -0.401 -0.393 
-5.63*** -5.55*** -5.97*** -5.34*** -5.53*** -5.14*** -4.79*** 
Adjusted  
R-squared 0.730 0.725 0.750 0.728 0.782 0.795 0.804 
Panel B:  
Accounting  
Fraud (n=92) 
[0; 6  
months] [0; 12] [0; 18] [0; 24] [0; 30] [0;36] [0;48] 
Parameters               
Alpha -0.023 -0.013 -0.013 -0.010 -0.008 -0.002 -0.003 
-2.88** -2.06* -2.29* -2.18* -1.88* -0.470 -1.050 
Beta 1.761 1.644 1.641 1.508 1.303 1.141 1.193 
8.34*** 10.44*** 11.78*** 11.70*** 12.43*** 9.04*** 10.50*** 
SMB 0.639 0.607 0.604 0.621 0.642 0.664 0.616 
2.89** 3.92*** 4.57*** 4.98*** 5.63*** 6.23*** 7.70*** 
HML 0.310 0.615 0.772 0.714 0.517 0.545 0.532 
0.920 2.97** 4.06*** 4.48*** 3.61*** 3.84*** 3.82*** 
UMD -0.712 -0.719 -0.591 -0.527 -0.436 -0.402 -0.396 
-4.08*** -4.79*** -4.07*** -5.30*** -5.04*** -4.36*** -6.80*** 
Adjusted  
R-squared 0.555 0.683 0.678 0.653 0.703 0.640 0.770 
Panel C:  
Illegal  
Business  
Practices (n=218) 
[0; 6  
months] [0; 12] [0; 18] [0; 24] [0; 30] [0;36] [0;48] 
Parameters               
Alpha -0.015 -0.007 -0.007 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
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Table 2.5 continued 
       -2.33** -1.240 -1.45$ 0.270 0.250 0.580 0.590 
Beta 1.372 1.333 1.274 1.176 1.184 1.167 1.186 
7.39*** 8.18*** 11.03*** 6.82*** 13.23*** 12.69*** 14.47*** 
SMB 0.616 0.756 0.681 0.498 0.673 0.681 0.691 
2.79** 4.10*** 4.57*** 2.63** 5.13*** 5.58*** 5.74*** 
HML 0.633 0.606 0.578 0.183 0.310 0.290 0.246 
2.12* 2.50** 3.38*** 0.690 2.17* 2.17* 1.86* 
UMD -0.482 -0.528 -0.482 -0.444 -0.447 -0.456 -0.447 
-4.17*** -4.87*** -5.18*** -4.78*** -5.10*** -5.02*** -4.55*** 
Adjusted  
R-squared 0.464 0.562 0.621 0.616 0.722 0.736 0.760 
Panel D:  
Insider  
Trading (n=128) 
[0; 6  
months] [0; 12] [0; 18] [0; 24] [0; 30] [0;36] [0;48] 
Parameters               
Alpha -0.009 0.011 0.006 0.012 0.009 0.010 0.009 
-1.050 1.33$ 0.940 2.15* 1.94* 2.10* 1.93* 
Beta 1.488 1.065 1.115 0.850 0.939 0.997 1.033 
6.57*** 5.54*** 7.95*** 5.59*** 7.51*** 8.85*** 10.53*** 
SMB 1.007 0.628 0.549 0.468 0.535 0.539 0.596 
3.93*** 2.74** 3.32*** 2.88** 4.19*** 4.39*** 5.06*** 
HML 0.821 -0.127 0.015 -0.359 -0.192 -0.129 -0.071 
1.99* -0.340 0.060 -1.36$ -0.970 -0.700 -0.420 
UMD -0.754 -0.798 -0.649 -0.607 -0.561 -0.535 -0.466 
-3.26*** -3.04** -3.82*** -4.38*** -5.12*** -4.77*** -4.71*** 
Adjusted 
R-squared 0.453 0.460 0.525 0.546 0.598 0.611 0.621 
 
Panel E:  
Governance  
Problems (n=107) 
[0; 6  
months] [0; 12] [0; 18] [0; 24] [0; 30] [0;36] [0;48] 
Parameters               
Alpha -0.042 -0.022 -0.011 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 
-3.04** -2.40** -1.90* -0.470 -0.280 -0.510 -0.810 
Beta 1.661 1.533 1.326 1.161 1.192 1.185 1.269 
4.85*** 6.79*** 8.95*** 6.33*** 9.37*** 9.30*** 13.34*** 
SMB 0.679 0.706 0.737 0.487 0.635 0.623 0.585 
1.53$ 2.91** 3.75*** 2.23* 3.50*** 4.16*** 4.21*** 
HML 0.530 0.757 0.733 0.430 0.504 0.556 0.575 
1.060 2.39** 2.95** 1.35$ 2.30* 2.65** 3.13** 
UMD -0.264 -0.131 -0.351 -0.235 -0.321 -0.269 -0.327 
-0.920 -0.570 -2.82** -2.00* -3.22*** -3.21*** -4.41*** 
Adjusted  
R-squared 0.243 0.371 0.453 0.388 0.517 0.525 0.592 
 
In Panels B-E of Table 2.5, we break down our sample into four allegations: 
accounting fraud, illegal business practices, insider trading, and governance 
problems. In the case of accounting fraud allegations, firms’ negative abnormal 
returns persist significantly for up to 30 months (and stays negative afterwards, 
though not significant any more). We do not observe this result for firms in Panels C 
and D. On the contrary, alpha reverses as long as the stocks are held longer than 24 
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months for firms facing charges of illegal business practices. Though not statistically 
significant, the monthly risk-adjusted alpha of a strategy investing in firms sued for 
illegal business practices is mildly positive. For firms and directors charged with 
insider trading, abnormal returns look even more prosperous. Initially (a zero to six 
months holding period), the monthly alpha is negative but not significant. Shortly 
afterwards, the strategy starts generating positive and significant monthly alphas in 
excess of up to 1.2%. A further striking feature is this group’s exposure to HML. 
Over short holding periods, the coefficient is still positive (being exposed to value 
stocks) and it switches signs after 18 months (being exposed to growth stocks with 
low book-to-market ratio). For comparison, allegations on governance problems are 
also more likely to have a systematically negative effect on performance. Here, 
alpha over a maximum period of one year is significantly negative. We conclude 
that for these groups of firms the filing of a class-action lawsuit has a disciplining 
effect in terms of stock market performance. This conclusion lends strong support to 
our Hypothesis 1. 
2.3.4 The Role of Triggering Events before the Filing Date 
Does it make a difference if an event prior to the actual filing of the lawsuit 
triggers shareholder litigation? In other words, if the investing public is already 
aware that the firm is in a “problematic” situation before the filing of the lawsuit, 
then does the filing of the lawsuit still make a difference for these types of firms? 
And if yes, then what returns can be expected on these types of firms? We therefore 
investigate whether any disciplining effect stems from the actual litigation or if 
shareholders already were monitoring these firms beforehand. Recall from Section 2 
that we were not able to spot differences in short-term pre-event performance prior 
to the lawsuit between the aforementioned two groups. In order to investigate this 
“true filing effect”, we split our sample into those firms, which have experienced 
these triggering events prior to the filing versus those firms where the shareholder 
litigation database and the respective court documents do not document such an 
event.  
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Table 2.6: Long Term Performance in Calendar Time – Triggering Events 
We conduct the same calendar time portfolio regression as in Table 2.5 but distinguish between class-
actions that were preceded by “triggering events” (Panel A) or not (Panel B). Below we test for the 
significance of the differences in the estimated average alpha coefficients in the portfolio depending on 
their holding period. 
Panel A:  
Triggering Event  
(n=359) 
[0; 6  
months] [0; 12] [0; 18] [0; 24] [0; 30] [0;36] [0;48] 
Parameters               
Alpha -0.019 -0.007 -0.008 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
-2.88** -1.35$ -1.73* -0.050 -0.390 -0.550 -0.500 
Beta 1.294 1.180 1.098 0.920 0.983 1.035 1.031 
7.54*** 9.00*** 10.37*** 7.06*** 10.15*** 11.64*** 11.69*** 
SMB 0.650 0.720 0.699 0.634 0.694 0.734 0.759 
3.68*** 4.94*** 5.59*** 4.44*** 5.75*** 6.59*** 7.17*** 
HML 0.164 0.208 0.234 -0.102 0.057 0.125 0.110 
0.650 0.940 1.38$ -0.480 0.390 0.970 0.840 
UMD -0.425 -0.493 -0.488 -0.463 -0.448 -0.446 -0.416 
-3.81*** -4.23*** -5.76*** -4.41*** -4.65*** -4.55*** -4.21*** 
Adjusted  
R-squared 0.447 0.530 0.564 0.559 0.597 0.620 0.623 
Panel B:  
No Triggering  
Event (n=290) 
[0; 6 months] [0; 12] [0; 18] [0; 24] [0; 30] [0;36] [0;48] 
Parameters               
Alpha -0.012 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
-2.07* -0.360 -1.040 -0.530 -0.630 -0.200 -0.290 
Beta 1.305 1.197 1.270 1.199 1.141 1.109 1.148 
8.21*** 11.88*** 13.28*** 12.27*** 12.30*** 12.20*** 15.63*** 
SMB 0.600 0.435 0.469 0.417 0.472 0.482 0.497 
3.50*** 3.64*** 4.69*** 4.28*** 5.99*** 6.31*** 6.63*** 
HML 0.447 0.361 0.494 0.345 0.267 0.247 0.267 
1.93* 2.25* 3.99*** 2.90** 2.25* 2.12* 2.51** 
UMD -0.744 -0.587 -0.478 -0.427 -0.415 -0.391 -0.397 
-4.86*** -7.14*** -5.37*** -5.95*** -6.02*** -5.45*** -5.05*** 
Adjusted  
R-squared 0.615 0.671 0.687 0.721 0.743 0.746 0.774 
 
Test for  
differences  
in Alphas 
[0; 6 months] [0; 12] [0; 18] [0; 24] [0; 30] [0;36] [0;48] 
Difference Triggering  
Event vs. No Triggering -0.007 -0.005 -0.004 0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
t-stat -0.502 -0.255 -0.078 0.479 0.000 -0.150 -0.166 
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We continue to rely on the calendar time portfolio approach and also check 
for difference in average portfolio alphas by using the following formula: 
    

 	
 

	

 ,    (2) 
where p1 and p2 resemble the average alphas of the individual portfolios (triggering 
event yes or no). The n1 and n2 are the respective sample sizes of the two portfolios. 
Note that these are two mutually exclusive sample groups that only share the 
common feature of being sued by their shareholders. The results are in Table 2.6 
below. 
Although initial short- and medium-term holding period alphas are more 
negative for firms with triggering events before the lawsuit, there is not a 
statistically significant difference in their alphas from firms without a triggering 
event in the past. Hence, we fail to reject the hypothesis of similar long-term returns 
for firms whose self-disclosure of accounting problems or SEC investigations have 
triggered the filing rather than shareholders’ dissidence. According to the analysis, it 
is not fundamental events before the filing that make investors lose faith in the 
company and directors. Even though both groups of firms start off at different levels 
after 40 trading days, this difference does not manifest itself in differences in 
expected long-term returns between the groups. It seems to be the official filing of a 
lawsuit by shareholders themselves that erodes confidence. With this finding, we fail 
to reject Hypothesis 2 and conclude a “true filing effect”. 
2.3.5 The Role of Other Stakeholder Groups as External Financiers 
Closely related to the aforementioned economic effects and to employees as 
stakeholders there is an open question with respect to another important group of 
external financiers: corporate creditors. The question of how shareholders fare in the 
long-term in a class-action lawsuit also leads to the debate of the consequences for 
the sued entity’s cost of debt. Are both shareholders and creditors equally hurt or 
compensated in class-action lawsuits or is either of the groups compensating for the 
gains or losses of its financing counterpart? The value of outstanding bonds is 
among others predominantly influenced by the corporation’s value in bankruptcy 
state. Therefore, which types of allegations and class-action lawsuits are likely to put 
the firm closer to this state, and how this state relates to shareholder returns is an 
unresolved issue.  
Both issuer and issue credit ratings, as well as bond returns and yield 
spreads, are likely to capture only the effects on holders of traded debt securities. 
Not every corporation in our sample is expected to actually have publicly traded 
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debt. In fact, we are only able to obtain long-term issuer credit ratings from Standard 
& Poors (COMPUSTAT item #280) for 62% of our sample. Of those 402 
observations, 193 got downgraded but almost the same amount of firms (185) got 
upgraded or remained unchanged in their credit rating. The remaining number of 
firms must have either defaulted on or retired existing debt since information one 
year after the lawsuit filing is unavailable. Incompleteness of data is why we focus 
on a broader measure of financial health and solvency based on the expected 
probability of default. Bharath and Shumway (2008) have derived a “naïve” version 
of the KMV-Merton model that is parsimonious in its computation and shows more 
than a fair predictive power compared to hazard models and the actual KMV model 
of expected distance to default.5 The correlation with the original distance-to-default 
ranges at 0.88 and significantly predicts actual defaults on debt and bankruptcy. This 
model requires fairly parsimonious ingredients for its computation. We estimate the 
volatility of firm value σV (naïve σV) with the following formula: 
         0.05  0.25  .   (3) 
In line with Bharath and Shumway’s approach, we use the annualized standard 
deviation of daily stock returns as σE and use market capitalization (number of 
shares outstanding times share price) as E. The F, the face value of debt, is debt in 
current liabilities (COMPUSTAT item #34) plus one-half of long term debt 
(COMPUSTAT item #9). The resulting volatility of firm value is our addition to the 
naïve distance to default (naïve DD) measure, which is computed the following way:  
 
/ !"#.$ &'() *+,-&'() *+√- ,    (4) 
where the associated probability of default equals: 
πnaive = Ν(- naïve DD).     (5)            
Here, Ν(·) equals the cumulative standard normal distribution function. In order to 
capture the effect of a shareholder initiated class-action lawsuit filing on a possible 
increase of the expected probability of default (under which creditors as financial 
claimholders suffer), we split our sample into two distinct time periods. Our pre-
lawsuit period spans from 270 trading days until 21 days before the filing. This is 
motivated by the fact that we want to reasonably isolate increases in volatility in 
stock prices from rumors or possibly triggering events.  
  
                                                          
5 Note that the actual KMV-Merton model involves a far more complex iterative estimation procedure 
compared to the simplified version of Bharath and Shumway (2008). 
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Our post lawsuit estimation period starts at 21 trading days and goes up to 
270 after the lawsuit. Here we would like to isolate repercussions from the lawsuit 
filing, possibly even from the media. For robustness we also include the lawsuit 
period up to 20 days after the filing. We use daily data in order to compute 
volatilities and cumulative returns prior and after the lawsuit event. Further, we 
require balance sheet information of the firms for the amounts of outstanding debt 
and equity. Data on financial stability and default probabilities is further 
supplemented with ratios of cash to assets, net worth to assets, leverage, Tobin’s Q, 
EBIT to Assets, and book-to-market. Since the estimation procedure requires full 
availability of stock price and company characteristics, our sample size reduces from 
650 to 556. The statistics portraying financial variables before and after the lawsuit 
filing can be found in Table 2.7 below. 
Several key figures from the table are worth addressing. Most importantly 
the probability of default of 12.09% before the lawsuit filing is already considerably 
higher than the unconditional 8.95% as reported in Bharath and Shumway (2008). 
Their sample pertains to an average of monthly data for all U.S. firms between 1980 
and 2003 for which there is complete data. This key finding lends credibility to why 
we call these firms “distressed”. Moreover, the probability of default does not 
increase after the lawsuit filing. This finding means that any potential recovery 
and/or long-term disciplining effect does not come at the expense of creditor groups 
in the form of a higher default probability. We therefore conclude a disciplining 
effect, which in our setting rejects Hypothesis 3. 
In order to further add to the notion of “distress”, we also check for 
transformations in other important variables, which are among others input variables 
for the computation of the expected default probability. We complement these by 
Tobin’s Q, book-to-market, net worth to assets, and cash to net assets. The former 
two variables are standard measures of the market value of a firm’s assets relative to 
its replacement value and book value of equity relative to its market value, 
respectively. The last two variables can be referred to as measures of borrower 
quality (Massoud, Nandy, Saunders, and Song, 2009). In order to examine how the 
firm’s operation might be affected by the lawsuit, we also look at EBIT relative to 
assets. It is therefore intriguing to examine how these variables change from the pre- 
to the post-lawsuit period. We note a significant decrease in Tobin’s Q combined 
with an increase in the firms’ book-to-market ratios in the year after the lawsuit. 
This lower market valuation might hint at the fact that these firms are “shunned” by 
investors. We further observe a sharp decrease in profitability (as measured by 
EBIT/Assets) and net worth. This non-negligible reduction lends further credibility 
to the notion that our sample of firms that are facing litigation is significantly 
distressed. Cash and leverage ratios do not point at any evidence of serious 
restructuring activities subsequent to the litigation. Note that the sample size of firms 
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with complete information has decreased by 98 firms from 556 to 458. Our results 
might be an artifact of a potential selection bias in the number of firms in the sample 
since we are comparing them only to firms that have complete post-litigation data. 
Still, if we investigate the expected default probability before the lawsuit initiation 
of only those companies that lack sufficient post-lawsuit data, then their expected 
default probability is statistically indistinguishable from our original sample of all 
sued firms (12.09% vs. 12.34%). However, if we expand the estimation period for 
naïve DD and include the 41 trading days prior and subsequent to the lawsuit filing 
the expected probability of default jumps from 12.09 to 16.96%. This value is more 
than twice as high as the value for the COMPUSTAT universe between 1980 and 
2003 and resembles a significant risk to the financial health of the firm.  
In Panel C, we also distinguish between class-action groups and time 
periods. Here, we only focus on πnaïve and the annualized volatility of equity (σE) 
since these variables change on a daily basis. By this classification we observe that 
results are fairly sensitive to the extension of the sample period by 41 trading days 
until the start of the post-lawsuit period. We further note that in the post-lawsuit 
filing period, the measure of πnaïve is invariant in comparison to the distinction of 
allegation types. If the company is facing allegations for the violation of duty of 
loyalty (i.e. insider trading allegations), then we observe the lowest expected default 
probability both prior and after the lawsuit filing compared to violations of duty of 
care. The former group also bears the highest pre-lawsuit annualized volatility, 
which is in line with managers increasing firm risk. Since their compensation is 
likely to include option packages, an increase in volatility (the options’ Vega) is in 
managers’ best interest. Only for this allegation do we observe the strongest decline 
in σE. When we contrast firms with and without triggering events, we conclude that 
the naïve KMV-Merton model seems to have some predictive power for the 
occurrence of financial distress. Firms without a triggering event have an almost 
50% higher probability of default over firms where a triggering event has taken 
place. With respect to the sharp decrease of πnaïve in firms facing accounting fraud, a 
possible explanation might be closer monitoring and more conservative management 
subsequent to litigation. 
2.4 Possible Explanations and Practical Implications 
How can we reconcile our results with shareholders’ motivations to sue 
companies and possible long-term disciplining effects? According to Coffee (2005), 
class-action lawsuits occur more often in the U.S. due to the differences in 
ownership structure and shareholder base. Consequently, minority shareholders and 
the managerial labor market are the ultimate disciplinary mechanism for corporate 
control. The latter is not the central topic of this paper and shareholder proxy 
contests occur very rarely and with limited success (Mulherin and Poulsen, 1998). 
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According to Peng and Röell (2008a), litigation is the central punishment device 
available for shareholders, and distinguishes the U.S. capital market from other 
markets. The question then becomes: who benefits from this punishment and what 
are its effects? Are there any long term merits in terms of disciplining and learning 
for the shareholder and the firm or do claims only center around the settlement 
amount and potential damages? Who gains and who suffers if shareholder litigation 
puts firms into potential distress? With respect to illegal insider trading claims, our 
analysis provides clear evidence of a disciplining effect. If selected individuals 
rather than the whole firm are sued, then over the long-term the effect lessens and 
even reverses into positive abnormal returns. A potential explanation might be that 
the firm is closer to financial distress in the form of possible default. Although we 
find decreases in market valuation and operating performance, our analysis in 
Subsection 3.5 rejects this explanation. We find that the probability of default 
actually decreases after the filing of a lawsuit. This observation actually benefits 
both groups of financial claimholders and a wealth transfer is absent. 
Concerning insider trading due to stock price manipulation, several issues 
are worth addressing. We acknowledge that the communication of company 
information to investors is essential to signal a healthy condition to the market. 
When this communication is taken to deceptive extremes, managers violate their 
duty of loyalty. The possibility for this process to hold requires the assumption that 
stock prices do not fully reflect leeway for manipulation (Peng and Röell, 2008b). 
However, investors tend to be uncertain about the manager’s true ability to move the 
stock price effectively. This uncertainty does not hold if accounting fraud as a firm-
wide systematic malpractice is alleged. Illegal business practices and accounting 
fraud are de facto systematically adverse events that affect the entire corporation, 
which seems to erode investor confidence on a more permanent basis. With respect 
to the latter, the naïve probability of default is highest, which indicates a more 
adverse systematic effect on the corporate entity. Though not the central topic of this 
paper, it might be interesting to investigate long-term performance differentials 
between firms being sued for insider trading before and after Sarbanes-Oxley 
(SOX). Since SOX penalizes managerial insider trading to a higher extent, investors 
might interpret the violation of duty of loyalty to be particularly grave if heightened 
personal liability have not prevented managers from self-dealing. 
In this paper, we have viewed the pre- and post-lawsuit filing periods as 
times of “distress”, which have triggered shareholders’ dissidence. The question 
whether corporations that face shareholder litigation are truly under distress is worth 
addressing. Conventionally, the academic literature distinguishes financial from 
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economic distress.1 Our paper focuses on self-inflicted financial distress, which does 
not pertain to an increase in liabilities that erodes solvency levels. Our measure of 
expected probability of default in shareholder litigation cases is more likely to be 
determined by (our approximation of) the volatility of asset value and its past 
cumulative returns rather than an increase in leverage beyond debt capacity. An 
observation, which is in line with the observation of prior literature on financial 
distress, is the sharp decrease in operating performance subsequent to litigation (cf. 
Table 2.7). This decrease hints at serious indirect costs of litigation for the firm, 
which are close to the values of Andrade and Kaplan (1998). The discussion about 
costs also brings U.S. back to the initially raised question of management-borne 
costs of shareholder litigation. Since in our case of shareholder litigation, top 
management is truly responsible for the inception of financial distress, an efficient 
managerial labor market should replace the incumbents. Ultimately the question 
whether financial distress is a self-inflicted product of individuals (as in our cases of 
litigation), or a result of systematic economic shocks, or industry factors determines 
the future viability of the enterprise. Our long-term performance differential between 
firms being sued for insider trading versus firms sued for firm-wide malpractices can 
be explained in the following way. Insider trading can be more easily pinned down 
to individuals, whereas accounting fraud and/or illegal business practices is more 
likely to be a product of many. In the case of insider trading, the observed action of 
the lawsuit or reputational costs discipline existing managers, or a more efficient and 
ethical management replaces the incumbent managers. In the latter case, new 
managers are aware of the prior lawsuit, which their predecessors faced, and this 
information set deters them from any self-dealing actions. 
We further document shareholder wealth effects for firms that face 
accounting fraud allegations. In a recent study, Kedia and Philippon (2009) 
demonstrate that subsequent to the disclosure of fraud (implicitly the filing of the 
lawsuit in our case, and eventually the final verdict) firms typically shed labor and 
capital to become more productive. This results from the high growth period (also 
shown by our strongly negative HML loading in Table 2.2) in which wrong 
accounting data encompasses high levels of investment and the hiring of additional 
employees. In general, by comparing Tables 2.4 and 2.6, we encounter the same 
pattern as predicted by Kedia and Philippon’s model. Firms in our sample 
experience a transformation from a negative to a positive SMB coefficient. Besides, 
most of our sample firms (exception illegal insider trading) develop into fallen 
angels. The HML coefficient turns from strongly negative into a positive coefficient. 
Still, at least in our analysis, the true long-term economic effects of accounting fraud 
and higher productivity do not materialize into higher expected returns.  
                                                          
1 See Senbet and Seward (1995) for a survey of the literature. Almeida and Philippon (2007) have derived 
a model of (risk-adjusted) costs of financial distress 
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In case the corporation has already been facing problems before the filing 
date in terms of self-disclosure or legal investigation by third parties, it suffers 
additionally from the filing of the lawsuit by its shareholders. This is documented by 
the lack of significantly different alphas between this group and a group without a 
pre-filing triggering event and the fairly isomorphic patterns before the actual 
lawsuit filing. Even though these two groups can be fundamentally different, they 
still share the common feature that both groups are being sued by their shareholders. 
Therefore, we conclude that the lawsuit per se and not any pre-filing events drives 
the long-term post event performance. 
We suggest several main directions for further research. What seems 
important is to further evaluate the performance until the filing of the lawsuit. As we 
have seen in Figure 2.1, the market is substantially contaminated with rumors, which 
result in a stock price drop before the filing, and then gets further aggravated by the 
eventual filing. Still, we also observe a similar pattern for event firms in which a 
triggering event is absent. Alternative analyses could also shift the investment date 
of the calendar time portfolios further in time. However, this shift has the drawback 
of not reflecting the investor’s perception at the time the investor decides to file the 
lawsuit and to possibly bear additional costs (unless the entire stake is sold). An 
open question remains on the role of the out-of-court settlements or, alternatively, 
the final verdict or dismissal dates. It will be interesting to relate immediate stock 
price reactions on these dates to the affected firms in our sample. Due to the 
resolution of uncertainty subsequent to these dates, we interpret this to be generally 
good news for the market. Nevertheless, we expect differences between allegation 
types and the potential severity in terms of the upcoming lawsuit. As a final point 
the relation between the violation of duty of loyalty, management turnover, and 
disciplining effects remains unexplored. Is long-term performance reversal a product 
of a replacement of incumbents or is there a serious deterrence effect for the insiders 
who stay in charge? 
Moreover, open questions remain whether initiated lawsuits are costly for 
the shareholders and whether they are the only punishing device to resort to. By 
construction our research is U.S.-centered in the sense that class-action lawsuits are 
a frequently occurring and truly American phenomenon. Although recently 
regulated by the PSLRA, there is still an ongoing debate on whether the regulation 
has made the merits matter more or less in these lawsuits. Although, Johnson, 
Nelson, and Pritchard (2007) state that the merits matter more after the introduction 
of PSLRA, Choi (2007) concludes the opposite. Our sample starts after the 
introduction of the PSLRA so that we do not have the opportunity to distinguish 
between periods. In our research, we deliberately ignored whether the initiation of a 
lawsuit of ex post has been meritorious or not. 
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We also document a few limitations. Event study methodology until so far 
is unfortunately still only a crude way to measure true security price performance 
subsequent to corporate events. Especially in volatile pre-event estimation windows, 
betas are likely to be mis-estimated and expected returns misspecified. A significant 
fraction of our firms facing class-action lawsuits come from the period between 
2001 and 2003. This rather turbulent market environment is likely to produce 
misstated betas, which only depend on past returns. More sophisticated approaches 
by, for example, Cosemans, Frehen, Schotman, and Bauer (2009), could sharpen the 
precision of the beta estimation by weighing between conditioning economic 
variables and past returns. 
Despite the appealing simplicity of using calendar time portfolios in our 
analysis, the asset pricing literature is so far not unanimous with respect to an 
accepted model of risk-adjusted performance (Ritter and Welch, 2002). Therefore, it 
is likely that any research on long-term post-event performance is sensitive to the 
methods employed. We do not take a stance on which asset pricing model produces 
the most precise results but motivate our approach from economic experience. The 
role of liquidity and investor recognition subsequent to materially adverse corporate 
events might play a role and is subject to further research. 
2.5  Conclusion 
In this paper, we provide the first credible evidence of the costs and gains 
for shareholders and creditors from litigation against distressed firms subsequent to 
the violation of duty of care and/or of loyalty. The question of performance 
subsequent to the filing of a class-action lawsuit ultimately determines whether 
shareholders hold on to their shares and bet on a recovery of the stock price. The 
alternative is to sell off the equity stake in the firm and either to take an out-of-court 
settlement, or wait for a final verdict. Our analysis shows that a recovery of the stock 
price highly depends on the type of allegation brought forward, the time horizon, 
and the estimation technique of long-term performance. Whether a stock price 
recovery kicks in and how potential shareholder losses materialize ultimately has 
important policy implications for securities market regulators. We do not only 
address shareholders’ role in our analysis but also focus on the firm’s expected 
probability of default in order to capture potential effects on creditors as the other 
major group of external suppliers of capital. Answering this question has important 
implications for institutional investors as lead plaintiffs that might have dual 
positions in stocks and bonds in the firms they take to court. Our analysis shows that 
investors with dual holdings should not be deterred from resorting to lawsuits. 
For allegations involving the corporate entity as a whole, we conclude that 
the event is highly disruptive. In the short run, the filing of a class-action lawsuit is a 
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materially adverse corporate event where long-term economic and financial effects 
depend on the nature of the allegations. Still, it remains to be seen how the role of 
class-action lawsuits as a governance mechanisms will evolve in the future and 
whether shareholders will continue to resort to this disruptive mechanism. 
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Appendix: Sample of Original Allegation Types 
Keywords for our coding into seven allegation types are underlined and marked in italics. 
Insider Trading Allegations (violation of “duty of loyalty”) 
Ascend Communications Inc. (CUSIP: 043491). Filing date: 2 December 1997 
“[…] The original Complaint charges defendants with violating federal securities and state laws, 
including Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Section 11 of the Securities Act of 
1933, by engaging in an illegal scheme and deceptive course of conduct designed to inflate Ascend's 
stock price through positive statements concerning Ascend's business, earnings and its growth prospects, 
despite the fact that, at the time the statements were made, defendants knew, or recklessly disregarded, 
but failed to disclose to investors, that sales of Ascend's advanced modem products would all but cease 
because of, among other things, serious software and firmware problems. The defendants' scheme 
allowed Ascend's officers and directors to sell their Ascend shares at enormous gains, exceeding $40 
million in proceeds.” 
Taken from: http://securities.stanford.edu/1011/ASND97/ 
 
Accounting Violations/Illegal Business Practices (violation of “duty of care”) 
Symantec Corporation (CUSIP: 871503). Filing date: 7 January 1997 
“[…] The original complaint alleges that during the Class Period, defendants engaged in a fraudulent 
scheme and course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit on all persons who purchased or 
otherwise acquired Symantec stock. As set forth hereafter, these false and misleading statements included 
statements about (1) Symantec's new Windows 95-related utility software products known as Norton 
Navigator, Norton AntiVirus and Norton Utilities; (2) Symantec's Enterprise products; (3) Symantec's 
sales in Europe; and (4) other aspects of Symantec's business. Furthermore, Symantec's financial 
statements for its first and second quarters of fiscal 1996 (ended June 30 and September 29, 1995) were 
false and misleading in violation of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.”  
Taken from: http://securities.stanford.edu/1013/SYMC97/ 
 
Illegal Business Practices/Governance problems (violation of “duty of care”) 
Duke Energy Co. (CUSIP: 26441C). Filing date: 23 May 2002. 
“[…] The original complaint alleges that Duke failed to disclose that it was engaging in electricity trades 
involving simultaneous purchases and sales of power at the same price, overstated Duke's revenues in its 
public SEC filings and elsewhere by including in such revenues sums received in connection with such 
simultaneous purchases and sales of power, and failed to disclose that Duke did not have in place 
sufficient management controls to prevent Duke's traders from engaging in simultaneous purchases and 
sales of power at the same price. The complaint further alleges that Deloitte & Touche violated the 
common law by certifying Duke's financial statements and by allowing its unqualified opinion to be 
incorporated by reference into Duke's filings with the SEC despite the fact that such financial statements 
and filings were materially misleading in that they materially overstated Duke's revenues by counting as 
revenue sums received in connection with simultaneous purchases and sales of power at the same price. 
After the foregoing became known to the public, the complaint alleges, Duke stock tumbled to as low as 
$32.89 on May 21, 2002, down from a class period high of $47.74.” 
Taken from: http://securities.stanford.edu/1024/DUK02-01/ 
47 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Sued or Glued – How To Align The 
CEO?1 
 
 
We argue that class-action lawsuits are an important disciplining mechanism 
available to dispersed shareholders. In our view, the ex ante threat of a lawsuit 
(“sued”) limits the potentially dysfunctional behavior of CEOs that is triggered by 
stock option incentives. Our empirical results show that the likelihood and severity 
of class-action lawsuits is higher, the greater the component of stock option 
incentives driven by corporate governance factors. Furthermore, we document that 
the relation between governance-induced option incentives and the occurrence of 
class-action lawsuits is less pronounced after the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
(SOX) Act in 2002. We conclude that SOX offers an additional external disciplining 
threat for managers engaging in excessive risk taking that is triggered by 
governance-induced incentives and entrenched boards. Our findings have important 
policy implications for shareholders and external monitors with respect to the 
optimal design of CEO incentive schemes (“glued”). 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In this paper, we examine to what extent dispersed shareholders use class-
action lawsuits as a disciplining mechanism. In a system characterized by dispersed 
ownership, as is the case in the United States, CEO incentives are predominantly 
provided via equity incentives (Hall and Liebman, 1998; Core, Guay, and 
Verrecchia, 2003). Although equity incentives help to align the incentives of the 
CEO with those of the owners of the firm (“glue”), these incentives are not 
uncontroversial. It has been argued that the non-linear payoff associated with stock 
options especially has an effect on excessive risk taking and stock market 
                                                          
1 This paper is based on Bauer, Braun, and Moers (2009) 
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manipulation (for example, Peng and Röell, 2008b). Given that these activities are 
costly to shareholders, it is important to understand what disciplining mechanisms 
shareholders have at their disposal to limit these activities. Blockholders like 
institutional investors can revert to shareholder activism (“voice”) or threaten to sell 
the stock (“exit”) to push for governance changes. Although there is debate about 
whether these mechanisms are at all effective (Gillan and Starks, 2007), they are 
clearly unavailable to dispersed shareholders. We argue that, with dispersed 
ownership, class-action lawsuits are an important disciplining mechanism to limit 
dysfunctional CEO behavior due to stock option incentives. In essence, the threat to 
sue helps to restore the “glue component” of equity incentives and thus better align 
incentives. 
CEO compensation lies at the heart of the principal-agent conflict in 
corporate governance. Because CEOs themselves are not the owners of the 
corporation that they steer, their objectives have to be aligned with shareholders’, 
who are the ultimate owners. In their seminal paper, Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
argue that CEOs lack enough incentives, and therefore need more equity incentives 
in order to exert optimal effort. In their view, the relation between pay and 
performance is simply too small to provide significant incentives for the manager. 
Ever since, executive stock options have become increasingly popular because they 
tie management compensation to the degree of wealth creation for shareholders. Hall 
and Liebman (1998) and Core and Guay (2002) have hitherto pointed out that equity 
incentives and, in particular, stock options are the dominant components in CEO pay 
packages in the U.S. 
Stock option compensation is popular for at least three reasons. First, from 
the firm’s perspective, it offers a favorable accounting treatment compared to cash-
based compensation, at least for the time period under investigation here (see Carter, 
Lynch, and Tuna, 2007). Second, from the manager’s perspective, capital gains from 
equity based compensation are taxed to a lower extent than personal income derived 
from a regular salary. Third, from a shareholder perspective, equity compensation 
(either via stocks, stock options or a combination of both) can be a powerful 
incentive for tying management compensation to shareholder wealth creation. This 
is confirmed empirically by Core and Larcker (2002), who document a significant 
increase in performance and valuation of firms adopting mandatory stock option 
plans—so called “target ownership plans”. Kato et al. (2005) conclude that the 
introduction of executive stock options in Japan has brought significant 
improvements in terms of operating performance. Thus, well-designed incentive 
plans are “consistent with the creation of shareholder value” (Kato et al. 2005, p. 
460). Moreover, Coffee (2005) points at institutional investors putting pressure on 
firms to adopt stock option plans. 
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Despite the obvious benefits of equity incentives, the literature on corporate 
governance critically questions whether these are (unanimously) achieved. In 
particular, some claim that certain governance mechanisms such as the market for 
corporate control are inadequate and provide CEOs with the ability to influence their 
own pay. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) find that in “poor” corporate 
governance structures, managers can set their own remuneration packages, which 
ultimately leads to inferior performance. With the use of survey data, Géczy, 
Minton, and Schrand (2007) further establish that companies with weak shareholder 
rights (a high G-index) induce excessive managerial risk-taking because managers’ 
equity-based compensation can be seen as a call option on the firm’s assets, where 
the value of the option increases with volatility. The authors find that directors of 
companies with a high G-index tend to engage more in speculative trading—instead 
of hedging—for their own benefit rather than the company’s. They note that a 
distinctive feature of a “speculating” versus a “non-speculating” firm is the use of 
short-term equity incentives. 
These findings indicate that some governance structures provide the CEO 
with discretion. If this is exploited, the manager receives “excessive” option 
compensation and has excessive risk-taking incentives. If the CEO aims to 
maximize his compensation he will bargain for option incentives and increase firm 
risk.2 But shareholders as residual claimants to the firm’s cash flows become 
discontent about excessive risk-taking by the manager. The reason lies in 
informational asymmetries and market frictions, which inhibit outside shareholders’ 
inference on the true state of the firm. The situation in our paper is therefore a 
variant of Miller and Rock’s (1985) proposed model of investment and dividend 
policy. The crucial difference is that market participants are unable to infer an 
optimal (in this case Fisherian investment) firm policy. Existing shareholders can 
potentially benefit from this and sell their shares at high prices but managers can 
time the release of information strategically. As a consequence neither existing nor 
outside shareholders are aware of the true state of the world. We interpret this form 
of risk-taking and behavior as harmful to outside and existing firm shareholders and 
beneficial to corporate insiders.3 
Although a solution to this problem might be to simply change the 
governance structure, this is incredibly difficult to achieve. Large shareholders 
might be able to induce pressure on management in the form of "voice" or "exit" 
                                                          
2 Even though a risk-averse manager with discretion might find it optimal to set his own pay to safe cash 
compensation, we assume that this does not hold in the presence of asymmetric information. This 
situation covers the possibility that the manager has the flexibility to influence the stock price and 
consequently capture the upside of his performance-sensitive payoff. This setting finds theoretical support 
in Peng and Röell (2008b). 
3 By construction the equity-aligned manager gains in this situation because he can time his selling 
strategy. 
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(Gillan and Starks, 2000; Edmans, 2009). But an active blockholder can also 
“overmonitor” the CEO and thereby induce him to exert suboptimal effort (Burkart, 
Gromb, and Panunzi, 1997). By construction, these actions are not available to 
dispersed shareholders with small ownership stakes—at least their credibility and 
impact is dwarfed by blockholders’ actions.4 As a result, small investors have two 
alternatives according to Becht, Bolton, and Röell (2003). On the one hand, a proxy 
fight, which allows rebellious shareholders to remove corporate boards protected by 
takeover defenses (Comment and Schwert, 1995), is seldom used (Mulherin and 
Poulsen, 1998). On the other hand, shareholder suits have recently received 
mounting attention. Shareholder suits (or class-action lawsuits) can be initiated by a 
single shareholder, if shares have been bought at allegedly inflated prices and stock 
market performance has been consequently poor and contrary to management’s 
(positive) statements. In 1995, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(PSLRA) was put into place, which enables shareholders to allege any violation of 
Rule 10(b)-5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. This rule proscribes, among other 
things, “the intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud with misstatements of material 
fact made in connection to financial condition, solvency and profitability.” In this 
paper, we argue that the threat of a class-action lawsuit is a disciplining mechanism 
in case prior governance mechanisms have failed, or are not available, or are 
inefficient. Since our database spans the post-PSLRA period, the heightened 
pleading requirements for plaintiffs, which discourage frivolous lawsuits that are 
triggered by lawyers’ incentives rather than shareholders’ (Johnson, Nelson, and 
Pritchard, 2007), lends further credibility to our argument. 
A closer look at the United States’ institutional environment reveals that the 
occurrence of shareholder litigation and the use of incentives are intertwined. 
Historically, shareholder litigation is more prevalent in the United States than in 
other financial markets. Even though studies differ, each shows a rapid increase in 
financial statement restatements. One important characteristic that contrasts the 
United States as a regime of dispersed ownership to concentrated stock market 
regimes is a stronger reliance on variable compensation such as executive stock 
options and equity sharing programs (Coffee, 2005). On the one hand, this has 
increased the 2001 mean CEO pay to four times the level in the beginning of the 
1990s but on the other hand it has also led to a focus on managing for short-term 
equity value (Hall, 2003).5 5 If at some point shareholders believe they have been 
misled according to Rule 10(b)5, they can take corrective action by suing the firm. 
                                                          
4 We stress that even some institutional investors do not dispose of the options of “exit” and “voice.” This 
is because they are low-turnover (high-trading cost) indexed funds (Bushee 1998) and/or funds, which 
find active monitoring too costly for other investors to free-ride on the activist’s monitoring effort 
(Admati and Pfleiderer 2009) 
5 In 2001 the equity component of total CEO compensation for the S&P 500 industrial companies 
constituted 66%. 
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Recent developments in financial markets have accelerated the occurrence of class-
action lawsuits. The burst of the internet bubble has resulted in a large number of 
dissident and discontent shareholders. According to The Economist (19 December 
2007), class-action lawsuits were filed on an “annual pace of around 270 between 
August and October 2007”. We note that the United States as a system of dispersed 
ownership plays a special role. In fact, class-action lawsuits are initially filed 
predominantly by individual rather than institutional investors.6 
We proceed with the empirical analysis of our main theoretical argument in 
three steps. In the first step, we seek to address whether stock option incentives are 
driven by governance factors in addition to traditional economic determinants. 
Although a relation between governance factors and stock options is no evidence of 
suboptimality, our purpose is also not to seek such evidence. We seek to identify 
that component of stock option incentives that is likely driven by discretion executed 
by the CEO and can as such be interpreted as “excessive.” To achieve this purpose, 
we follow the methods used by Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) and more 
recently by Bowen, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2008) and focus on governance-
induced option incentives. 
In the second step, we analyze the consequences of these governance-
induced option incentives with respect to the occurrence of class-action lawsuits 
acting as a disciplining threat to managers. We interpret the occurrence of a class-
action lawsuit as a proxy for the enforcement of a governance mechanism, the threat 
of which disciplines management ex ante. The probability of a class-action lawsuit 
in this study is very much like the probability of CEO termination in turnover 
studies (among others Yermack, 2006b). As a result, we hypothesize that the 
likelihood of class-action lawsuits is higher the greater the component of stock 
option incentives that is driven by corporate governance factors. 
In our last step, we examine whether the demand for class-action lawsuits 
to act as a disciplining threat to CEOs is time-varying. The passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act in 2002 has introduced higher personal penalties for CEOs who are 
accused of price manipulation. Inarguably, the enforcement of the Act has changed 
the institutional and legislative landscape for corporations and managers. The 
introduced personal liability of directors and officers poses an additional threat, 
forcing CEOs to manage in the shareholder interests in order not to be personally 
sued. This additional threat acts as a cost-efficient substitute for class-action lawsuits 
after SOX. As a result, we hypothesize that the relation between governance-induced 
option incentives and the occurrence of class-action lawsuits is less pronounced 
                                                          
6 The random sample of 128 firms (20% of our total sample) in our sample of class-action lawsuit firms 
shows that 82% of the lawsuits were initially filed by individual investors with the remainder being 
initiated by pension funds, trustees, and other companies. 
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post-SOX compared to pre-SOX, because SOX introduces a substitute disciplining 
mechanism. 
Our empirical results are consistent with the theoretical arguments put 
forward here and provide several contributions to the literature. First, by combining 
two strands of research our paper contributes to the literature on shareholder 
litigation and CEO compensation. We interpret class-action lawsuits as a governance 
mechanism available to minority shareholders in order to monitor the CEO. We 
document that certain elements of corporate governance bear a significant 
incremental explanatory power in determining CEO equity-based incentive levels. 
These governance-induced levels of option incentives exhibit a strongly positive 
influence on the probability of being subjected to a class-action lawsuit and thus to 
shareholders taking action. Not only does this component of equity incentives affect 
the likelihood of being sued, it also drives the severity of lawsuits in terms of the 
number of allegations that the corporation faces. Assuming the manager is aligned 
with equity implies that he inevitably cares about the stock price. We state that 
lawsuits are at least successful in punishing the equity-aligned manager ex post due 
to negative stock price effects irrespective of the type and legitimacy of the 
allegation. Thus, our paper rejects the claim of Armour et al. (2009), who state that 
lawsuits in the United States are comparatively ineffective in enforcing private law. 
Second, our interpretation of a class-action lawsuit as a governance 
mechanism is in contrast to previous studies that interpret it as a “bad performance 
event.” For example, Peng and Röell (2008a) use one specific type of class-action 
lawsuit as a proxy for price manipulation. Such an interpretation conceptually 
ignores the disciplining potential of class-action lawsuits that we put forward in this 
paper. However, more importantly, interpreting class-action lawsuits as bad 
performance events is inconsistent with the empirical results provided in this paper. 
If class-action lawsuits were merely bad performance events, then we should only 
observe a drop in class-action lawsuits due to SOX (intercept effect). The finding 
that the relation between governance-induced option incentives and the occurrence 
of class-action lawsuits changes due to SOX (slope effect), is consistent with class-
action lawsuits acting as a governance mechanism. 
Third, our findings have important implications for shareholders, 
policymakers and external monitors in designing CEO incentive schemes. We 
emphasize the relevance of class-action lawsuits as an available governance tool and 
monitoring mechanism for small investors. A further contribution is that this effect 
is significantly less pronounced after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and has 
introduced higher personal penalties for directors being eventually convicted of 
financial fraud. We complement Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007), who point out 
a positive valuation effect for SOX. Despite being criticized for being increasingly 
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burdensome for companies to comply to SOX, we hence present a benefit; a 
disciplining mechanism in Sections IX, XI, XIII, which impose higher penalties for 
financial fraud and insider trading committed by directors and officers. We conclude 
that SOX offers an additional external disciplining threat for managers engaging in 
excessive risk taking due to excessive incentives and entrenched boards. 
In the context of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), we also offer an 
additional explanation for the higher valuation of “well-governed” companies. 
Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008a & b) show that class-action lawsuits and possible 
SEC enforcement actions have materially adverse effects on managers and the 
companies as well. According to our results, companies with weak shareholder 
rights have potentially discretionary compensation schemes and therefore face a 
higher litigation risk. This higher risk causes a lower stock market valuation. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we 
describe the data, the construction of the main variables and our empirical analysis. 
Section 3 provides evidence of the association between governance structures, 
managerial discretion, and equity incentives. Here, we also show how equity 
incentives relate to the occurrence of class-action lawsuits and the potential 
severance pay from them. We further investigate the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
with respect to class-action lawsuits triggered by equity incentives. In Section 4 we 
discuss our results in a governance and regulatory context. A brief conclusion 
follows. 
3.2  Data and Empirical Approach 
3.2.1  Class-action lawsuit data 
We obtain our information on class-action lawsuits from the website of 
Stanford Law School, which—in collaboration with Cornerstone Research—
compiles data on the filing date, number and identification of lead plaintiffs, trial 
outcome (if applicable), and the reason why shareholders sue the company.7 Since 
the initiation of the PSLRA of 1995, shareholders have the right to take managers to 
court upon violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Violations like these 
typically are the dissemination of false and misleading statements, artificial stock 
price inflation (for the purposes of accelerating mergers and takeovers and 
benefiting from IPOs and SEOs at the expense of new shareholders), accounting 
violations, insider trading, or even governance problems. Since 1996, the database 
includes more than 2,600 companies, which are listed on the NYSE, AMEX or the 
NASDAQ. The database also includes private and OTC-traded companies as well as 
                                                          
7 This database is publicly available via http://securities.stanford.edu. 
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foreign issuers (who consequently also fall under U.S. securities-law regulations). 
Unlike Fich and Shivdasani (2007), we decide not to exclude class-action lawsuits 
related to insider trading because we consider governance- and compensation-related 
cases to be particularly relevant to our study.  
We hand collect case by case information and identify seven main reasons 
for shareholders going to court against the corporation. These reasons are listed in 
Table 3.1 below. Note that these allegations are not mutually exclusive. We also 
identify whether a so-called “triggering event” has preceded the class-action lawsuit 
filing. We classify triggering events as events where a material correction of 
management’s earnings forecasts takes place before the filing date of the class-
action lawsuit. Alternative triggering events can be the initiation of a SEC 
investigation, self-disclosure of accounting problems, resignation of the CEO/CFO, 
or severe problems in the auditing process. This definition aligns with our 
previously alluded to concept that these are consequences of performance and risk-
taking rather than a prequel to lawsuits. In our final sample of 650 companies, a 
triggering event precedes the filing in over 55% of the cases. Thus, we already 
observe that a sizeable fraction of the initiated shareholder suits comes as a surprise 
to the market. 
As can be seen in our table, we observe some clustering in the types of 
allegations. Failure to disclose or the dissemination of false and/or misleading 
information belong to the most prominent allegations. Typically both actions are 
performed with the motive of share-price manipulation. Observing more than 90 
cases of insider trading confirms the study of Aboody and Kasznik (2000) and 
Yermack (1997), who conclude that CEOs strategically time the issuance of 
information according to the exercise date of their options. Allegations of insider 
trading in our sample typically include statements such as “management reaping 
proceeds from own equity (options) holdings and taking advantage of their inside 
information before releasing adverse facts to the public.” The average number of 
allegations per class-action lawsuit between 1996 and 2007 is 2.15, the maximum 
number of allegations is six.8  Class-action lawsuits typically emerge when 
shareholders are notoriously discontent with stock market performance or if they 
feel they have bought shares at inflated stock prices. In Panel B, we point out that 
shareholder litigation is likely to be initiated by private and minority shareholders. If 
we investigate the number of class-action lawsuits per year in our database next to 
the major stock market indices’ performances, we note an intriguing pattern. 
                                                          
8 On May 6, 2005, a class-action lawsuit was filed against the internet company findwhat.com (formerly 
known as Miva). Here, the total number of allegations amount to six. Reference to this can be found at: 
http://securities.stanford.edu/1034/FWHT05_01/. 
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If we investigate the number of class-action lawsuits per year in our 
database next to the major stock market indices’ performances, we note an intriguing 
pattern. In times of rising stock prices, shareholders appear to be indifferent about 
managers’ potential wrongdoing. We can see this in Figure 3.1, for example, 
between 2005Q1 and 2007Q1. This is in line with the paper by Povel, Singh, and 
Winton (2007), who note that manager incentives to commit fraud are highest in 
times of good performances in stock price. This is due to the fact that shareholders’ 
vigilance and monitoring incentives are lower in bull markets and higher in bear 
markets. After 2001Q1 we note a sharp increase in the number of class-actions 
reacting to the declining stock market. This increase might also be partly due to 
prominent governance failures and accounting scandals since then. We also observe 
the increase in the amount of shareholder litigation in the very recent past (2007Q1 
through 2008), which is attributable to the subprime crisis. Previously, there had 
also been a sizeable amount of class-action lawsuits related to the option backdating 
scandal, which was disclosed in 2006. 
Since 2000 several firms have restated their earnings in order to put right 
the wrongful accounting that followed backdating (The Economist 2006).15 Note 
that, typically, management is sued with a small time lag upon revelation of negative 
news (triggering events). The average time between a triggering event and class-
action lawsuit filing is 90 days (median 28). For 310 companies in the sample this 
duration is basically zero because there was no triggering event reported. In order to 
investigate influences of corporate governance and compensation elements on class-
action lawsuits, we construct two samples for which we find sufficient data. Our 
additional databases are further outlined in the next section. 
3.2.2 Governance data, financial control variables and equity 
incentives  
Our second data source stems from the RiskMetrics Group, which compiles 
annual corporate governance information on all companies in the S&P 1500 in the 
United States.16 Hence, we investigate a broad index, which spans all types of 
industries and sectors. Data is purely descriptive and neither rating nor weighting 
algorithms are included. The governance variables are composed of board 
characteristics, elements of board composition and variables of takeover defenses, 
and entrenchment mechanisms. Our list of governance variables can be found in our 
Appendix A and for most definitions and explanations we refer to Appendix A of 
                                                          
15 In the article “Dates from Hell,” The Economist has put forward that in mid-2006 up to 60 firms were 
subject to SEC investigation for their timing of executive stock options 
16 This database was formerly known as the Investor Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC) and was, 
among others, the foundation of “Corporate Governance and Equity Prices” by Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003). 
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Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). We control for financial-, firm- and case-
specific factors with data from COMPUSTAT. Our inclusion of control variables is 
based on prior research by Peng and Röell (2008a), Fich and Shivdasani (2007), 
Agrawal and Chadha (2005) and Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996). Our database 
on executive compensation is from Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp The variable of 
equity-based incentives can be interpreted as follows: Assume the CEO holds a 
portfolio of stocks and stock options in the company that he manages. How much 
does the value of this portfolio change with a one percent change in the firm's stock 
price? We subdivide this variable into equity-only, stock-option-only, and total-
portfolio-value incentives. We take the natural logarithm of this value for 
distributional convenience. Please refer to Core and Guay (2002) to find a detailed 
description of equity incentives.  
3.2.3 Estimation Method 
We regress the level of equity incentives (total-wealth, stock-option or 
stocks-only) on economic factors and governance variables. We seek to explore if 
some governance structures provide the CEO with discretion to negotiate for 
“excessive” option packages. We identify these as the portion of incentives that is 
not driven by economic (firm) variables: 
  01'2  3'  ∑ 567896,'2  ∑ :;<;,'2=  >'2?;@=A6@= ,  (1) 
where EIit equals the level of equity incentives (total-equity incentives, stock-based 
equity incentives or stock-option equity incentives) and Govj,it equals a set of 
governance variables as shown in Appendix A. The Ck,it-1 is a vector of control 
variables (also lagged by at least one period), which are described in Appendix B of 
this paper. From this regression, we predict the level of “excessive” CEO equity 
incentives, which are determined by corporate governance structures of firm i in 
excess of economic determinants. We compute these for every CEO in our sample 
for every year t. By using this method, we follow Core, Holthausen, and Larcker 
(1999). We use governance-induced equity incentives (via stock and/or stock 
options) and interpret these as managers’ propensity for risk-taking and discretion. 
Each predicted variable follows from a set of governance variables that resemble 
managerial discretion and entrenchment. In total, our prediction model will generate 
three different levels of equity-based incentives for each CEO in each year. Our 
focus will be on the stock-option component of the following model: 
   01BCDE'  ∑ 5F6 789DCGHGID'   (2) 
As can be seen, EIpredi is the predicted level of equity incentives from 
governance variables. We distinguish our approach from other authors (Peng and 
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Röell, 2008a; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006) who use the raw level of equity 
incentives or the residual from the regression. In our setup, we are able to isolate the 
component that is driven by insiders and managerial discretion. These predicted 
values will enter into a next-stage regression, when we estimate the probability of 
being sued based on financial and control variables and the predicted equity 
incentives. As a next step we analyze the consequences of governance-induced 
option incentives with respect to the occurrence of class-action lawsuits. For that 
purpose we estimate the conditional probability of being sued and claim this to be 
the enforcement of a governance mechanism to pose a disciplining threat to CEOs. 
Our control sample is constituted by firms that are not sued in that respective year 
and the year before. We adopt a binary probit model of the following form: 
   JC8KL  1|O  )PQR=)PQR,    (3) 
where Y = 1 if a class-action lawsuit was filed against the firm and zero otherwise. 
The x is a vector of the equity-based incentive variables and control variables, and β 
is the vector of parameters. Control variables are lagged by at least one period just 
like the variable of equity-based incentives. Our estimation method is a maximum 
likelihood and we control for year- and industry effects. In order to retain model 
parsimony, we opt for the Fama-French 12-industry classification. This approach 
has already been used before by Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) for firms’ 
decisions to go public versus staying private. 
3.3 Empirical Analysis 
3.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
We start our analysis with univariate comparisons of two sample groups. 
One constitutes the class-action lawsuit sample, which we outlined in Section 3.2, 
but our control sample incorporates the universe of non-sued RiskMetrics-rated 
(S&P 1500) companies. The statistics of our sample can be found in the table below. 
Restricting the analysis to firm characteristics and operating performance, we note 
several observations. Firms being involved in class-action lawsuits are significantly 
larger, both in terms of total assets and sales revenue. We also notice a slightly better 
operating performance in terms of three-year sales growth but a significantly worse 
stock price performance over the prior calendar year. Firms in the class-action 
sample are also significantly more likely to have engaged in a major new equity 
issuance (more than 10% increase in stockholders’ equity) in the prior calendar year.
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This is in line with shareholders’ allegations of managers exploiting overvalued 
share prices in order to reap personal benefits in seasoned equity offers or to use the 
inflated stock as an “acquisition currency.” The latter allegation is in line with 
managers’ tendency to engage in empire-building activities. Firms hardly differ in 
terms of operational performance or investment behavior, because cash flow to total 
assets, return on assets, and trailing three-year capital expenditures relative to total 
assets, respectively, hardly differ among the two groups. Focusing on the 
governance variables, our samples do not display strong differences. Most 
importantly the G-index (the number of entrenching and shareholder-unfriendly 
provisions) is in fact lower (resembling stronger shareholder rights) for class-action 
lawsuit firms. However, sued firms are more likely to have suffered from so-called 
“governance incidents.” The degree of director and officer voting rights is 
significantly higher in the control sample and well above 5% for both samples. Ofek 
and Yermack (2000) note that in more than half of America’s corporations’ directors 
own less than 5% combined of a firm’s outstanding shares.  
However, most relevant differences between the class-action sample and 
the control sample are in the sensitivity of the CEO’s wealth to changes in the stock 
price of the company. This sensitivity captures in our setting the extent to which the 
CEO can benefit from an artificial inflation in the share price of his company. The 
level of equity incentives is significantly higher for all three measures of equity 
incentives. We distinguish between total equity incentives, equity incentives derived 
from the CEOs’ stock portfolio, and payoffs derived from the option portfolio. For 
all three variables, we note statistically significant differences in both mean and 
median values. An exponential transformation of, for example, mean values of total 
equity incentives of 6.39 and 5.48 (for class-action and control sample, respectively) 
results in a total wealth change for the CEO of  $599,922 USD and  $239,846 USD, 
respectively for a 1% change in the stock price. For the stock option part, we find 
$211,896 USD and  $79,154 USD, hence almost three times higher. 
3.3.2 Announcement returns of class-action lawsuit filings 
We now turn to the potential of shareholder litigation to penalize the CEO 
ex post and the credibility of the ex ante threat. Prior research has established that 
the announcement of a class-action lawsuit filing leads to a negative return on the 
event date. The magnitude varies though depending on which types of lawsuits are 
included. In general, we identify four empirical studies that amplify the credibility of 
threatening to file class-action lawsuits ex ante and the disciplining power ex post. A 
summary of each of these studies and the central message to each of these papers 
can be found in Table 3.3 below. 
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In their sample Fich and Shivdasani (2007) find two-day cumulative and 
announcement day abnormal returns ranging between -5.95% and -3.25%, 
respectively. These can even be lower depending on whether an Accounting and 
Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER) was issued or the settlement amount has 
been in the top quartile. The authors stress that there are also significant reputational 
effects at work in the form of lost directorships on other boards. Similar conclusions 
emerge from Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008a). Focusing on companies that face 
SEC and DOJ enforcements between 1988 and 2006, 93% of the 2,206 individual 
directors in 788 companies had lost their jobs by the end of the enforcement period. 
In a related paper with a shorter time window, Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008b) 
state that the initiation of class-action lawsuits is usually preceded by triggering 
events. Their study on these triggering events between 1988 and 2002 yields an 
abnormal return of -25.24%, the subsequent class-action lawsuit was -7%, and 
further criminal (SEC) investigation announcements result in -14.4%. The 
aforementioned three studies all investigate performance effects conditional upon 
the fact that allegations have been ex post legitimate. Using the exact same database 
as our study, Bauer and Braun (2010) document significantly adverse announcement 
effects irrespective of the legitimacy of allegations. In their study, the authors 
basically only distinguish between the type and the number of allegations generated 
by shareholders. The more allegations brought forward, the more severe is the stock 
price reaction. Controlling for economic factors, the authors find a particularly 
pronounced negative stock-price reaction for illegal business practices and insider 
trading allegations. Our conclusion from these studies on class-action lawsuits is that 
there is a credible ex ante threat to the equity-aligned manager. 
3.3.3 Quarterly Performance Volatility Between Groups 
From Table 3.2, we conclude that companies facing a class-action lawsuit 
have superior past operating performance. If CEOs and directors have an 
“excessive” incentive and discretion to inflate stock prices by issuing materially 
false information, failing to disclose adverse events, taking on irresponsible project 
risk, or by manipulate accounting numbers, this will result in higher performance 
volatility. When true performance is disclosed the stock price adjusts back to 
fundamental levels from its heavily inflated levels. Managers holding a substantial 
amount of stock options have an incentive to increase the volatility of performance. 
Therefore we analyze the firms’ past operating and stock-price performance and 
volatility in greater detail. We use COMPUSTAT Quarterly files and data from 
Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp in order to investigate how class-action lawsuit 
firms’ prior operating-performance volatility compares to our control sample. The 
results are shown in Table 3.4.  
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In Panel A, we report variables from COMPUSTAT Quarterly files of the 
12 quarters prior to the class-action lawsuit filing. This time frame also incorporates 
the period long before the mean date of the triggering event. Here, the stock price, 
earnings per share (EPS), and price-earnings (PE-) ratios of the class-action group 
bear a significantly higher volatility than the control group both for mean and 
median values (except for EPS). Hence, both operating performance as well as stock 
market performance are more volatile for sued companies compared to our control 
sample of non-sued S&P 1500 firms. This observation is reinforced by the 60 month 
stock-price volatility in Panel B. This value stems from ExecuComp and is the 
baseline for the calculation of the CEO stock option value. 
Since a call option’s value increases with volatility we can also easily see 
the CEO’s motives for increasing the company’s performance volatility. This 
finding is in line with Géczy, Minton, and Schrand (2007). The remaining values in 
Panel B confirm the operating performance patterns from Table 3.2. Companies, 
which were subsequently sued, display substantially larger growth in sales, 
operating performance, and net income. We stress the findings from Table 3.2 that 
these two types of companies do not differ significantly in terms of firm age, so that 
the possible explanation of young aspiring high-growth companies can be ruled out. 
Hence, from the inspection of raw data we can already confirm that firms who are 
sued by their shareholders have superior operating performance but are subject to 
higher firm risk prior to the filing date. Allegedly, managers forge performance 
levels or earnings forecasts and revenue recognition turn out to be too aggressive. 
These values are robust to controlling for industry effects (univariate sorts relative to 
the Fama-French 12-industry median values) since class-action lawsuits might tend 
to cluster in specific sectors that are marked by high growth and largely intangible 
assets. 
3.3.4 Who and What Determines Equity Incentives? 
As a next step we investigate whether equity incentives are determined by 
discretion and prevalent corporate governance structures. In the simple contracting 
perspective, shareholders determine managers’ compensation levels and equity 
incentives—possibly through the board of directors (Bertrand and Mullainathan 
2000). If managerial discretion does not have an influence on the CEO to bargain for 
steep incentives, then corporate governance must not have any significant 
incremental explanatory power over financial and firm characteristics. If we do 
observe that governance variables and board characteristics effect (option) 
incentives, then we interpret this portion of incentives as “excessive.” Effectively, 
this procedure boils down to testing whether shareholders eventually care about 
incentives as long as they are driven by managerial discretion. Below, we regress the 
logarithm of equity incentives on a rich set of financial and governance variables—
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holding constant year- and industry effects—using OLS with heteroskedasticity 
consistent standard errors. 
Economic reasoning and prior research motivate our inclusion of control 
variables (economic factors) and governance variables. Firm size (log TA) and 
book-to-market (log M/B) have already been shown in Core, Holthausen and 
Larcker (1999) to have a significantly positive impact on equity incentives. We also 
control for firm age and institutional ownership (IO), prior operating performance 
(return on assets, ROA) and whether the firm is a dividend paying firm. In 
accordance with the literature we define institutional ownership as follows: 
     1S'2  ∑ T'62U '@= ,    (4) 
where sijt is the share s that the institutional money manager j holds in company i at 
time t. Our governance variables of interest are the following. As shown by Stulz 
(1988) the relation between inside ownership and firm value is in theory curvilinear. 
With low managerial ownership, interests are not fully aligned with shareholders’, 
and managers act on their own behalf. 
If managerial ownership increases beyond a certain threshold, alignment becomes 
entrenchment. Even further increasing managerial ownership makes managers close 
to entrepreneurs where money spent on perquisites harms them in increasing 
proportion. We therefore complement the level of aggregate D&OHOLDINGS with 
a quadratic term to capture non-linearity. Similar to the variable IO, we define 
D&OHOLDINGS as: 
   V&SX8YEZG[T'2  ∑ 9'62U\'@= ,   (5) 
where vijt represents the fraction of voting rights v that the director or 
officer j holds in firm i at time t. A further governance variable is board size. 
Yermack (1995) has shown that companies with larger boards are worth less on the 
stock market, therefore we expect a significant effect for this variable as well. 
Measures of CEO power (CEO duality and director indemnification contracts) and 
extraordinary remuneration (severance agreements and golden parachutes) help to 
augment the CEO’s bargaining position and amplify managerial discretion. We seek 
to identify which of these are significant determinants in the granting of equity 
incentives. 
  
68 
 
Table 3.5: Economic and Governance Determinants of Equity Incentives 
This table shows results of three different ordinary least squares models. Model (1) regresses equity 
incentives of the CEO’s option and stock portfolio on economic determinants, firm characteristics, board 
characteristics, board compensation and director powers elements. Equity incentives (equity incentives 
total) are defined as the change in wealth of the CEO’s portfolio for a 1% change in the firm’s stock 
price. For details on the variable construction please refer to Core and Guay (1999, 2002). Model (2) 
performs the same regression with equity incentives of the CEO’s stock portfolio (equity incentives stock) 
as the dependent variable, and model (3) has the regressor as the CEO’s option portfolio (equity inc. 
options). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using White’s method (1980). All models 
adjust for industry and time effects; the coefficients are omitted from the output for practical reasons. For 
the definitions of the variables, please refer to Appendix A and B. Significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level 
is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
(1) 
Equity incentives 
Total 
(2) 
Equity incentives 
Stock 
(3) 
Equity incentives 
Options 
 coefficient S.E. coefficient SE coefficient S.E. 
intercept 0.8105*** (0.1439) 0.3419 (0.2390) -2.1953*** (0.1653) 
Economic determinants       
LOG(TA) 0.6528*** (0.0112) 0.6285*** (0.0206) 0.5724*** (0.0158) 
LOG(MB) 1.1796*** (0.0347) 1.1391*** (0.0622) 0.7837*** (0.0473) 
Cash Flow/TA 0.4157*** (0.1228) 0.2829 (0.2065) 0.2599* (0.1493) 
Return on Assets -0.3730*** (0.0937) -0.0673 (0.1778) -0.5364*** (0.1177) 
Dividend payer -0.3103*** (0.0280) 0.0349 (0.0511) -0.5490*** (0.0385) 
Change in sales 0.0632 (0.1065) -0.0314 (0.1940) 0.2650** (0.1284) 
Change in price3YR 0.0052*** (0.0006) 0.0042*** (0.0012) 0.0088*** (0.0008) 
CAPEX/TA3YR 0.6284** (0.2432) 1.0994** (0.4312) 0.4617 (0.3638) 
Firm Age -0.0058*** (0.0007) -0.0100*** (0.0012) -0.0010 (0.0009) 
Institutional Own.% -0.2938*** (0.0833) -0.9346*** (0.1386) 0.9160*** (0.0940) 
Governance factors       
Gov. incidents 0.0925*** (0.0211) 0.1509*** (0.0368) 0.0183 (0.0255) 
GINDEX 0.0168*** (0.0060) 0.0299*** (0.0099) 0.0011 (0.0078) 
D&O Holdings 0.0302*** (0.0019) 0.0411*** (0.0030) -0.0092*** (0.0019) 
(D&O Holdings)2 -0.0001*** (0.0000) -0.0002*** (0.0000) 0.0000*** (0.0000) 
Indep. Directors% -0.0036*** (0.0009) -0.0048*** (0.0017) 0.0062*** (0.0012) 
# of committees -0.0860*** (0.0165) -0.1033*** (0.0272) 0.0613*** (0.0203) 
Diversity % -0.2059** (0.1017) -0.3429** (0.1737) 0.2556* (0.1354) 
Board size -0.0480*** (0.0063) -0.0525*** (0.0110) 0.0104 (0.0086) 
Class. Board 0.0662** (0.0269) 0.1177** (0.0465) 0.1528*** (0.0353) 
Dual CEO? 0.6665*** (0.0267) 1.1527*** (0.0478) 0.0951*** (0.0342) 
Lead Director? -0.1220*** (0.0316) -0.2133*** (0.0543) 0.0288 (0.0437) 
Delaware Firm? -0.0039 (0.0240) -0.1287*** (0.0432) 0.1889*** (0.0306) 
Golden Parachute? -0.0171 (0.0298) -0.3897*** (0.0503) 0.5559*** (0.0373) 
Severance Pay? 0.0116 (0.0459) -0.3564*** (0.0839) 0.3859*** (0.0580) 
Director Indemn.? 0.1581*** (0.0369) 0.2586*** (0.0646) 0.0826* (0.0453) 
ASQR full model 0.5722 0.3376 0.4836 
ASQR economic det. 0.4753 0.2317 0.4446 
incremental ASQR 0.0968 0.1059 0.0390 
Nobs 9120 9120 9120 
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In Table 3.5, we regress both the total level of equity incentives (1) and the 
two components thereof, namely equity incentives of stock (2) and equity incentives 
of options (3), on a number of economic and governance variables. As expected, 
economic variables have a significant effect on equity-based incentives for the CEOs 
in the sample. Firm size as well as the market-to-book ratio have a significantly 
positive effect on the level of equity incentives for the CEO. The same holds for the 
three-year trailing stock price performance (change in price 3Y). We proxy for firm 
age with the first listing date on CRSP and observe a negative and significant effect 
with respect to regressions (1) and (2) but not in (3). Prior corporate investment 
(CAPEX/TA3Y) activity is significant and positively related to equity-based 
incentives. This finding relates to a study by Grinstein and Hribar (2004), who 
analyze whether weak boards grant significant bonuses to their CEOs contingent on 
their M&A and investment activity. However, this finding only holds for regression 
models (1) and (2). Observing a significantly positive coefficient for the percentage 
of institutional ownership (IO) on option incentives confirms the argument by 
Coffee (2005). He justifies the strong reliance on stock option compensation for 
America’s CEOs as coming from institutional pressures. 
Turning to governance characteristics, we observe that numerous variables 
contribute to explaining the incremental level of equity incentives. CEO duality has 
a strongly positive effect on equity incentives in all three specifications. The same 
holds for the presence of a classified board, which has a significantly positive effect 
in all three regression models. These findings also support Faleye’s (2007) 
conclusion that managers use classified boards to grant themselves a higher pay-for-
performance sensitivity. Bates, Becher, and Lemmon (2008) argue that institutional 
investors and joint shareholder initiatives are increasingly opposed to the adoption of 
classified boards. The percentage of independent directors on the board and total 
number of committees has a negative effect on the level of equity incentives. 
However, for regression (3) this effect is reversed. Remarkably, the diversity 
percentage of the board also has a significant effect: the influence is positive for 
stock option incentives and negative overall. We also note the significance of 
severance payments and golden parachutes. With those already in place, they both 
reduce equity incentives and increase stock option incentives. It is also quite 
astonishing to find numerous state legislations exhibiting a significant influence on 
pay-for-performance sensitivity. The Delaware incorporation effect (Daines, 2001) 
is apparently also present for executive compensation.17 Similarly, director 
indemnification contracts significantly increase the level of equity incentives, even 
though this finding is only mildly significant for stock option incentives. These 
                                                          
17 In his paper, Robert Daines establishes robust evidence that Delaware firms are valued significantly 
higher than other firms. He explains this finding by the surprising evidence that Delaware companies are 
more likely to receive takeover bids, even though Delaware legislation is known to be particularly 
protective for incumbent management 
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contracts indemnify directors and officers from certain legal expenses arising from 
their misconduct. The respective cost of this indemnity to shareholders can be seen 
as an incentive for corporate governance (Core 1997, 2000). A further intriguing 
result can be found for a company’s G-index. This result can be observed in column 
(3), which means that high G-index (weak shareholder rights) firms grant 
significantly more option incentives to their CEOs than low G-index firms (strong 
shareholder rights). Judging from the additional explanatory power (incremental 
adjusted R2 from governance variables) of the model, we conclude that governance 
structures contribute to the level of equity incentives in excess of firm-level and 
economic determinants. As expected, CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity is to 
some extent negotiated with managerial discretion. The question is about the 
consequences for shareholders and for the firm itself. 
3.3.5 The Consequences of Insider Determined Equity Incentives 
In order to test our second hypothesis we predict the incremental level of 
equity incentives in excess of economic and control variables. We use this 
governance-induced portion of performance-sensitive compensation in order to 
evaluate the probability of facing a class-action lawsuit. Core, Holthausen, and 
Larcker (1999) use the predicted level of excess cash and variable compensation to 
investigate future operating and stock-price performance. In our paper, we take a 
different point of view in that managerial discretion from governance structures 
drives incentives, which trigger shareholder litigation and, hence, investors’ attempt 
to monitor the managers after prior governance mechanisms have failed or are 
unavailable. 
We observe offsetting effects of stock and stock-option-based equity 
incentives. The negative coefficient of equity incentives stock and the significantly 
positive coefficient of equity incentives options imply that the overall equity 
incentive coefficient is nonsignificant. We find that incremental stock-option equity 
incentives, which are set by corporate governance structures and discretion, 
positively affect the likelihood of being sued below the 5% level (z-stat. 2.31). The 
opposite holds for stock only equity incentives. This variable is not significant. 
Apparently, incentives and variable compensation, which CEOs with little restriction 
can negotiate for, increase the level of risk-taking. This risk-taking triggers a 
governance mechanism channeled through allegations of securities fraud. 
Shareholders attempt to discipline the CEO ex post. 
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Table 3.6: Governance-Induced Equity Incentives 
This table shows results from three binary probit regression models per panel, where the dependent 
variable always equals one if a class-action lawsuit (CA) was initiated in that year against company i, and 
zero otherwise. Our estimation method is maximum likelihood. All models have the same set of economic 
determinants to predict the probability of becoming subject to a class-action lawsuit. We predict equity 
incentives as the incremental part of equity incentives that is explained by governance variables in excess 
of economic determinants. The Z-statistics are based on cluster-robust covariances according to 
Huber/White. The models include year and industry fixed effects but coefficients are not reported for 
practical reasons. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
 Probit: CA yes/no Probit: CA yes/no Probit: CA yes/no 
 coefficient S.E. coefficient SE coefficient S.E. 
intercept -3.7095*** (0.2339) -3.7262*** (0.2275) -3.5440*** (0.2468) 
Accruals -0.1692 (0.6118) -0.1625 (0.6123) -0.1576 (0.6068) 
Return on Assets 0.0309 (0.3467) 0.0305 (0.3468) 0.0221 (0.3456) 
LOG(M/B) 0.1602** (0.0643) 0.1604** (0.0643) 0.1718*** (0.0644) 
LOG(TA) 0.1719*** (0.0179) 0.1711*** (0.0176) 0.1687*** (0.0175) 
Cash Flow/TA -0.3124 (0.4361) -0.3096 (0.4362) -0.3257 (0.4307) 
Dividend pay -0.1689*** (0.0619) -0.1678*** (0.0620) -0.1740*** (0.0620) 
Equity issue -0.1268* (0.0701) -0.1265* (0.0701) -0.1271* (0.0700) 
Change in sales 0.0045** (0.0021) 0.0045** (0.0021) 0.0047** (0.0021) 
Change in price -0.0107*** (0.0009) -0.0107*** (0.0009) -0.0108*** (0.0009) 
CAPEX/TA3Y -0.5442 (0.6438) -0.5315 (0.6441) -0.4656 (0.6447) 
       
Equity incentives 
total -0.0266 (0.0496)     
Equity incentives 
stock   -0.0310 (0.0318)   
Equity incentives 
options     0.1448** (0.0648) 
       
McFadden R2 0.1510 0.1512 0.1523  
Nobs 11961 11961 11961  
 
We take the analysis a step further and also conduct a Poisson integer-count 
data regression of the number of allegations (that is, to proxy for the severity of the 
allegations and the likelihood of the allegations being well-founded), which are 
brought forward by shareholders on the same set of control, governance, and CEO 
equity-based incentive variables. In doing so, we test whether not only the likelihood 
of a lawsuit is affected by option incentives but also its potential severity. Recall 
from our earlier analysis that a higher number of allegations increasingly penalizes 
the equity-aligned CEO. We therefore approximate for a lawsuit’s severity by the 
number of allegations brought forward by shareholders. A higher number of 
allegations might increase the potential final settlement amount. A Poisson 
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regression model is a generalized linear model with a "log" link function and 
Poisson distributed errors (Greene 2003). This model attributes to a count response 
variable Y and a Poisson distribution whose expected value depends on predictor 
variables x in the following way:  
logE[Yit | xit] = βixit,   (6) 
where xit is a vector of regressors describing the characteristics of an observation 
unit i (a company or executive compensation variable) during a given time period t, 
and Yit is the observed event count (number of allegations) for unit i in the class-
action lawsuit filing.18 Our variables also have a significant explanatory power if we 
go beyond analyzing whether a firm becomes sued or not; it also determines the 
potential magnitude of the class-action lawsuit measured by the number of 
allegations brought forward by shareholders. 
In Table 3.7, we observe that the severity of a potential class-action lawsuit 
also is higher (hence also its “punishment”) in firms with high option incentives in 
the presence of managerial discretion. That means if strong option incentives induce 
managers to act for personal benefits, then the severity of class-action-lawsuit 
allegations also increases and possibly also personal consequences for managers. 
The potential severity of class-action lawsuits might in fact also lead to higher 
chances of success and possible legal enforcement. Karpoff, Lee, and Martin 
(2008b) show that the personal consequences for managers after regulatory 
enforcement (by the SEC and the DOJ) are material. Of the managers who lose their 
jobs, 93% experience reputational damages and forgo significant amounts of future 
labor income. We conclude from these effects that threats evolving from potential 
class-action lawsuits are credible. 
We conclude that the CEO’s option incentives combined with insider-
influenced boards indeed increase the probability of triggering shareholder litigation. 
Therefore the necessity for shareholders to discipline the managers via the threat of a 
lawsuit and to take influence via the actual filing is higher with larger governance-
induced option incentives. Given that in most cases class-action lawsuits allege 
managerial malfeasance, the question that arises is in how far managers can be held 
personally liable. Both active monitoring and the actual filing of a lawsuit are costly 
for investors. The analysis of our third hypothesis seeks to provide some answers. 
We argue that there is a more cost-efficient way to ex ante discipline CEOs and 
identify this in the SOX personal liability section. We add an interaction term of a 
post-SOX dummy together with the level of equity incentives in our three 
                                                          
18 We also conducted a Tobit regression with a censored dependent variable. The results do not materially 
differ. 
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measurements. We conduct the same regression as in table 6 and report the results in 
the table below. 
Table 3.7: Severity of Class-Action Lawsuits 
In this table we report three integer count regression models per panel, where the dependent variable 
always equals the number of allegations brought forward in the class-action lawsuit against company i. It 
ranges from zero to six. Our estimation method is maximum likelihood. All models have the same set of 
economic determinants to predict the severity of a class-action lawsuit. We predict equity incentives as 
the incremental part of equity incentives that is explained by governance variables in excess of economic 
determinants. We distinguish between equity incentives predicted by all governance variables. The Z-
statistics are based on cluster-robust covariances according to Huber/White. The models include year and 
industry fixed effects but coefficients are not reported for practical reasons. Statistical significance at the 
10, 5, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Equity incentives predicted from all governance variables  
 
Poisson: 
# allegations 
Poisson: 
# allegations 
Poisson: 
# allegations 
  coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
intercept -6.3788*** (0.3704) -6.3558*** (0.3613) -5.9550*** (0.3841) 
Accruals 0.3536 (0.7630) 0.3768 (0.7630) 0.3662 (0.7595) 
Return on Assets -0.0388 (0.3599) -0.0401 (0.3598) -0.0426 (0.3591) 
LOG(M/B) 0.1927** (0.0854) 0.1903** (0.0853) 0.2097** (0.0854) 
LOG(TA) 0.2978*** (0.0254) 0.2939*** (0.0248) 0.2848*** (0.0245) 
Cash Flow/TA 0.2315 (0.5502) 0.2432 (0.5506) 0.2134 (0.5456) 
Dividend pay -0.3629*** (0.0906) -0.3616*** (0.0907) -0.3721*** (0.0907) 
Equity issue -0.2161** (0.0954) -0.2151** (0.0954) -0.2162** (0.0953) 
Change in sales 1.0727*** (0.2515) 1.0866*** (0.2519) 1.1340*** (0.2511) 
Change in price -1.6990*** (0.0857) -1.6990*** (0.0857) -1.7097*** (0.0859) 
CAPEX/TA3Y -0.2182 (0.9318) -0.2189 (0.9328) -0.1232 (0.9382) 
       
Equity incentives 
total 0.0121 (0.0762)     
Equity incentives 
stock   -0.0207 (0.0486)   
Equity incentives 
options     0.3033*** (0.0986) 
              
McFadden R2 0.1309  0.1309  0.1324  
Nobs 11961   11961   11961   
 
We include the same financial control variables as in tables 3.6 and 3.7. 
Our results imply that we cannot reject our third hypothesis that SOX attenuates the 
demand for class-action lawsuits to discipline CEOs. Our interaction term for stock 
option incentives with a post-SOX dummy (that is, for 2002–2007) is negative and 
below the 10% significance but the pre-SOX variable for stock option incentives is 
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positive and highly significant. In this analysis we also find support for our 
interpretation of class-action lawsuits as acting as a governance mechanism rather 
than a “bad performance event.” We observe a changing relation in the slope 
between option incentives and the occurrence of shareholder litigation over time in 
addition to a change in the intercept, which is consistent with our interpretation of 
class-action lawsuits.  
Table 3.8: Equity Incentives Pre- and Post Sarbanes-Oxley 
In this table we perform the same regression as in Tables 6 and 7. Here we incorporate a dummy, which 
equals one if the observation lies in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley period (i.e. 2002 and later), and zero 
otherwise. We interact this variable with the level of equity incentives defined by our three 
measurements. The control variables are the same as in the analyses above. The Z-statistics are based on 
cluster robust covariances according to Huber/White. The models include year and industry fixed effects 
but coefficients are not reported for practical reasons. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level is 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Equity incentives predicted from all governance variables 
  Probit: CA yes/no Probit: CA yes/no Probit: CA yes/no 
  coefficient S.E. coefficient S.E. coefficient S.E. 
intercept -3.2923*** (0.1753) -3.3388*** (0.1701) -3.0649*** (0.1894) 
Accruals -0.3042 (0.5834) -0.3073 (0.5871) -0.2452 (0.5853) 
Return on Assets 0.0398 (0.3308) 0.0626 (0.3352) 0.0441 (0.3355) 
LOG(M/B) 0.1552** (0.0617) 0.1537** (0.0622) 0.1681*** (0.0623) 
LOG(TA) 0.1736*** (0.0176) 0.1720*** (0.0173) 0.1673*** (0.0173) 
Cash Flow/TA -0.3881 (0.4209) -0.3906 (0.4238) -0.3946 (0.4181) 
Dividend pay -0.1952*** (0.0612) -0.1808*** (0.0618) -0.1945*** (0.0615) 
Equity issue -0.1350** (0.0694) -0.1265* (0.0695) -0.1274* (0.0695) 
Change in sales 0.0034* (0.0021) 0.0036* (0.0021) 0.0039* (0.0021) 
Change in price -0.0101*** (0.0008) -0.0103*** (0.0008) -0.0103*** (0.0008) 
CAPEX/TA3Y -0.8597 (0.6291) -0.6660 (0.6267) -0.5960 (0.6410) 
       
Equity incentives 
total -0.0036 (0.0603)     
Equity incentives 
total*SOX -0.0955 (0.0934)     
Equity incentives 
stock   0.0080 (0.0395)   
Equity incentives 
stock*SOX   -0.0869** (0.0430)   
Equity incentives 
options     0.2413*** (0.0696) 
Equity incentives 
options*SOX     -0.0773* (0.0519) 
       
McFadden R2 0.1399 0.1410 0.1429 
Nobs 11961 11961 11961 
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3.4 Are Lawsuits a Disciplining Device for “Excessive” 
Risk?  
Too many option incentives determined by governance structures trigger 
managerial risk-taking. Shareholders can counteract this behavior by suing the firm 
and thus bringing in a further disciplining governance mechanism. We ask the 
question about the consequences of “excessive” stock options in combination with 
giving CEOs the discretion to negotiate for incentives. We find that governance 
structures enable the level of stock option incentives to a significant extent. The 
consequence of this “excessive” component of stock options is that shareholders 
counter allegedly high levels of risk-taking with class-action lawsuits. For minority 
shareholders and private investors this is a central corporate governance mechanism, 
whose mere threat disciplines management ex ante. The necessity for this threat 
taking place diminishes after the introduction of SOX’s increased personal liabilities 
for directors and officers and, therefore, provides a more cost-efficient alternative to 
filing lawsuits. 
It seems imperative to study whether Sarbanes-Oxley is effective given the 
results of our analysis. We interpret our finding as an additional external disciplining 
mechanism for managers. Sections XIII, IX and XI impose higher penalties for 
financial fraud and insider trading committed by directors and officers. Before 2002 
managers were still sued but were not held personally liable to the same extent as 
after 2002. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) analyze the impact of the SOX 
introduction on companies that were subject to insider trading before. Stock market 
valuation responded favorably for these companies, but subsequent abnormal return 
performance was generally lower than the benchmark due to a decrease in inherent 
risk. If shareholders can hold CEOs liable to a higher extent for financial fraud and 
can demand parts of their personal wealth, then we find that CEOs’ incentives for 
financial fraud (and to profit from option incentives) are weaker in the post-SOX 
period. This is simply because the mere threat of a class-action lawsuit and the 
accompanying potential severity for the manager is higher after 2002 and therefore 
poses an additional disciplining mechanism. 
Based on our results, we can also question whether shareholders should 
actually care about CEOs’ level of stock options and whether it makes a difference 
for them how the CEO is compensated. Our results indicate that as long as 
shareholders have the opportunity to counteract adverse CEO actions and these 
disciplining mechanisms are effective, they still have sufficient opportunities to take 
corrective action ex post. The more the CEO’s wealth is dependent on the stock 
price, the more he will be “punished” ex post for misbehavior and risk taking. Our 
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paper rejects the statement by Armour et al. (2009) that states that class-action 
lawsuits are ineffective.  
In fact we argue the opposite by stating that the mere filing of a lawsuit 
hurts the equity-aligned CEO by depressing the stock price—irrespective of the 
legitimacy of the allegations and who eventually covers the settlement. We find that 
shareholders do take action at firms that have experienced highly volatile 
performance due to managerial risk-taking triggered by stock options and 
managerial discretion. In their empirical analysis of firms facing SEC enforcement 
subsequent to class-action lawsuits, Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008a) find that the 
consequences for managerial misconduct can be quite severe. Moreover, the authors 
find a remarkable result with respect to Sarbanes-Oxley’s effect on personal 
penalties for managers. The authors find that in only 5% of the cases do SOX’s 
provisions need to be invoked for a legal penalty, and conclude that “firms’ internal 
governance […] worked to penalize much financial misrepresentation even before 
the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act” (Karpoff, Lee, and Martin 2008a, p. 214). The 
authors’ argument boils down to saying that where managers “get caught” for 
financial misrepresentation, shareholders hardly have to make use of SOX’s 
provisions. Our paper offers a different interpretation. In our view, the ex ante threat 
of increased personal liability already functions to make CEOs less manipulative and 
risk-seeking due to their option incentives. We stress that our sample rules out any 
conclusions on whether allegations are well-founded or whether managers of the 
firms have eventually been found guilty. We treat the mere occurrence as a threat 
from shareholders and as a countervailing governance mechanism. 
The results of event studies also underpin the credibility and the effect of 
the filing of lawsuits by highlighting the stock price impact for the equity-aligned 
manager. Neither our paper nor Bauer and Braun (2010) have discriminated between 
ex post meritorious lawsuits and unfounded allegations, but deliberately include all 
filings. Class-action lawsuits are the shareholders’ desire to discipline managers and 
to correct managerial failure. This is triggered by taking risks in the form of higher 
performance volatility. Hence, shareholders can punish the CEO ex post for possible 
shirking or manipulation. 
CEOs indeed tend to select and design their own board, which sets 
compensation and incentive schemes. The corporate governance literature has 
already pointed at boards of directors as “endogenously determined institutions” 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). Directors and 
officers can take risks and increase the volatility of the firm’s share price to either 
benefit from a value-increase in their option portfolio or to derive non-pecuniary 
benefits from “speculating and taking a view” (Géczy, Minton, and Schrand 2007,  
p. 2407). In their survey on corporations’ use of derivatives for speculative purposes, 
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the authors find distinctive characteristics for speculating firms versus non-
speculating ones. The authors document that compensation arrangements are 
significantly different for managers taking a view compared to CEOs speculating 
infrequently. Hence, CEOs and CFOs of speculating firms have an interest in 
increasing the volatility of the firm’s share price if their level of equity-based 
incentives is high.  
Considering class-action lawsuits to estimate managers’ risk-taking 
propensity and potential for forensic malfeasance also bears further implications for 
the firm, namely consequences in terms of stock market valuation, expected returns, 
and financial distress. With increased firm risk, investors will ultimately discount 
the firm’s future cash flows at a higher rate, which leads to a lower valuation in the 
medium- and long-term. Our results of executive compensation triggering class-
action lawsuit adds to the findings of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). In their 
paper, well governed companies are valued higher, perform better operationally, and 
invest more efficiently. Complementing this finding, it is fair to state that well-
governed companies give less discretion for the CEO’s incentive schemes, which 
reduces shareholder litigation risk. 
Our paper does not take a view on whether class-action lawsuits should be 
used as a governance mechanism of last resort. Do excessive option incentives 
represent optimal contracting or is it a consequence of the rent-seeking behavior of 
CEOs? An answer to this question ultimately depends on how costly class-action 
lawsuits are on a macro level. The costs comprise the active monitoring costs for 
shareholders, direct costs of the filing and attorney fees, and eventually whether 
lawsuits result out of poor performance or as a correction of out-of-equilibrium 
incentives and governance failures. In the latter case we might consider it to be 
optimal contracting whereas the former situation points at CEOs’ risk-seeking 
behavior. 
3.5 Conclusion 
We started with shareholders facing a trade-off in the granting of stock 
options to CEOs. Having too few options does not give the right incentives to exert 
optimal effort but having too many options gives incentives “to do bad” in the form 
of irresponsible project risks, timing information to the market, and eventually 
manipulating numbers to inflate stock prices. A further trade-off is involved in the 
question of who determines the incentives. Outside shareholders often lack the 
sophistication so incentives are determined by the insiders themselves. Corporate 
insiders are usually the most informed but they act with discretion. The cost is that 
they are able to exploit informational asymmetries to negotiate for excessive stock 
options. Ample empirical and anecdotal evidence shows that because of this 
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exploitation, CEOs tend to engage in problematic behavior. Shareholders are too 
diffuse in order to coordinate on the CEO’s pay package. The consequence is that 
institutional investors vote with management and shareholder proposals have 
increasing but lower success rates in absolute terms (Gillan and Starks, 2007). Our 
paper answers the question of the consequences of these excessive equity incentives 
by focusing on the stock option factor. 
Class-action lawsuits are an available governance tool, which exerts a 
sufficiently credible threat to discipline managers to not behave adversely. The stock 
market reacts negatively around the event date depending on the nature of the 
allegations and the punishment is greater when more allegations are asserted. This 
way, the filing provides a credible threat for the equity-aligned manager ex ante. Our 
observation that shareholders monitor the CEO’s excessive risk-taking behavior 
means that they counteract this behavior in the form of class-action lawsuits—the 
“sued” issue, which punishes CEOs ex post. Given that variable CEO compensation 
via options has been acknowledged to align managers with equity holders—the 
“glued” issue—our paper confirms that it potentially creates another problem. It 
increases managerial propensity to manage for short-term equity prices due to 
options’ leverage and non-linearity in the payoff. 
Will shareholders actually care given that they can counteract this behavior 
and can rely on Sarbanes-Oxley’s personal liability threat as an additional 
mechanism? If the filing of a lawsuit is costless, excessive stock option incentives 
should not matter. The question on whether shareholders should actually care about 
the option incentives depends on the actual direct and indirect costs of lawsuits. 
Returning to restricted stock as a means of compensation could be an alternative 
mechanism given its negative effect on the likelihood of being sued. 
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Appendix A: Corporate Governance Variables from 
Risk-Metrics and Thomson Reuters 
Note: for a detailed description of the variables listed under the “RiskMetrics Governance” section, please 
refer to Appendix A of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). 
# full name Definition source 
1 Delaware incorporation dummy variable 1=yes RiskMetrics Governance  
2 Sum of committees Total board committees self-constructed 
3 corporate "incidents" sum of 6, 8, and 9 self-constructed 
4 Diversity ratio Diverse board members relative to board size self-constructed 
5 board size number of board members RiskMetrics board & committees  
6 litigation disclosed dummy variable 1=yes Risk Metrics board & committees  
7 employee representatives on board dummy variable 1=yes 
Risk Metrics board & 
committees  
8 real estate transactions disclosed dummy variable 1=yes 
Risk Metrics board & 
committees  
9 third party transactions disclosed  dummy variable 1=yes 
Risk Metrics board & 
committees  
10 % independent board members percentage 0-1 Risk Metrics board & committees  
11 Combined chair/CEO (CEO Duality) dummy variable 1=yes 
Risk Metrics board & 
committees  
12 lead director dummy variable 1=yes Risk Metrics board & committees  
13 D&O holdings of voting stock percentage 0-1 RiskMetrics Directors  
14 classified board dummy variable 1=yes RiskMetrics Governance  
15 director indemnification contracts dummy variable 1=yes RiskMetrics Governance  
16 Governance Index  (Gompers et. al) number 0 - 24 RiskMetrics Governance  
17 severance payments dummy variable 1=yes RiskMetrics Governance  
18 Instit. Ownership Percentage 0-1 ThomsonReuters 13F 
19 Firm age (CRSP first listing date) In Years CRSP 
20 golden parachute disclosed dummy variable 1=yes RiskMetrics Governance  
80 
 
Appendix B: Financial and Control Variables from 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP 
name full name description and definition 
MB Market to book  ratio 
market-to-book ratio as the market value of the firm’s equity (item 
25*item 199) at the end of the year plus the difference between the 
book value of the firm’s assets (item 6) and the book value of the 
firm’s equity (item 60) at the end of the year, divided by the book 
value of the firm’s assets (item 6) at the end of the year 
ROA Return on assets 
operating income before depreciation (item 13) plus the decrease 
in receivables (item 2), the decrease in inventory (item 3), the 
increase in current liabilities (item 72), and the decrease in other 
current assets (item 68), divided by the average of beginning- and 
ending-year book value of total assets  (item 6) 
ACCR Total accruals 
The change in accounts receivable (item 2), plus the change in 
inventories (item 3), plus the change in other current assets (item 
68). From this we subtract the change in accounts payable (item 
70), plus the change in other current liabilities (item 72). After 
subtracting depreciation (item 178) we scale by total assets 
LEV leverage Short plus long term debt (items 9 and 34) scaled by total assets (item 6) 
Cashdiv cash dividends sum of preferred and ordinary cash dividends (item 19 and 21, respectively) 
DIV dividend dummy dummy equals 1 if variable "cashdiv" is larger than zero 
deltasales average trailing 3 year sales growth change in total sales (item 12) 
deltaSP average change in share price change in fiscal year end share price (item 199) 
deltacash average change in cash change in cash and short term investments (item 1) 
TA book value of total assets book value of balance sheet total assets (item 6) 
TS total sales book value of balance sheet total assets (item 12) 
Equity Equity issue dummy equals 1 if the change in number of shares outstanding in the prior year was larger than 10% 
CAPX3y 3 year average capital expenditures  average of capital expenditures over the last three years (item 128) 
Earn earnings earnings is measured as operating income after depreciation (75); 
CF earnings - accruals  cash flow is earnings minus accruals, scaled by TA 
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Chapter 4 
 
Laddered IPOs: A Case of Ineffective 
Regulation?1 
 
We study the effect of regulation on financial markets using the case of mysterious 
disappearance of lawsuits for laddering in initial public offerings (IPO) in 2001. We 
argue that this sharp reduction, far from being the outcome of a successful 
regulatory sweep, in fact was due to the investment banks changing the form of the 
game and that laddering still goes on with the same characteristics, but largely 
unnoticed by the Courts. We first show that underpricing is instrumental for 
laddering to occur and that IPOs have ex post not been underpriced optimally for 
deterring litigation. The underwriter exploits the asset management arm of the 
financial conglomerate it belongs to in order to support the price after the IPO. If we 
compare laddered IPOs to a matched sample of other similar but non-laddered IPOs, 
we see that in laddered IPOs, the probability of the affiliated conglomerate to have a 
stake is significantly higher (up to twice as high). No similar behavior is detected in 
case of non-laddered IPOs. A direct implication of this underwriter involvement is 
the fact that the performance of the laddered IPO is higher than that of other IPOs. 
Laddered firms display a similar risk-adjusted aftermarket performance as the non-
laddered sample. Laddering keeps the price artificially high so as to allow the 
insiders to trade by selling their shares after the IPO and the expiration of the lock-
up period without negatively affecting the stock price. Indeed, laddered IPOs display 
abnormal – compared to the other IPOs and with respect to the average life of the 
stock – trading activity by the insiders as the lockup periods expire. This higher 
market activity by the insiders is not accompanied by higher price impact. We then 
show that after 2001, when no lawsuits were any longer filed, this overall behavior 
still persists. We build a model to predict laddering out-of-sample and show that 
“hidden laddered” IPOs display significant higher insider trading activity and a 
higher stake of the conglomerate affiliated with the underwriter. This trading takes 
place at convenient trading conditions with low price impact.   
 
                                                          
1 Large parts of this chapter are based on Bodnaruk, Braun, and Massa (2010) 
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4.1 Introduction  
What is the effect of regulation on financial markets? It is often argued that 
regulation rarely achieves its goal as the regulated subjects respond in a way that 
minimizes the effects of regulation. We study this topic by focusing on one specific 
case study: the decision in 2000 of the SEC to clamp down on stock market 
manipulation by enforcing Regulation M that was largely dormant until then2. This 
led to an exogenous change in the degree of enforcement against the practice called 
“laddering”. This form of price manipulation involves the investment bank 
artificially pushing the secondary market price at the IPO in order to please the 
issuer and secure a larger allotment. To achieve this, the underwriting investment 
bank allocates IPO shares to privileged investors conditional on these same investors 
(“ladderers”, hereafter) agreeing/committing to purchase additional shares in the 
aftermarket at predetermined dates. This behavior is deceitful for the uninformed 
investors who are unaware of laddering if the price declines after the IPO.  
The SEC enforcement implied that a total of 312 firms that went public in 
1998-2000 as well as their underwriters were subsequently sued for “laddering”3. 
After this clampdown in which the SEC began to enforce Regulation M, only a 
handful of IPOs which went public in 2001 or afterwards were sued for laddering. 
This has been hailed as a successful intervention of regulatory authorities. In this 
paper, we argue the opposite. We will show that the action of the regulatory 
authorities far from preventing laddering from taking place did instead make 
investment banks change the form of the game and pursued laddering strategies 
through other means.  
We will proceed in two steps. First, we identify the drivers of laddering and 
relate them to stock underpricing. In particular, we show that laddering is 
implemented by the investment banks to help the pre-IPO insiders of the firm. Then, 
we use these determinants in the period when laddering has apparently disappeared 
to explain underpricing as a function of the very same determinants. We argue that 
this provides indirect evidence that alternative ways have been indentified to reach 
the same results that are less likely to originate lawsuits. 
In order to identify the drivers of laddering, we start by relating the first day 
stock return (underpricing) to laddering. If underpricing is instrumental for 
investment banks to achieve their goals, this would induce a positive correlation 
between laddering and underpricing. And indeed, using an instrumental variable 
                                                          
2 Section 101 of Regulation M under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 has been amended in 1997 
in order to specifically proscribe market manipulation in the form of laddering.  
3 The first laddering lawsuit was filed against VA Linux on 11 January 2001. 
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specification to control for endogeneity (Lowry and Shu, 2002), we document that 
more underpriced IPOs were more likely to be sued for laddering.4 
Next, we study how the underwriter can implement laddering. We argue 
that the underwriter can use the firepower of the asset management arm of the 
financial conglomerate it belongs to to support the price after the IPO. We therefore 
investigate the investment in the laddered IPO firms by the members of the financial 
conglomerate affiliated with the underwriter. We track the ownership in IPO firms 
by the underwriter from the quarter after the IPO up to one year after. We show that 
in laddered IPOs, the probability that asset managers affiliated with lead 
underwriters hold a stake in the IPO firms and the size of their position is 
significantly higher (up to about twice as high) compared to non-sued IPOs or firms 
facing litigation in the context of material misstatements and omissions in their IPO 
prospectuses (Section 11). This can be observed right after the IPO and for at least a 
year after and holds both univariately and multivariately. Overall, laddered IPOs 
enjoy a much stronger direct support by the affiliated conglomerate: the underwriter 
keeps a significant fraction of the shares outstanding within the affiliated financial 
conglomerate to stabilize the price and to create favorable trading conditions.  
A direct implication of this underwriter involvement is the fact that even 
though the prices of laddered IPOs have been artificially propped up, laddered IPOs 
do not underperform other IPOs. Indeed, if we construct a portfolio of laddered IPO 
firms and compare its net of risk performance in calendar time to that of a portfolio 
of all non-sued IPOs or a portfolio of similar non-sued IPOs we do not observe 
either economic or statistical difference between them.  
We then look at the potential beneficiaries of the laddering strategy and we 
identify them in the insiders of the issuing firms. We argue and show that laddering 
keeps the price artificially high so as to allow the insiders to trade by selling their 
shares after the IPO and both before and the expiration of the lock-up period without 
negatively affecting the stock price. We document that this allows the insiders in 
laddered IPOs to reduce their ownership in the company prior to lock-up period 
expiration with little price impact. In particular, we show that insiders of laddered 
firms sell their shares significantly more often than insiders in non-sued firms. This 
holds whether we compare laddered firms to all non-sued firms or to a subsample of 
non-sued firms with similar characteristics. We consider dollar trading volume and 
                                                          
4 Laddering is not limited to “hot” IPOs, it also extends to “cold” IPOs. And indeed, Griffin, Harris, and 
Topaloglu (2007) show that a reputable underwriter can also ladder cold IPOs with the threat of excluding 
the prospective investor from future offerings. Benefits are that the insiders of “cold IPO firms” can also 
sell at stabilized prices. A necessary condition for this to succeed is that the underwriter’s IPOs have to be 
on average underpriced. 
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the number of transactions executed.  We include open market transactions as well 
as option exercises.  
The results clearly show that insiders in laddered IPOs sell their shares 
much more often than insiders in other IPO firms not only after the lock-up period 
expiation, but also within the lock-up period. While this does not require prior notice 
to the public, it requires underwriter’s approval.5 In 38.33% of laddered IPOs 
insiders sell their shares prior to lock-period expiration. This is significantly more 
often than 32.79% in the case of Section 11 IPOs, 29.25% for the full sample of 
non-sued IPOs and 24.11% for similar non-sued IPOs. When we look at insiders 
selling activity over one month after the lock-up period expiration in 37.63% of 
laddered IPOs insiders sell some of their shares. This should be compared to 
27.87%, 20.57% and 25.53% for Section 11, all non-sued and similar non-sued IPOs 
respectively. 
This higher trading activity by the insiders is not accompanied by higher 
price impact. If we consider the stock price reaction to the sales of the insiders, we 
see that the stock price reaction around insider sales is similar for laddered IPOs and 
for other IPO groups. This result is robust to whether we consider insider sales done 
at any point in time or only sales executed prior to lock-period expiration. This 
evidence suggests that laddering is a way of providing price support to the insiders 
that lasts for the length of the lock-up period and beyond that and allows them to sell 
with minimal market impact. 
Overall, these findings provide a rationale for laddering and relate it to 
underpricing. Then, we use our findings to test whether after 2001 laddering has 
completely disappeared – as the number of lawsuits would suggest – or whether it 
just changed shape. We therefore use the characteristics that identify the laddered 
IPO in sample till 2001 and build a model that predicts laddering. We then apply this 
model out-of-sample after 2001. In particular, we focus on the firms that have been 
identified as “laddered” and we determine whether they display the same 
characteristics that distinguished laddered firms. The results are striking: “predicted 
laddered” IPOs display significantly higher insider trading activity and a higher 
stake of the conglomerate affiliated with the underwriter. The magnitude of the 
effect is comparable to the actual laddered IPOs.  
Moreover, “hiddenly-laddered IPOs” are characterized by the same selling 
activity of the insiders before and after the expiration of the lock-up period. As well 
                                                          
5 An example of this can be found in eBay (Ticker symbol: EBAY. IPO date: 24 September 1998) Inc. 
IPO prospectus “The representatives of the several underwriters acting together may, in their sole 
discretion and at any time without notice, release all or any portion of the securities subject to lock-up 
agreements.” 
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as for the openly laddered IPOs of the previous decade, this trading takes place at 
convenient – in the sense of low price impact – trading conditions. This provides 
some suggestive evidence of the fact that, even if lawsuits have stopped, a 
phenomenon very similar to laddering is still taking place. We interpret it as 
suggesting that the regulatory changes just made it more difficult for investors to 
detect malpractices and to eventually file lawsuits. 
Our results link to three main strands of the literature. The first deals with 
IPOs. We study a particular class of IPOs – the laddered ones. They have specific 
characteristics that differentiate them from other IPOs – higher underpricing, higher 
price support from the conglomerate affiliated with underwriter through a direct 
stake and higher insider trading, but comparable performance and price impact of 
insider trading. 
Our results directly relate to the strand of IPO literature arguing that 
underpricing of IPOs could be seen as a way of buying litigation protection (Lowry 
and Shu, 2002). When we consider IPOs sued for material misstatement and 
omissions in the IPO prospectus according to Section 11 of the Securities and 
Exchange Act (“Section 11 IPOs”) we confirm earlier findings by Lowry and Shu 
(2002) that these IPOs – unlike laddered IPOs – are underpriced optimally, i.e. that 
magnitude of underpricing is not related to the likelihood of litigation. In the case of 
laddering, the ex-ante likelihood of being sued for stock price manipulation was 
lower than ex-post likelihood. Indeed, even though Regulation M has been in place 
since 1934 and was amended in 1997 to specifically address the practice of 
laddering, there were only a handful of IPOs sued for it prior to 2000 even though 
anecdotal evidence suggests that this practice has been widespread for a number of 
years prior to that.6 That resulted in a positive relation between underpricing and 
litigation for laddered IPOs. 
Second, we contribute to the literature on financial conglomerates. Ritter 
and Zhang (2007) show that lead underwriters allocate hot IPOs to affiliated funds, 
and Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000) show that NASDAQ market makers 
belonging to a financial group support the stock price of the firms whose IPOs have 
been underwritten by an investment bank belonging to the same group. Acharya and 
Johnson (2007), and Ivashina and Sun (2010) provide evidence of bank insider 
trading by showing that lending banks use private information regarding corporate 
                                                          
6 Our database on securities litigation suggests three lawsuits which were filed prior to 2001: on 22 July 
1996, 11 April 1997, and 21 August 1998. Documents in Re: Initial Public Offerings Securities Litigation 
suggest that market manipulation and tie-in agreements (i.e. “laddering”) are not a new phenomenon: hot 
issue periods between 1959 and 1963, 1967-1971, 1979-1983 have also witnessed practices of tie-in 
agreements (See Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission concerning the hot issues markets, at 
4-28, Aug. 1984). For further details please refer to: 
 http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/ipo/ipolit21903opn.pdf 
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clients to trade credit default swaps or equity. Massa and Rehman (2005) show that 
mutual funds use the inside information available to the affiliated banks lending to 
firms around the time the loan is granted. We provide indirect evidence of 
coordinated behavior of financial conglomerates in the case of IPOs. 
Third, we contribute to the debate on the effects of regulation. Our results 
show that the change in regulation almost completely eliminated the lawsuits, 
without eliminating the behavior behind them. This has important normative 
implications as it seems to suggest that the regulatory changes far from protecting 
the shareholders in fact allowed investment banks and firms to stave off lawsuits. 
This qualifies as evidence of “captive regulation”.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we 
describe the data and the construction of the main variables. In Section 3, we 
provide evidence of the relation between laddering and underpricing. In Sections 4 
and 5, we relate laddering to the investment banks’ behavior and to the insiders’ 
behavior respectively. In Section 6, we look out of sample and we study how 
laddering persisted even in the absence of lawsuits. A brief conclusion follows. 
4.2  Data  
4.2.1 Data Sources  
We focus on NASDAQ IPOs done between 1995 and 2007. The choice of 
our sample period is motivated by the availability of lawsuit data. We deliberately 
choose to focus on NASDAQ IPOs for several reasons. First, this provides us with a 
relatively homogenous sample of firms going public: high growth opportunities, 
short balance sheet history and low asset tangibility. Second, investors trading in 
NASDAQ stocks represent a particular group of risk-seeking clientele. Third, 
according to Ellis, et al. (2000) only on NASDAQ the underwriting investment bank 
also has the opportunity to become the active market maker for the aftermarket 
trading. In fact, Ellis et al. (2000) argue that the lead underwriter of NASDAQ IPOs 
always becomes the market-maker, the most active dealer and a significant provider 
of post-IPO liquidity. 
In order to identify IPO firms as being laddered or not we rely on two 
online databases. The Securities Class Action Clearinghouse from Stanford Law 
School lists the name, filing date and nature of allegations towards the firm and if 
applicable the names of the involved investment banks.7 We cross-check and verify 
this with information from the website of IPOSecuritiesLitigation.com. Between 
                                                          
7 Available online via http://securities.stanford.edu 
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1995 and 2007 we identify 292 NASDAQ IPOs where the investment bank(s) have 
been sued for manipulative underwriting and/or allocation practices.  
Additionally, we identify IPO firms which have been sued for false and 
misleading statements or a failure to disclose material information in the public 
offering prospectus (sued under Section 11). This is a kind of lawsuits studied by 
Lowry and Shu (2002) over 1988 to 1995 time period. We were able to identify 61 
of such firms during our sample period. 
Data on IPO firms is obtained from SDC Global New Issues Database. We 
exclude closed end funds, unit offerings, REITs, financial firms, reverse LBOs and 
spin-offs. In order to be included in our database, firms need to have sufficient 
information on initial return. Firm age and underwriter reputation rankings have 
been obtained from the website of Jay Ritter (http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/) whereas 
accounting and performance variables come from CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged 
database. Missing pieces of information on lock-up length have been hand-collected. 
A complete description of our variables can be found in Appendix A and B. Our 
total sample comprises 2,469 firms with 2,320 firms having complete data.  
For our analysis on post IPO insider selling behavior we rely on Thomson 
Reuters Insider Transactions database. We focus only on open market purchases and 
disposals (Thomson Reuters Transaction codes “P” and “S”) of derivative and non-
derivative securities by insiders with cleanse indicators of “R”, “H”, or “C” in order 
to obtain a reasonable level of accuracy.8 Moreover, we group insiders into level 1 
and level 2 insiders according to the classification of Thomson Reuters. The 
classification of Level 1 insiders is in line with the definition of Cicero (2009). 
These two groups might have potentially different access to inside information, 
which is why we decide to contrast these two groups.  
We also require sufficient information on the length and time of expiration 
of the lock-up period. Since SDC data is insufficient for this item for more than 20% 
of our sample, we hand-collect missing information from individual firm 
prospectuses from SEC Edgar. Our filtering process of insider transaction data 
closely follows the method as in Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer (2010). 
We identify equity ownership by underwriting investment banks by 
aggregating positions of their asset management affiliates from Spectrum 13F. 
Given that different divisions of a financial conglomerate (banks, insurance firms, 
mutual fund families, etc.) often appear in 13F filings as separate entities lacking 
                                                          
8 The Cleanse Indicator indicates Thomson’s level of confidence concerning the accuracy of a particular 
record contained in the database 
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common identifiers, we constructed a database that groups the different divisions of 
individual financial groups under single umbrellas. This database has been 
assembled manually from various public sources.9 For a more detailed description of 
conglomerate construction and the descriptive statistics of conglomerates’ 
characteristics see the description of a “brand” construction in Bodnaruk, Massa, and 
Simonov (2009). 
4.2.2 Descriptive Statistics of Laddered IPOs 
We start with some univariate statistics. We track the distribution of sued 
firms across years and industries and discriminate between IPOs sued for material 
misstatements and omissions (Section 11 IPOs) and laddered IPOs. The results are 
shown in Table 4.1. Two noteworthy patterns emerge from Panel A. First, laddered 
IPOs clearly peak during the tech bubble between 1998 and 2000 and almost 
completely disappear thereafter. By contrast, Section 11 IPOs are more evenly 
distributed over our sample period. Second, the general IPO activity declines after 
2000 reflecting the cold issue period after the burst of the internet bubble. Panel B 
shows distribution of IPOs and IPO litigation activity across industries. “Science”, 
“Manufacturing” and “Communication, Computers & Electronics” stand out in 
terms of number of IPOs, the latter also being the one with most instances of 
litigation. Overall, we observe that 14.30% of 2,469 IPOs between 1995 and 2007 
have been sued for either laddering or for material misstatements and omissions 
under Section 11. This value is significantly higher than the 8% litigation frequency 
reported by Lowry and Shu (2002).  
We present descriptive statistics of offering and aftermarket characteristics 
for IPO firms in Table 4.2. Laddered IPOs have much larger first day returns and are 
much likely to have their offer price updated than both non-sued IPOs and Section 
11 IPOs. They are also larger and have lower leverage, but raise similar proceeds to 
Section 11-sued IPOs. Laddered IPOs are younger firms, underwritten by more 
reputable investment banks, more likely to be venture capital backed and to be high 
tech firms. They also have larger post-IPO volume and turnover. The average 
laddered firm has negative earnings (strongly negative PE ratio) and a poor 
operating margin. This provides some indication and outlook on how these firms 
might perform in the aftermarket and why laddering might be in the issuer’s interest.  
                                                          
9 We used the directory of investment advisers maintained by the SEC (www.adviserinfo.sec.gov), 
Morningstar’s directory of mutual fund family websites (www.advisor.morningstar.com), and the 
websites of financial groups and mutual fund families. All affiliations, transaction dates, and missing 
information were double-checked using extensive web querying. 
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4.3 Laddering and Underpricing 
4.3.1 Methodology 
We now examine the relation between litigation risk and IPO underpricing. 
We distinguish between two types of lawsuits – laddering and Section 11. We 
expect that firms that ex-ante correctly anticipate their likelihood of being sued for a 
particular type of violations would chose to underprice shares optimally – i.e. the 
magnitude of underpricing would not affect the probability of litigation. At the same 
time, if the likelihood of being sued for a particular violation is underestimated and 
underpricing is beneficial to the company insiders and investment banks, this would 
ascertain a positive relation between underpricing and litigation. 
Our task is not simple as firms choose underpricing in such a way as to 
minimize the likelihood of being sued and the decision by shareholders to file a suit 
is dependent on the observed underpricing. We thus face a problem of joint 
estimation of underpricing and litigation.  
Table 4.1: Distribution of sample firms across years and industries 
The sample consists of completed IPOs between 1995 and 2007 that are in the Securities Data Company 
(SDC) database. Closed-end funds, unit offerings, REITs, financial firms, reverse LBOs, ADRs and spin-
offs are excluded. Firms must also have data on initial returns. The final sample consists of 2,469 firms. 
Sued firms represent those IPOs that are listed in the Shareholder litigation database from Cornerstone 
Research (http://securities.stanford.edu) and IPO Securities Legislation 
(www.iposecuritieslitigation.com). Panel A classifies the total number of IPOs and the number of IPOs 
that were sued by year. Panel B classifies the firms by industries (where industries are by SIC code).  
 Panel A:  
by Year 
No  
of IPOs % sued “laddering” 
% sued 
LS-type 
% sued 
(pooled) 
1995 298 0.34% 2.01% 2.35% 
1996 486 0.41% 2.47% 2.88% 
1997 309 0.00% 2.27% 2.27% 
1998 165 4.24% 3.64% 7.88% 
1999 407 41.77% 0.25% 42.01% 
2000 334 32.93% 1.80% 34.73% 
2001 46 0.00% 4.35% 6.52% 
2002 38 0.00% 7.89% 7.89% 
2003 35 0.00% 5.71% 5.71% 
2004 107 0.00% 3.74% 3.74% 
2005 87 1.15% 2.30% 3.45% 
2006 103 0.97% 4.85% 5.83% 
2007 53 0.00% 7.55% 7.55% 
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Panel B:  
By Industry SIC Codes 
Total 
# of 
IPOs 
# of IPOs 
sued 
# of  
Section 
11 IPOs 
# of 
Laddered 
IPOs 
Agriculture and Mining 100-1299, 1400-1499 7 0 0 0 
Apparel 2200-2399, 3100-3199 13 1 1 0 
Communications, 
Computers and 
Electronics 
3570-3570, 3600-3699 1139 256 28 228 
Construction 1500-1799 12 1 0 1 
Finance 6000-6499, 6700-6799 6 0 0 0 
Food 2000-2099 20 0 0 0 
Health 8000-8099 60 3 3 0 
Manufacturing 
2400-2499, 2600-2699, 2800-
2899, 3000-3099, 3200-3569, 
3580-3599, 3900-3999 
268 12 7 5 
Oil and Gas 1300-1399, 2900-2999, 4600-4699, 4920-4929 51 3 3 0 
Printing and Publishing 2700-2799 13 0 0 0 
Recreation 7000-7099, 7800-7999 40 6 3 3 
Science 3800-3899, 8710-8719, 8730-8739 262 15 3 12 
Services 
6500-6599, 7200-7369, 7380-
7399, 7600-7699, 8100-8399, 
8720-8729, 8740-8749 
242 30 5 25 
Trade 5000-5999 229 20 6 14 
Transportation 3700-3799, 4000-4299, 4400-4599, 4700-4799, 7510-7549 83 4 2 2 
Utilities  4910-4919, 4930-4979 10 0 0 0 
Other   14 2 0 2 
Total   2469 353 61 292 
 
We proceed with adopting a similar approach as in Lowry and Shu (2002) 
by assuming that both IPO underpricing and litigation risk are endogenously and 
simultaneously determined in a system of equations. In particular, if IPOs which are 
ex-ante more likely to be sued will be underpriced more, the degree of the 
underpricing is endogenous to the likelihood of litigation. Properly controlling for 
this endogeneity should eliminate the relation between underpricing and likelihood 
of litigation. We measure underpricing with the percentage difference of the offer 
price and the closing price on the first day of trading – the first day return. 
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This ideal case would, however, require that the ex-ante likelihood of 
litigation is correctly estimated. In the case of laddering, the ex-ante likelihood of 
being sued for stock price manipulation was lower than ex-post likelihood. Indeed, 
even though Regulation M was in place since 1934 and was amended in 1997 to 
specifically address the practice of laddering, there were only a handful of IPOs sued 
for it prior to 2000 even though anecdotal evidence suggests that this practice has 
been widespread for a number of years prior to that. Therefore, if larger underpricing 
was instrumental for investment banks to achieve their goals (at the expense of 
investors) and if investment banks underestimated the threat of litigation for 
laddering, then they should have underpriced their IPOs excessively as this would 
have allowed them to benefit from price manipulation most. This would induce a 
positive correlation between laddering and underpricing.  
Since we distinguish between laddering and Section 11 lawsuits we end up 
with the system of three equations, which we will outline below.  
Insurance effect:  
]GEDCBCZIZG[  :=^YHEEDCZG[ YZ_Z[H_Z8G CZT`  :=abDI_Z8G 11 cZ_Z[H_Z8G dZT`  e=f  5=f=  >=    (1)
       
Laddering litigation deterrence: 
cHEEDCZG[ cZ_Z[H_Z8G dZT`  :g]GEDCBCZIZG[  egf  5gfg  >g   (2) 
Section 11 litigation deterrence 
bDI_Z8G 11 cZ_Z[H_Z8G dZT`   :h]GEDCBCZIZG[  ehfh  >h    (3) 
Maddala (1983, p.244-245) shows that a system of two equations using a 
continuous variable in the first stage and a dichotomous variable in the second stage 
is problematic as the parameters in the second equation cannot be fully recovered. 
To address this issue, in a two-stage probit model, the specification should be: 
iGEDCBCZIZG[  :=gYZ_Z[H_Z8G CZT`  e=f  5=f=  >=    (4) 
YZ_Z[H_Z8G CZT`  j*  ]GEDCBCZIZG[  kl f  m* fg  n*,    (5) 
where σ22=Var(ε2). In our case, we face a system of three equations. Since laddering 
litigation neither directly affects Section 11 litigation nor vice versa, this boils down 
to: 
iGEDCBCZIZG[  :=^gYHEEDCZG[ YHoT]Z_  :=ahbDI_Z8G 11 cHoT]Z_  e=f  5=f=  >=  (6)
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cHEEDCZG[ cHoT]Z_  jg* ]GEDCBCZIZG[  k* f  m* fg  n*    (7) 
bDI_Z8G 11 cHoT]Z_  jp*p ]GEDCBCZIZG[  kp*p f  mp*p fh  np*p    (8) 
The estimation consists of two stages. In the first stage, we regress 
underpricing, laddering risk and Section 11 risk on all the exogenous variables in the 
system including X1, X2 and X3 using OLS and probit, respectively. In the second 
stage, we substitute the predicted values from the first stage estimation for 
corresponding variables in regressions (6) – (8) and then estimate them with OLS 
and probit. Even though we cannot separately estimate γ1A, γ1B, γ2 and γ3 we can at 
least test whether these are statistically different from zero. 
In the first stage regressions, the dependent variables are a laddering 
dummy (Section 11 dummy), which equals one if the firm was sued for laddering 
(material misstatements and omissions in the IPO prospectus) and zero otherwise, 
and underpricing, which is equal to the first day return relative to the IPO offer 
price. 
In order to estimate our system of equations we need to identify predictive 
variables specific to each of our dependent variables. Thus, X1 has to have at least 
one variable which is not in X2 and X3. Similar logic should follow for X2 and X3. 
We use the following overidentifying restrictions. In equation (1) [underpricing], X1 
includes a dummy for venture capital (VC) backing and the size of underwriting 
syndicate. It is well known that general partners at VC firms are very sensitive to 
timely exits.1 Gompers and Lerner (1998) additionally suggest that underpricing is 
not a first order concern for VCs as venture capital funds rarely sell their shares at 
the IPO, but instead distribute shares to the limited partners in the fund at the post-
IPO market prices. Lin and Smith (1998) argue that VCs would like to establish a 
reputation for not selling overpriced shares and are willing to tolerate underpricing. 
All of this suggests that VCs are more likely to tolerate underpricing. Hence, VC-
backing is a variable which conceptually explains underpricing, but is not related to 
the occurrence of litigation. 
As a second variable which identifies underpricing, we include the 
logarithm of the size of the underwriting syndicate. Corwin and Schultz (2005) 
argue that larger syndicates lead to better information production which reduces 
information asymmetry in IPOs and sets a better offer price. At the same time there 
                                                          
1 One reason being that they have to sell their shares (usually at the discount) in firms that did not get an 
exit at the time the fund was liquidated. In some cases they have to forgo their shares in such firms 
entirely (Kandel et al, 2010). 
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does not seem to be any relation between syndicate size and either types of 
litigation. 
To indentify equation (2) [laddering litigation risk], X2 includes stock 
turnover of matched firms. Since turnover is not measurable until after the IPO we 
use prior year share turnover.2 Turnover equals [1 - ∏t (1 – volume tradedt/total 
sharest)] over the one year prior to the IPO. The motivation behind this variable is as 
follows. The laddering practice by design generates significant trading due to 
investors meeting laddering “contracts” and high demand in the secondary market 
(Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu, 2007). This will induce a positive correlation 
between turnover and laddering probability. Lowry and Shu (2002) used stock 
turnover as overidentifying restriction for Section 11 litigation. However, in our 
sample Section 11 litigation and share turnover appear to be unrelated. 
 To indentify equation (3) [Section 11 litigation risk], X3 includes the 
presence of insider sales (secondary sales) dummy. If company insiders do not 
reveal material information during pre-IPO process, this results in inflated IPO offer 
price. Insiders would then have incentives to sell (some of) their shares at such 
inflated price at the IPO (Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989). Secondary sales should 
therefore be positively related to the Section 11 lawsuit probability.  
There are a number of control variables (X) that are common to all three 
equations. We measure firm size with the market capitalization of the IPO on the 
first day of trading. Larger firms are more likely to get sued (“deep pockets 
hypothesis”). According to Michaely and Shaw (1994) larger issues are harder to 
sell and therefore should result in higher underpricing. We also include firm age 
(measured relative to the IPO firm’s founding date) in all three regressions because 
there is less information asymmetry for mature firms, they are also easier to value, 
which results in less underpricing.  
In the case of the estimation of the probability of laddering, we posit that 
underwriters pick to ladder opaque firms with high informational asymmetry. A 
similar line of reasoning (both for lawsuit probabilities and underpricing) applies for 
the IT dummy variable. Underwriter rank measures the reputation of the book-
runner(s) in the syndicate and is expected to provide certification to the issue and 
hence less underpricing.3 Reputable underwriters are also high quality repeat players 
in the IPO market.  We also include the average standard deviation of the same 
matched sample of firms, which is an approximation for future stock price volatility. 
                                                          
2 The matched sample consists of firms in the same three-digit SIC code with market capitalization within 
80–120% of the IPO firm’s market value at the close of the first day of trading. 
3 For the role of underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing over time, please refer to Loughran and 
Ritter (2004). 
95
 
 
High risk firms are more likely to be sued because higher volatility increases the 
probability of extreme losses.   
Since our database spans 13 years of going public activity with different 
degrees of underpricing, we also include an indicator variable whether the IPO took 
place during the tech bubble years (i.e. between 1999 and 2000). Finally, Benveniste 
and Spindt (1989) and Hanley (1993) show that price update also tends to be related 
to underpricing. Moreover, a price update variable captures the “hotness” of the 
issue and this can affect laddering probability as well.  
4.3.2 Results without controlling for endogeneity 
We first report the results on the relation between underpricing and 
litigation risk without controlling for endogeneity. They are reported in Table 4.3. 
The first column tests the insurance effect: do firms with higher litigation risk 
purchase more insurance by underpricing more? We estimate an OLS regression of 
underpricing on laddering lawsuit dummy, Section 11 lawsuit dummy and control 
variables described above. The results suggest that there’s a positive effect of 
laddering lawsuit litigation risk on underpricing, implying that firms with higher 
laddering lawsuit risk underprice their shares more. Consistent with Lowry and Shu 
(2002), we find that the relation between Section 11 litigation risk and underpricing 
is negative.  
Columns two and three report on litigation deterrence effects. ME reports 
the marginal effects. The question is whether firms which choose higher levels of 
insurance (underprice more) reduce their likelihood of being sued. It appears that 
higher underpricing makes IPO firms more likely to be sued for laddering. This is 
inconsistent with a deterrence effect.  
The effect of underpricing on Section 11 litigation likelihood is instead the 
opposite: companies buying more litigation protection are less likely to be sued for 
Section 11 violations. This is in line with deterrence effect and corroborates the 
findings of Lowry and Shu (2002). We are, however, hesitant to make any 
inferences from these results as our analysis could be potentially affected by the 
endogeneity bias. We now proceed to perform the simultaneous-system analysis 
which should take care of endogeneity concerns.  
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4.3.3 Results after controlling for endogeneity 
To control for endogeneity of underpricing and litigation risk we re-
estimate equations (1)-(3) using the simultaneous-equation approach we described 
above. The results are reported in Table 4.4. Columns 1, 2, and 4 report the results of 
first-stage regressions where the dependent variables (underpricing, laddering 
litigation and Section 11 litigation) are regressed on all of our exogenous variables 
(X1, X2, X3, and X). Columns 3, 5, and 6 present the coefficients from second stage 
regressions from insurance and deterrence effects. The explanatory variables in the 
second stage are similar to those used in Table 4.3, with the exception that we now 
substitute the lawsuit and underpricing for their fitted values from first stage 
regressions. Inferences on the relation between litigation risk and underpricing are 
based on second stage regressions. 
The results clearly show that in terms of the insurance effect, companies 
with higher likelihood of laddering lawsuit underprice their shares by a greater 
amount. The result is significant at the 1% level. Companies with higher likelihood 
of being sued for Section 11 violation are also more likely to underprice their shares; 
however, the effect is not significant.  
When we turn our attention to litigation deterrence effect, we observe that 
IPO underpricing is not related to Section 11 litigation. The effect of underpricing 
on laddering litigation, however, is very different: companies which underprice their 
shares more are also more likely to be sued for laddering. The result is significant at 
1% level and suggests that laddered IPOs were underpriced in excess to what was 
ex-post optimal from the litigation perspective. 
4.4  Laddering and Investment Bank Behavior 
The previous results show that laddering is related to a higher first day 
return. Laddering can be implemented by the financial conglomerate, which is 
affiliated with the underwriter by taking a direct stake in the IPO firm. We therefore, 
now investigate the investment in the laddered IPO firm of the members of the 
financial conglomerate affiliated with the underwriter. To do this, we study how 
performance of “laddered” firms compare to that of non-sued IPOs and to Section 11 
IPOs and then we provide some evidence of investment bank’s aggregate investment 
behavior in laddered IPOs.   
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4.4.1 Laddering and Stock Performance 
To analyze the performance of the IPO stocks, we refer back to the 
descriptive statistics reported in Table 4.2. They showed that laddered firms are 
significantly larger in total assets and significantly worse in operating performance. 
This suggests that we are facing two operationally and fundamentally different sets 
of firms. Effectively, this can result in self-selection with respect to the underwriting 
investment bank that the issuer might choose and the IPO (aftermarket-) pricing. To 
address this issue, we perform a matching sample estimation. We identify a group of 
non-sued IPOs, which are similar to laddered IPOs along a number of firm-specific 
characteristics. Matching on the basis of these variables therefore tackles potential 
concerns of endogeneity with respect to the likelihood of being laddered. We 
proceed as follows. We construct a propensity matched sample of non-sued IPOs 
based on the variables suggested by Hillion and Vermaelen (2004). These include 
total assets, operating income before depreciation/Assets, profit margin, return on 
assets, OIBD/Sales, CAPEX/Sales, and Market-to-Book ratio. We are able to 
identify matches to 258 (out of 292) laddered IPOs in our sample. We then test the 
difference in performance between laddered IPOs and the control group. We report 
the results of our matching procedure in Table 4.5. They show that our sample and 
control group are very similar along the matching characteristics. 
We investigate long-term stock performance of IPO firms by constructing 
calendar time portfolios (Fama, 1998). At the beginning of the month following the 
IPO, we add the firm to the corresponding portfolio. We consider five portfolios: all 
IPOs, laddered IPOs, Section 11 IPOs, full subsample of non-sued IPOs and 
subsample of non-sued IPOs propensity matched to laddered IPOs. We consider five 
different holding periods: 6, 12, 24, and 36, and 48 months. To ensure that 
performance is corrected for risk we regress excess returns on these portfolios on 
Fama-French factors augmented by Carhart (1997) momentum factor. Results are 
reported in Table 4.6. The results show that laddered IPOs perform relatively well 
compared to other IPO groups. They consistently outperform Section-11 IPOs. The 
difference in monthly abnormal returns is 419 basis points (bp), 242bp, and 298 bp, 
for  12, 24 and 36 month holding periods for equally weighted portfolios 
(corresponding outperformance is 396bp, 310bp, and 197bp for value-weighted 
portfolios) and is significant at least at 5% level. Additionally, performance of 
laddered IPOs is statistically indistinguishable from that of non-sued IPOs. This 
holds when we compare laddered IPOs to a full sample of non-sued IPOs or to a 
subsample of matched non-sued IPOs and is consistent across investment horizons 
and observation weighting. This might be evidence of price support via laddering for 
the insiders. 
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4.4.2  Laddering and Investment Bank Ownership 
We then directly focus on the investment behavior of the underwriter and 
proceed as follows. We look at the probability that the investment bank and its 
financial group invest in the IPO firm. We identify holdings of investment banks and 
their affiliates (“underwriter ownership”) in the underwritten IPO firm at the end of 
the quarter immediately after IPO (q0) until one year later (q4) and relate it to post-
IPO litigation. We distinguish between firms which have been sued for laddering, 
sued within Section 11 and non-sued IPOs.  
The results for the univariate analysis are reported in Table 4.7. We find 
that in the laddered IPOs, the likelihood that asset managers affiliated with lead 
underwriter have a stake in the firm is significantly higher than in other types of 
IPOs. In particular, from Panel A we see that the difference in likelihoods of 
observing underwriter ownership in laddered IPOs and in non-sued IPOs is 22.6% 
(or 96.8% more relative to unconditional mean) than non-sued IPOs to enjoy a direct 
investment of the affiliated conglomerate immediately after IPO. This difference in 
probabilities is 24.0% in the first quarter after the IPO, 27.9% in the second quarter, 
29.6% in the third quarter, and 29.6% in the fourth quarter.  
If we consider fraction of shares outstanding (Panel B) the difference in 
ownership stakes between underwriters in laddered and non-sued IPOs is about 
0.30% (or 114.57% relative to unconditional mean) - right after the IPO (0.31%, 
0.18%, 0.38%, 0.36% after one, two, three and four quarters after the IPO 
correspondingly). In terms of dollar stake (Panel C) ownership by investment banks 
is between 5.7 and 13.1 times larger in laddered IPOs than in non-sued firms during 
one year following the IPO. We find similar results on underwriter ownership when 
we compare laddered and Section 11 IPOs. 
 The results for multivariate tests reported in Table 4.8 are consistent with 
our univariate findings. In particular, being laddered increases the likelihood of 
underwriter stake immediately after going public by 11.4% relative non-sued IPOs, 
and by 9.1%, 13.5%, 15.1% and 14.3% after 1, 2, 3, 4 quarters correspondingly.  
Similarly, underwriters hold on average 0.88% larger ownership stake as 
measured by fraction of number of shares in laddered IPOs than non-sued IPOs 
outstanding immediately after the IPO. This difference in ownership stands at 
0.75%, 0.61%, 0.89%, and 0.67% for 1, 2, 3, and 4 quarters after going public. As in 
our univariate analysis, Section 11 IPOs do not appear to be different from non-sued 
IPOs in terms of underwriter ownership. Our results are confirmed in Tobit analysis 
when we regress the dollar volume of the investment bank stake on the occurrence 
of either laddering or Section 11 IPOs.  
109 
 
Table 4.7: Univariate Analysis of Post IPO Underwriter Ownership 
We define the probability of underwriter ownership as all holdings of all entities of the financial 
conglomerate j, which are affiliated with the lead underwriter, company i at time t. We distinguish 
between firms which have been sued according to allegations involving misbehavior of the investment 
bank (“Laddered IPOs”) and firms being sued in the sense of Lowry and Shu (2002), which are termed 
“Section 11 IPOs”. Panel A investigates the percentage of cases in which the brand of the underwriting 
investment bank holds shares in the IPO firm. Panel B looks at the market value of shares relative to the 
total market capitalization of the IPO firm at that time. Panel C reports the dollar volumes of the brand’s 
position in millions of dollars. 
Panel A: Probability 
of IB stake in IPO 
Firm 
N 
IB holdings 
during IPO 
Quarter 
IB holdings 
at Q1 
IB holdings 
at Q2 
IB holdings 
at Q3 
IB holdings 
at Q4 
Laddered IPO 238 0.42 0.508 0.559 0.601 0.655 
Section 11 IPO 34 0.265 0.265 0.324 0.324 0.353 
Non-sued IPO (all) 1151 0.194 0.268 0.28 0.305 0.359 
              
 
t-test 
     
Test for differences 1-3 6.64*** 6.86*** 7.99*** 8.56*** 8.75*** 
 
1-2 1.87* 2.92*** 2.69*** 3.17*** 3.41*** 
  2-3 0.92 -0.05 0.52 0.23 -0.07 
Panel B: Fractional 
Shares Held (Frsh) 
N 
IB Frsh at 
IPO Quarter 
IB 
Frsh 
at Q1 
IB 
Frsh 
at Q2 
IB 
Frsh 
at Q3 
IB 
Frsh 
at Q4 
Laddered IPO 238 0.51% 0.62% 0.51% 0.73% 0.72% 
Section 11 IPO 34 0.28% 0.34% 0.36% 0.58% 0.39% 
Non-sued IPO (all) 1151 0.21% 0.31% 0.33% 0.35% 0.36% 
  
      
 
t-test 
     
Test for differences 1-3 2.34** 1.94* 1.14 2.46** 2.29** 
 
1-2 0.97 1.21 0.74 0.49 1.51 
  2-3 0.51 0.08 0.02 0.77 -0.02 
Panel C: Dollar 
(DVOL) Volume of 
Position 
N 
IB DVOL at 
IPO Quarter 
IB 
DVOL 
at Q1 
IB 
DVOL 
at Q2 
IB 
DVOL 
at Q3 
IB 
DVOL 
at Q4 
Laddered IPO 238 $10.09 $14.85 $12.75 $24.03 $26.37 
Section 11 IPO 34 $0.48 $0.49 $0.69 $0.73 $0.36 
Non-sued IPO (all) 1151 $0.77 $2.60 $1.48 $1.89 $2.48 
  
      
 
t-test 
     
Test for differences 1-3 5.29*** 2.62** 5.54*** 4.71*** 4.12*** 
 
1-2 2.55** 2.06** 2.91*** 2.32** 2.12** 
  2-3 -0.25 -0.23 -0.37 -0.38 -0.49 
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Furthermore we also note in Table 4.9 that the institutional share ownership is 
remarkably stable. We do so by identifying the ten largest investor “brands” in our 
IPO groups and investigate their ownership stability. Only in the fifth quarter after 
the IPO, large institutional ownership in laddered IPOs becomes outnumbered by a 
matched sample of non-laddered IPOs. This stability in ownership further 
contributes to price stability in the aftermarket. Overall, these results suggest that 
laddered IPOs enjoy a much stronger direct support by underwriting investment 
banks.   
4.5  Laddering and Insider Behavior 
We now investigate the potential beneficiaries of the investment bank’s 
behavior: the insiders of the IPO firms. We consider the trading activity both prior 
and post lock-up expiration and its impact on stock price. As we argued above, if 
laddering is a way of helping the insiders by getting the investment bank involved to 
stabilize the price and allow the insiders to sell with limited price impact, we expect 
the insiders to avail of this option by trading more intensely after the IPO and such 
trades to have limited impact.  
4.5.1 Laddering and Insider Trading 
We start by looking at insider trading behavior and market-wide trading 
volume of the IPO stock. We compare insider trading in laddered IPOs to that of 
other IPO groups – Section 11 IPOs, full sample of non-sued IPOs as well as 
comparable non-sued IPOs.1 We consider both dollar trading volume, the number of 
transactions executed and insider sales to purchase index (ISPI) (e.g., Lang and 
John, 1991, Damodaran and Liu, 1993). With respect to post IPO stock trading 
volumes (cf. Table 4.10), differences during the lock-up period are less pervasive. 
After the expiration of the lock-up, however, trading volumes differ significantly. 
There is significantly higher trading volume 180 days after the IPO. 
For each of these groups of IPOs, we look at the transactions of the insiders 
after the IPO. We follow Thomson Reuters and define 4 levels of insider 
transactions.2 We only consider insider transactions from level 1 and level 2. The 
reasons is that only level 1 and 2 insiders resemble corporate executives and key 
decision makers with potential access to inside information.  
                                                          
1 In our matched firm analysis a non-sued IPO can be a match for several laddered IPOs due to limited 
size of the control group on NASDAQ, i.e. we allow double-counting. The results are qualitatively 
unaffected when we remove multiple observations of matched firms. 
2 For the description of insider classification please refer to Thomson Reuters manual. 
 
 
T
ab
le
 4
.1
0:
 P
os
t I
PO
 S
to
ck
 T
ra
di
ng
 V
ol
um
es
 
In
 th
e 
ta
bl
e 
be
lo
w
 w
e 
sh
ow
 tr
ad
in
g 
vo
lu
m
es
 o
ur
 IP
O
 g
ro
up
s,
 w
hi
ch
 h
av
e 
be
en
 d
ef
in
ed
 p
re
vi
ou
sl
y.
 W
e 
in
ve
st
ig
at
e 
tr
ad
in
g 
vo
lu
m
es
 a
t t
he
 o
ff
er
 d
ay
 a
nd
 s
ev
en
 d
if
fe
re
nt
 ti
m
e 
w
in
do
w
s,
 w
hi
ch
 a
re
 li
st
ed
 in
 th
e 
fi
rs
t r
ow
 o
f P
an
el
 A
. I
n 
th
is
 ta
bl
e 
w
e 
di
vi
de
 s
ha
re
 v
ol
um
e 
(a
s 
m
ea
su
re
d 
by
 C
R
SP
 a
s 
un
its
 o
f o
ne
 s
ha
re
 (r
ou
nd
ed
 to
 th
e 
ne
ar
es
t h
un
dr
ed
))
 b
y 
th
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f s
ha
re
s 
ou
ts
ta
nd
in
g 
(w
hi
ch
 is
 d
ef
la
te
d 
by
 1
00
0)
. W
e 
co
m
pu
te
 m
ea
ns
 (P
an
el
 A
) a
nd
 m
ed
ia
ns
 (P
an
el
 B
) a
nd
 te
st
 fo
r d
if
fe
re
nc
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
“l
ad
de
re
d”
 s
am
pl
e,
 
th
e 
m
at
ch
ed
 n
on
-s
ue
d 
sa
m
pl
e 
an
d 
th
e 
ot
he
r S
ec
tio
n 
11
 IP
O
s 
in
 P
an
el
 C
. 
 
T
ra
di
ng
 V
ol
um
e/
N
um
be
r 
of
 S
ha
re
s 
O
ut
st
an
di
ng
 
P
an
el
 A
: M
ea
n 
V
al
ue
s 
of
fe
r d
ay
 
[0
; 5
] 
[0
; 1
0]
 
[0
; 2
0]
 
[2
0;
 4
0]
 
[0
; 1
80
] 
[1
80
; 3
60
] 
[1
80
; 1
90
] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.
 A
ll 
IP
O
s 
0.
27
6 
0.
07
9 
0.
04
8 
0.
05
0 
0.
01
6 
0.
01
2 
0.
00
9 
0.
01
0 
2.
 L
ad
de
re
d 
IP
O
s 
0.
38
6 
0.
11
9 
0.
07
5 
0.
03
1 
0.
04
3 
0.
02
0 
0.
01
6 
0.
01
9 
3.
 P
ro
pe
ns
ity
 M
at
ch
ed
 IP
O
s 
 
0.
36
0 
0.
10
1 
0.
06
3 
0.
04
2 
0.
02
2 
0.
01
5 
0.
01
2 
0.
01
3 
4.
 S
ec
tio
n 
11
 IP
O
s 
0.
25
0 
0.
06
9 
0.
04
2 
0.
02
7 
0.
01
0 
0.
01
1 
0.
01
0 
0.
01
2 
P
an
el
 B
: M
ed
ia
n 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.
 A
ll 
IP
O
s 
0.
22
4 
0.
06
3 
0.
03
8 
0.
03
5 
0.
00
6 
0.
00
9 
0.
00
6 
0.
00
6 
2.
 L
ad
de
re
d 
IP
O
s 
0.
29
7 
0.
08
6 
0.
05
5 
0.
02
4 
0.
02
0 
0.
01
4 
0.
01
2 
0.
01
4 
3.
 P
ro
pe
ns
ity
 m
at
ch
ed
 IP
O
s 
 
0.
27
2 
0.
07
7 
0.
04
8 
0.
03
5 
0.
01
1 
0.
01
2 
0.
00
8 
0.
00
9 
4.
 S
ec
tio
n 
11
 IP
O
s 
0.
24
5 
0.
06
5 
0.
04
2 
0.
02
6 
0.
00
6 
0.
01
0 
0.
00
6 
0.
00
7 
P
an
el
 C
: D
iff
er
en
ce
s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D
if
fe
re
nc
e 
2-
3 
(t
-s
ta
t) 
0.
77
 
1.
64
 
1.
66
 
1.
80
 
2.
34
 
3.
27
 
3.
22
 
4.
33
 
D
if
fe
re
nc
e 
2-
3 
(W
ilc
ox
on
 z
-s
ta
t)
 
2.
67
 
3.
70
 
3.
67
 
2.
96
 
3.
58
 
4.
58
 
4.
43
 
4.
74
 
D
if
fe
re
nc
e 
2-
4 
(t
-s
ta
t) 
0.
41
 
1.
19
 
1.
24
 
1.
49
 
1.
79
 
2.
08
 
3.
07
 
3.
39
 
D
if
fe
re
nc
e 
2-
4 
(W
ilc
ox
on
 z
-s
ta
t)
 
1.
29
 
2.
22
 
2.
29
 
2.
00
 
2.
91
 
3.
34
 
4.
35
 
3.
90
 
115
116 
 
We consider open market transactions and include option exercises. We 
restrict our sample to Thomson Reuters cleanse indicators “R”, “H”, and “C”. We 
consider both the transaction volumes – i.e., transaction price times the number of 
shares tendered – and the transaction trades – i.e., the counts of every trade of an 
officer as a single observation aggregated during the respective time period. 
The results for the number of transactions are reported in Table 4.11. We 
find that in 38.33% of laddered IPOs insiders sell their shares prior to lock-period 
expiration. This is significantly more often than 32.79% in the case of Section 11 
IPOs, 29.25% for full sample of non-sued IPOs and 24.11% for similar non-sued 
IPOs. When we look at insiders selling activity over one month after the lock-up 
period expiration in 37.63% of laddered IPOs insiders sell some of their shares. This 
should be compared to 27.87%, 20.57% and 25.53% for Section 11, all non-sued 
and similar non-sued IPOs respectively. 
Table 4.11: Summary Statistics of Insider Trading Activity 
We show summary statistics of insider open market and private trading in private trading in the time 
periods of IPO until lock-up expiration (usually 180 days): 30, 90, and 180 days post lock-up expiration. 
Insider transaction data is obtained from Thomson Reuters. The sample covers the period of 1995-2007. 
Our five sample groups are as defined in earlier tables. Sample size is 1983 for non-sued IPOs, 287 for 
laddered IPOs, 61 for Section 11 IPOs, and 253 for our propensity matched sample, respectively. 
Panel A: non-sued  
(Group 1) [IPO; lock-up] [lock-up; 30] [lock-up; 90] [lock-up; 180] 
          
Number of firms 1983 1983 1983 1983 
% of firms with  
insider purchases 56.68% 10.29% 22.19% 34.75% 
% of firms with  
insider sales 29.25% 20.57% 38.93% 51.79% 
Number of  
Insider Purchases 6721 767 2677 5190 
Number of  
Insider Sales 3803 5505 19924 44978 
average # of  
purchase per firm 3.39 0.39 1.35 2.62 
average # of  
purchase per firm 1.92 2.78 10.05 22.68 
Average Dollar Volume  
Purchases per Firm $441,001.40 $33,414.24 $106,087.10 $196,517.20 
Average Dollar Volume  
Sales per Firm $3,167,308.00 $1,270,806.00 $3,292,976.00 $5,878,545.00 
Panel B: laddered  
firms (Group 2)         
Number of firms 287 287 287 287 
% of firms with  
insider purchases 60.28% 13.59% 24.39% 33.80% 
% of firms with  
insider sales 38.33% 37.63% 59.23% 71.43% 
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Number of  
Insider Purchases 1254 127 239 548 
Number of  
Insider Sales 1149 1516 3713 7364 
average # of  
purchase per firm 4.37 0.44 0.83 1.91 
average # of  
purchase per firm 4.00 5.28 12.94 25.66 
Average Dollar Volume  
Purchases per Firm $1,735,925.00 $482,109.60 $1,986,091.00 $2,093,420.00 
Average Dollar Volume  
Sales per Firm $14,173,705.00 $7,952,907.00 $18,289,255.00 $36,987,250.00 
Panel C: Section 11  
Firms (Group 3)         
Number of firms 61 61 61 61 
% of firms with  
insider purchases 50.82% 21.31% 39.34% 45.90% 
% of firms with  
insider sales 32.79% 27.87% 36.07% 45.90% 
Number of  
Insider Purchases 182 37 133 173 
Number of  
Insider Sales 107 1383 1490 1661 
average # of  
purchase per firm 2.98 0.61 2.18 2.84 
average # of  
purchase per firm 1.75 22.67 24.43 27.23 
Average Dollar Volume  
Purchases per Firm $419,453.60 $16,258.19 $101,163.80 $131,990.40 
Average Dollar Volume  
Sales per Firm $3,335,340.00 $1,698,010.00 $2,395,274.00 $3,489,346.00 
Panel D: Matched  
Sample (Group 4)         
Number of firms 253 253 253 253 
% of firms with  
insider purchases 60.08% 16.21% 23.72% 31.23% 
% of firms with  
insider sales 28.46% 31.23% 44.66% 56.52% 
Number of  
Insider Purchases 1137 214 345 585 
Number of  
Insider Sales 501 761 1476 2789 
average # of  
purchase per firm 4.49 0.85 1.36 2.31 
average # of  
purchase per firm 1.98 3.01 5.83 11.02 
Average Dollar Volume  
Purchases per Firm $1,727,802.00 $40,539.68 $108,165.20 $152,865.40 
Average Dollar Volume  
Sales per Firm $4,509,162.00 $624,337.90 $3,393,728.00 $5,461,906.00 
Panel E: Differences in  
Selling Volume (t-stats)         
(Group 2 - 4) 2.62*** 4.17*** 4.70*** 5.37*** 
(Group 2 - 3) 2.06** 1.74* 2.45** 2.78*** 
(Group 1 - 2) 8.01*** 8.22*** 9.77*** 11.50*** 
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When we look at transaction dollar volume sales we observe that insider 
sales in laddered IPOs are also significantly larger. In particular, prior to lock-period 
expiration insiders in laddered IPOs on average sold over 14 million dollars worth of 
stock, which is more than twice as any other IPO group. Results are very similar if 
we look at insider selling post lock-up period. When we consider insider sales-to-
purchase index (ISPI) in Table 4.12, we see that insiders in laddered IPO are 
significantly more likely to be net sellers of their shares than insiders in other IPO 
groups.33 For example, if we condition that there has been at least 1 (1.5, 2) insider 
transactions per week in the pre-lock-up period there are 2.79% (2.09%, 1.39%) of 
laddered IPOs whose insiders are net sellers over this period. This is significantly 
more than 0.50% (0.10%, 0.10%) in the case of non-sued IPOs, 0% (0%, 0%) for 
Section 11 IPOs and 1.19% (0%, 0%) for similar non-sued IPOs. The results are 
economically and qualitatively even stronger if we consider post-lock up period. 
4.5.2 Laddering and the Market Impact of Insider Trading 
What are the stock price implications of this behavior? We look at the stock price 
reaction to the sales of the insiders conditioning on whether the IPO is laddered. We 
estimate abnormal stock performance of IPO firms around the selling activity by 
insiders. The problem with defining abnormal returns for short-horizon event studies 
in IPOs is 1) the absence of an estimation period for computing expected returns and 
2) the difficulty of obtaining a set of comparable companies. Recall from Tables 4.2 
and 4.5 that our analysis deals with young growth companies with little or no history 
of profitability. One solution is to compare stock performance subsequent to an 
event to the performance of the own stock price during a reasonably distant 
comparison period. 
                                                          
33 We use a measure of standardized intensity of insider trading according to John and Lang (1991) and 
Damodaran and Liu (1993). We aggregate insider trades over a pre-defined time period t, where t is the 
number of days elapsed a) between offer date and lock-up expiration (for early releases) and b) between 
lock-up expiration until maximum 180 trading days. The measure is computed the following way: ISPI1 
= (NP – NS)/(NP + NS),  where NP is the aggregate number of insider purchases in time interval t and NS 
is the corresponding number of insider sale transactions. This index is bounded between -1 and +1. The 
interpretation of e.g. 0.2 would be that in 20% of the total number of transactions, insider purchases 
exceeded insider sales. A value of e.g. -1 means that of all transactions, 100% were sales transactions. 
However due to the bounded nature of this measure, a very low number of transactions can potentially 
result in very high/low values of the ISPI. This is why, in line with previous studies, we adopt the use of 
so-called threshold values for the insider transactions to be informative. We specify minimum levels of 
transactions per trading week which have to be exceeded for the insider trading behavior to be 
informative. So a threshold of 2 for a [IPO; lock-up] period implies that there should be at least 2 
transactions per trading week for a company to have its ISPI1 index calculated.  
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We define the abnormal return as the cumulative return on the company 
stock less return on the company over the control window. In such a way we aim to 
adjust for the systematic differences in exposure to risk factors between companies 
in difference IPO groups. We consider a (-1;+1) days event window with a (-6;-4) 
days control window, as well as a (-3;+3) days event window with (-10;-4) days 
control window. We report the results in Table 4.13. They show that the stock price 
reaction around insider sales is very similar for laddered IPOs and non-sued IPOs. 
This holds true whether we consider insider sales over two year period after the IPO 
or pre-lock period sales only. This provides evidence that higher trading activity by 
the insiders is not accompanied by higher price impact. Laddering appears to be a 
way of providing price support to the insiders that lasts for the length of the lock-up 
period and beyond that and allows the insiders to sell with minimal market impact. 
Table 4.13: Stock Market Reaction to Insider Sales 
We estimate abnormal stock performance of IPO companies around sales by insiders. fCAR3 is the 
cumulative return on the company stock over the (-1;+1) days window around the date of sale less return 
on the company over days (-6;-4). fCAR7 is the cumulative return on the company stock over the (-3;+3) 
days window around the date of sale less return on the company over days (-10;-4). All other variables are 
as defined previously. 
Panel A: all insiders sales over 2 years following IPO  
  fCAR3 fCAR7 
 n mean median mean median 
1. all IPOs 93803 0.00% 0.00% -0.44% -0.18% 
2. laddered IPOs 20634 0.10% 0.04% -0.38% -0.42% 
3. Section 11 IPOs 1684 -0.33% -0.06% -1.24% -0.54% 
4. non-sued IPOs 71485 -0.02% 0.00% -0.44% -0.12% 
Difference 2-4  t-test Wilcoxon t-test Wilcoxon 
  1.24 0.4 0.45 -0.65 
    (-0.22) -0.35 -0.65 (-0.26) 
Panel B: early releases (pre-lock-up termination sales)  
  fCAR3 fCAR7 
 n mean median mean median 
1. all IPOs 1192 -0.37% 0.00% -0.32% -0.04% 
2. laddered IPOs 307 -0.04% 0.81% -0.34% 0.92% 
3. Section 11 IPOs 21 4.61% 2.50% 5.35% 0.31% 
4. non-sued IPOs 864 -0.60% -0.05% -0.45% -0.18% 
Difference 2-4  t-test Wilcoxon t-test Wilcoxon 
  0.57 -0.86 0.07 0.13 
  -0.58 -0.2 -0.95 -0.45 
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4.6 Laddering again? 
Now that we have defined the main characteristics of laddering, we use 
them to ask whether the regulatory changes in 2000 determined a disappearance of 
this phenomenon. We proceed as follows. First, we determine whether we can 
predict the likelihood of the firms being laddered during the period of 2001-2007 
based on the estimated parameters from a binary probit model regressing the 
likelihood of IPOs being laddered during the period of 1995-2000. Then, we focus 
on the firms that have been identified as “laddered” and we determine whether they 
display the same characteristics that distinguished laddered firms.  
We start by verifying that characteristics that we identified as drivers of 
laddering (high underpricing, high underwriter rank, etc) are indeed helpful to 
predict laddering. To do this, we estimate the relation between likelihood of 
laddering and its characteristics for 1995-1998 and use the obtained coefficients to 
construct the predicted values of likelihood of IPO laddering for 1999-2000 period. 
We find that there is a significant relation between predicted values of laddering and 
actual laddering – the correlation stands at 62.16%. Moreover, 15 (28) of top 15 (30) 
companies with highest likelihood of laddering have actually been sued for 
laddering subsequently. This provides in-sample validation of our predictive model.  
Also, if we relate the probability of being laddered to some of the 
observable characteristics that define the economics of laddering – trading by 
insiders and involvement of underwriter – we see that the predicted laddered IPOs 
display patterns which resemble the characteristics of the firms which went public 
prior to 2001 and were sued for laddering. In Table 4.14, we show that firms that 
rank high on the predicted likelihood of laddering have much higher instances of 
insider trading, dollar volume of these transactions is higher and insider net trading 
behavior as measured by ISPI index is more heavily tilted toward net selling of 
company stocks. In particular, in 52.5%1 of companies in the upper quartile of the 
likelihood of being insiders are net sellers within 90 days after the expiration of the 
lock-up. This compares to 38.5%, 28.2% and 33.6% for the second, third and fourth 
quartile. Similar results could be observed when we compare dollar volume or the 
number of transactions being executed. If we condition on at least 1.5 (2) transaction 
per week to take place, results are even more extreme: 28.8% (27.1%) of companies 
in the top quartile of the probability distribution of being laddered are net sellers 
within 90 days after lock-up expiration. This compares to 12% (11%), 9.4% (7.6%), 
and 12% (6.9%) for the third, second, and bottom quartile respectively. The 
unconditional average (between 2001 and 2007) ranges at 38.2% for the same time 
interval and at 15.6% and 12.4%, if we condition on weekly minimum transactions. 
                                                          
1 Not reported in Table 4.15 but available upon request 
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In Table 4.15, we relate the out-of-sample likelihood of laddering to brand 
underwriter ownership for the sample of IPOs in 2001-2007. In a multivariate 
setting we find that companies which are likely to have been laddered in this time 
period have a much more significant underwriter ownership than companies with 
low predicted likelihood of laddering. If we consider IPOs with a one standard 
deviation higher predicted laddering likelihood, then underwriter ownership in these 
companies in the quarter right after the IPO is 9.1% more likely and 12.7% (10.2%, 
9.2%, 13.0%) one (two, three, four) quarter after. The difference in ownership is 
even more significant if we compare top quartile of laddering likelihood firms with 
firms in the third and fourth quartiles. 
As additional check, we study the effects of insider selling after the IPO. 
Similar to the analysis in Section 5.2 we estimate abnormal stock performance of 
IPO firms around sales by insiders and relate them to the likelihood of laddering. As 
before, we define the abnormal return as the cumulative return on the company stock 
less return on the return on the company over the control window. The results 
indicate that there is no economic or statistical difference in stock market reaction to 
insider sales across laddering likelihood groups. This holds if we consider a two-
year window after the IPO as well as if we focus on the pre-lock period sales only. 
All these results suggest that a phenomenon very similar to laddering is still taking 
place and the regulatory changes just made it more difficult for investor to file 
lawsuits. 
4.7 Conclusion 
We study the effect of regulation on financial markets using the case of 
“laddered IPOs”. In 2001, authorities deliberately started to clamp down on 
laddering and changed the degree of enforcement of Regulation M, which was 
amended in 1997 to proscribe market manipulation. In the period 1998-2000, a 
yearly average 104 of lawsuits were filed, which almost completely vanished after 
2001. We argue that this sharp reduction, far from being the outcome or a successful 
regulatory sweep, in fact was due to the investment banks changing the form of the 
game. In fact, laddering still goes on with the same characteristics, but largely 
unnoticed by the Courts and investors.  
To make this point, we first identify the drivers of laddering. We document 
the relation between laddering and underpricing and show that in the presence of 
lawsuits, underwriters used the first-day price return to avoid the probability of 
being sued. However, ex post, the likelihood of litigation was higher than ex ante, 
which is why underpricing was not optimal. We document a positive correlation 
between laddering and underpricing. Next, we provide evidence of how the 
underwriter can implement laddering. We argue that the underwriter exploits the 
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asset management arm of the financial conglomerate it belongs to in order to support 
the price after the IPO. We compare laddered IPOs to a matched sample of other 
similar but non-laddered IPOs and we show that in the laddered IPOs, the 
probability of the affiliated conglomerate to have a stake is significantly higher (up 
to twice as high) compared to non-sued IPOs or laddered firms. Being laddered 
raises the fraction held by the affiliated underwriting group. In particular, laddered 
IPOs are 11.4% more likely to enjoy a direct investment of the affiliated 
conglomerate in the first quarter after the IPO, 9.1% higher in the second quarter, 
13.5% higher in the third quarter and 15.1% higher in the fourth quarter. No similar 
behavior is detected in case of non-laddered IPOs. A direct implication of this 
underwriter involvement is the fact that the performance of the laddered IPO is 
higher than that of other IPOs. Laddered firms display a better aftermarket 
performance in terms of raw excess returns than the non-laddered sample.  
We then look at the potential beneficiaries of the laddering strategy and we 
identify them in the insiders. Laddering keeps the price artificially high so as to 
allow the insiders to trade by selling their share after the IPO and the expiration of 
the lock-up period without negatively affecting the stock price. Laddered IPOs 
display abnormal – with respect to the other IPOs and with respect to the average 
life of the stock – trading activity by the insiders as the lockup period expires. This 
higher trading activity by the insiders is not accompanied by higher price impact. 
The stock price reaction around insider sales is always lower for laddered IPOs than 
for the other ones. This holds across the different windows and is economically 
significant. For laddered IPOs the abnormal return is even lower than average.  
We then ask whether this type of price support persists even after 2001, 
when no lawsuits were any longer filed. To address this issue, we use the 
characteristics that identify the laddered IPO in sample till 2000 and build a model 
that predicts laddering and we apply this model out-of-sample from 2001 onwards. 
We show that “hiddenly-laddered” IPOs display significant higher insider trading 
activity and a higher stake of the conglomerate affiliated with the underwriter. This 
trading takes place at convenient – in the sense of low price impact – trading 
conditions.    
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Appendix A: Variables used in the Analysis 
Variable Definition source 
Bookrunner(s) 
rank 
Average rank of joint bookrunners (min. 1, max. 9) according to 
underwriter reputation by Carter and Manaster (1990)  
SDC and Jay 
Ritter 
Bubble 
dummy 
Time dummy equaling unity if IPO took place between 1999 and 
2000, zero otherwise SDC 
firm age logarithm of the IPO firm age at the date of the primary offering Jay Ritter 
first day 
return 
change between the IPO offer price and the closing price on the stock's 
first day of trading (i.e. IPO underpricing) SDC and CRSP 
internet/high-
tech IPO 
dummy equaling unity if IPO firm's primary SIC is classified as an 
internet- or high-tech firm according to Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 
(2003) and Loughran and Ritter (2004) 
SDC and Jay 
Ritter 
lawsuit filed 
(dummy) 
dummy variable equaling one if the IPO firm was sued for "Section 
11-type" allegations or "laddering-type" allegations 
Stanford Law 
School 
Section 11 
(dummy)  
dummy variable equaling one if the IPO firm was sued under Section 
11 of the Securities Act of 1933 as in Lowry and Shu (2002) 
Stanford Law 
School 
Laddering 
(dummy) 
dummy variable equaling one if the IPO firm was sued for allegations 
of "laddering-practices" from the underwriting investment bank 
Stanford Law 
School 
Money left on 
the table 
Equals the variable number of shares offered times the first day closing 
price minus proceeds raised.  SDC and CRSP 
Number of 
bookrunners Number of joint book-runners in an IPO deal  SDC 
Post IPO 
Market 
Capitalization 
Post IPO Market Cap is the number of shares outstanding after the IPO 
times the first day closing price CRSP 
post IPO 
std.dev.  
the annualized standard deviation of stock returns over one year from 
day 22 after the IPO CRSP 
post IPO 
turnover 
equals [1  - ∏t (1 – volume tradedt/total sharest)], computed for the 
year after the IPO CRSP 
pre-IPO 
Std.dev.  
annualized volatility of a matched sample over the one year prior to the 
IPO to proxy for the IPO firm’s standard deviation and stock turnover CRSP 
pre-IPO 
Turnover  
average stock turnover of a matched sample over the one year prior to 
the IPO to proxy for the IPO firm’s standard deviation and stock 
turnover 
CRSP 
Price update  Price update equals the percentage change between the midpoint of the file range and the offer price (partial adjustment; Hanley, 1993) SDC and CRSP 
Prior 
NASDAQ 
return 
equals the compounded value-weighted NASDAQ market return over 
the 15 trading days prior to the IPO CRSP 
syndicate size Total number of (joint-) bookrunners, co-managers, global coordinators and syndicate members SDC 
VC backing dummy variable, which equals unity if the firm was backed by a venture capitalist (VC) prior to the IPO SDC 
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Appendix B: Variable Description 
Variables marked with * are computed net of the SIC2 industry median. 
Variable Name description 
Log(total assets) Total Assets, Compustat item 6 
Log(b/m)* 
Book to Market (B/M) is the ratio of debt to equity for the prior fiscal year 
(COMPUSTAT items 9/60) 
P/E* 
Price to Earnings (P/E) is the ratio of the year-end stock price to earnings per 
share for the prior fiscal year (COMPUSTAT items 24/58). 
D/E* 
Debt to Equity (D/E) is the ratio of debt to equity for the prior fiscal year 
(COMPUSTAT items 9/60) 
OpIncome* Ratio of operating income to total assets: CCM data 13/ data 6. 
R_D_Sales* 
Ratio of research and development expenses relative to total sales of the firm: 
CCM data 46 / data 12 
Capex* Ratio of capital expenditure to total assets of the firm: CCM data 128/ data 6. 
IO* 
End of the year fraction of shares outstanding owned by institutional fund 
managers: Spectrum 13f. 
Sic2Herf 
Sum of the squared market share of each firm in the same industry during a 
year. Market share is defined as the total sales of the firm in a given year 
divided by the total sales of the industry in the year. The industry is defined at 
the two-digit SIC code level, where the SIC codes have been obtained from 
CRSP Monthly Stocks (SICCD). The sales data comes from CCM: data 12. 
Credit spread 
Difference between yields to maturity on corporate bond and Treasury with 
similar maturity: estimated from Lehman Brothers Bond Database data and 
FRED 
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Chapter 5 
 
Industry competition, ownership structure 
and shareholder activism1 
 
 
We study shareholder activism by means of proxy proposals in the United States 
from 1997 to 2006. Using a new dataset of 9,082 shareholder proposals, we 
investigate the determinants of being targeted by shareholder activists and the 
corresponding voting results. Our dataset is distinctive from others as it also 
includes withdrawn and omitted shareholder proposals. By including those proposals 
in our analyses, we circumvent a selection bias towards only those proposals that 
actually go to a vote. We hypothesize that a lack of industry competition in 
combination with higher managerial entrenchment by fewer shareholder rights 
increases the likelihood of being targeted. Our empirical results support this 
hypothesis. Concerning the actual voting outcomes of shareholder proposals, we 
find that insiders’ equity holdings are significantly and negatively correlated with 
the voting outcomes. Managers of firms that are operating in highly concentrated 
industries with few shareholder rights actively vote against shareholder proposals. 
 
5.1 Introduction  
We demonstrate that entrenchment and the firm’s exposure to the degree of 
industry competition jointly influence the occurrence and efficiency of shareholder 
activism in the form of proxy proposals. Using this channel, shareholders can 
monitor and pressure management and boards to pursue actions that increase firm 
value and in turn supposedly lead to improved shareholder value. This is an 
important corporate governance mechanism in the United States. Rule 14a-8 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the so-called shareholder proposal rule, allows 
individuals and institutional investors to file proposals to be included in the proxy 
statement that strive for a change in the companies’ operations, governance 
                                                          
1 This chapter is based on Bauer, Braun, and Viehs (2010). 
132 
 
structures or social policies. We hypothesize that firms with low competition and 
weak governance are more likely to be targeted by shareholders. Concerning the 
success rate of the voting process, the roles of the outside shareholder base and 
insider holdings of voting rights are pivotal. Our study does not only investigate the 
magnitude and frequency but also the actual outcome of shareholder proposals. 
The extent of shareholder activism has been increasing. Both small 
individual shareholders, so-called gadfly investors, and institutional shareholders are 
becoming more active in trying to influence and change managerial actions and 
corporate governance structures. Examples are Carl Icahn and his confrontational 
request to remove the entire board of directors of Yahoo! in 2008 or the Rockefeller 
family who strived for the separation of the positions of the chairman of the board 
and the CEO at Exxon Mobile in spring 2008.    
Managers are exposed to several monitoring mechanisms. Firstly, the 
managerial labor market is designed to ensure that they maximize firm value. The 
extent to which managers are exposed to takeover threats and the accompanying 
shareholder wealth effects have been widely researched in the literature (cf. 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003). Secondly, these insights have been extended by 
the degree of industry competition acting as an alternative or complimentary 
corporate governance mechanism in motivating and disciplining managers to exert 
optimal effort (cf. Hart, 1993, Giroud and Mueller, 2009; 2010). Industry 
competition as a governance device makes economic sense since competition in the 
industry reduces managerial slack and room for opportunistic behavior. We 
therefore assume the threat to be driven out of business to be equivalent to being 
taken over. Both eventually result in the manager’s position to be endangered. 
Industry competition as a purely exogenous governance mechanism cannot be 
altered by shareholders. This implies that shareholder activism is more likely to 
occur in industries where the firm competes with very few companies for market 
share. We define competition as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (sum of each 
firms’ squared percentages of the industry’s total revenue; henceforth HHI) 
corresponding three digit SIC code. 
We posit that if both industry competition and the managerial labor market 
fail to discipline managers, shareholders will adopt a different way of trying to 
influence managerial behavior and corporate governance structures, namely voice 
engagement through proxy proposals. By raising their voice, shareholders can 
prevent managers from enjoying a quiet life, a concept which has been put forward 
by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003). Our paper assumes that already the mere 
filing of shareholder proposals is costly for managers to deal with. On the one hand 
this is due to negative publicity. For the manager this is a public signal for 
underperformance. On the other hand it also resembles a significant opportunity cost 
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for managers to deal with and actively block proposals. This costliness also siphons 
resources and time from the annual general meeting agenda. This makes shareholder 
activism a pervasive nuisance for the entrenched manager. We argue that the 
occurrence of shareholder proposals is particularly strong for poorly governed firms 
that are not exposed to fierce industry competition and the managerial takeover 
market. In the absence of punishment for poor performance, shareholders’ optimal 
response in these firms is to propose steeper incentives for managers. Figuratively 
speaking, the absence of “sticks”, requires managers to be awarded “carrots” in 
order to exert optimal effort. However, carrots in the form of option packages 
involve the downside of equity compensation. As a result, corporate insiders might 
own a larger fraction of voting rights, which could be abused to enforce certain 
corporate policies that are not in the interest of shareholders. Consequently, we also 
investigate in how far insiders’ voting rights influence the voting outcomes of 
shareholder proposals. More specifically, we study whether managers use their 
voting rights to vote against shareholder proposals.  
We start by showing who gets targeted. First, we observe an increasing 
trend of shareholder proposals between 1997 and 2006 on aggregate. Secondly, 
companies are more likely to receive shareholder proposals if they are both poorly 
governed and if the disciplining force of a highly competitive industry is absent. 
This finding is particularly strong for shareholder proposals that pertain to internal 
governance and compensation, which is in line with shareholders’ optimal response. 
Thirdly, the outside shareholder base and its structure play a significant role with 
respect to the occurrence and frequency of shareholder proposals.  
Next we look at what affects whether activism is successful, i.e. how this 
depends on insider ownership and institutional ownership. Our analysis of the voting 
outcomes of shareholder proposals shows that shareholdings of corporate insiders 
are stronger correlated with the voting outcomes than holdings of outside investors. 
Insiders of firms, where both shareholder rights and industry competition are absent, 
apparently use their voting rights to block shareholder proposals. We find a 
significantly negative relation between our measure for insider ownership and the 
number of votes cast in favor of proposals. This result is robust to different measures 
of competition and governance quality. These findings indicate that managers in 
these firms are not able to shirk because corporate insiders receive negative publicity 
from activism and have to actively vote against proposals. This holds especially in 
the presence of steeper incentives. We argue that shareholders of poorly governed 
firms recognize that managers of those companies have more discretion and thus 
shareholders use “voice” engagement in the form of proxy proposals to discipline 
and monitor managers.  
134 
 
Our results have several implications. If corporate insiders actively vote to 
block shareholder proposals, our results help to explain why previous studies find 
that the proxy proposal mechanism is ineffective in monitoring managers. The 
results of our empirical analysis ultimately relate to two different streams of 
literature on (1) shareholder activism and (2) industry competition as an alternative 
or complimentary corporate governance mechanism. To the best of our knowledge, 
no previous study explicitly investigates the impact of industry competition in 
combination with managerial entrenchment on the presence and effectiveness of 
shareholder activism. So far literature on shareholder activism has mainly focused 
on firm and ownership characteristics to draw inferences about the determinants of 
the likelihood of receiving a proposal and the corresponding voting results. In 
particular, the insider and outsider shareholder base influences the voting results of 
shareholder proposals (Gordon and Pound, 1993; John and Klein, 1995; and Gillan 
and Starks, 2000). Furthermore, the chances of being targeted by proposals are 
affected by the firm’s past performance and its size (John and Klein, 1995 and 
Karpoff, Malatesta and Walkling, 1996). Previous studies find no significant relation 
between the insider holdings of voting rights and the likelihood of receiving a 
proposal.  
Institutional shareholders play an important role in the proxy proposal 
process both as proposal sponsors and as shareholders per se (Smith, 1996, Wahal, 
1996, Kahn and Winton, 1998, Gillan and Starks, 2000). These investors have more 
incentives and power to induce other (institutional) shareholders to vote with them. 
Consequently, proposals sponsored by institutions display the strongest voting 
support. They are also more effective when it comes to private negotiations with 
management which might eventually lead to changes in corporate policies or 
governance structures (Carleton, Nelson and Weisbach, 1998 and Chidambaran and 
Woidtke, 1999). Especially proposals that have been withdrawn prior to the annual 
meeting because of private negotiations provide evidence of bargaining power of 
institutional investors and/or management. Withdrawn proposals also reflect 
management’s ability to shirk since it will negotiate about a possible withdrawal if it 
feels that those proposals erode managerial power or expose managers to negative 
publicity. Given that managers are able to successfully negotiate about a proposal 
withdrawal, they are in a comfortable position. Omitting these proposals from the 
analysis causes a serious bias towards ex post unsuccessful proposals, which we 
address. 
An emerging body of literature questions the absolute measure of corporate 
governance and proposes the addition of a moderating factor into the analysis, 
namely the degree of industry competition. Theoretical work by Hart (1993) 
provides the foundation for the argument that industry competition can mitigate 
principal-agent conflicts. The key notion in this concept is that good governance 
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only matters relatively to industry- or geographic peers. Giroud and Mueller (2010) 
report that highly concentrated industries benefit from good corporate governance 
practices whereas in competitive industries this effect is not observable. Likewise, 
Giroud and Mueller (2009) show that on average, firms in highly concentrated 
industries suffer from exogenous shocks that weaken governance structures of firms. 
In contrast, firms in highly competitive industries are not affected by these shocks. 
Further, they find that managers of firms in highly concentrated industries can enjoy 
a quiet life. Lastly, a firm’s governance quality has to be evaluated against its 
operating environment (John and Kadyrzhanova, 2008). Ultimately, the evidence on 
industry competition as a governance mechanism alludes to a relation between the 
level of competition and the corporate governance quality of firms. We provide 
direct evidence on relative governance by showing that managers of poorly-
governed firms in highly concentrated industries are prevented from exerting no 
effort as shareholders become active and exert control. We show that only if 
managers hold substantial fractions of voting rights and they use those rights to vote 
against shareholder proposals, they are in a dominant position. A logical reaction is 
to exploit the voting rights in management proposals. However, shareholders are 
still able to attach negative publicity to their activism, which is what management 
aims to avoid. 
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in numerous ways. Firstly, 
we examine the determinants of being targeted by shareholder proposals. Here, we 
contribute by studying the joint effects of industry competition and the managerial 
labor market (i.e. antitakeover provisions) on the occurrence of proposals. Our 
second contribution is to study under which circumstances corporate insiders are in a 
comfortable position when the disciplining forces from the takeover market and 
industry are absent. To shed light on this hypothesis, we study if insider holdings of 
voting rights are used to block shareholder proposals that eventually go to a vote at 
annual general meetings. If insider holdings of voting rights significantly relate to 
the voting outcome, we provide indicative evidence of managers that actively vote 
against shareholder proposals. However, if shareholders succeed at annual meetings 
with their resolutions, we argue find evidence of optimal contracting, and managers 
are still controlled. We therefore provide evidence on the efficiency of shareholder 
activism in the presence of insider holdings conditional on the firm’s competitive- 
and governance environment. Our third contribution is the uniqueness of our data. 
Our shareholder proposal database includes shareholder proposal information from 
1997-2006. This database is distinctive from others because it also includes 
information about withdrawn and omitted shareholder proposals. Withdrawn 
proposals have been subject to private negotiations between corporate managers and 
proposal sponsors prior to the annual meeting. Eventually, they are withdrawn from 
the voting process. Omitted proposals, on the other hand, have been removed from 
the voting agenda because they violate SEC regulations. In other words, these 
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proposals are not put to a vote but they still occur. Existing studies on shareholder 
proposals (see for example Gordon and Pound, 1993 or Gillan and Starks, 2000) 
suffer from a selection bias in the sense that they focus only on proposals which 
management admitted to the voting process. These proposals have a low ex ante 
probability of receiving a majority. Restricting the analysis to these instances 
neglects the bulk of firms, where no such proposal has been filed from the investor 
base. More importantly it neglects firms, where proposals have been withdrawn for 
private negotiation. Hence, we investigate all companies in the COMPUSTAT 
universe, which have complete financial and ownership information available, 
irrespective of whether they have been targeted or not to circumvent this selection 
bias. The results of our paper cast doubt on prior studies’ conclusion of ineffective 
shareholder voting. Shareholder proposals do not have to be voted on successfully to 
be effective. In our setup, the mere filing of proposals is sufficient for preventing 
managerial entrenchment and can be regarded as effective. 
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In the next section we 
present our economic model and hypotheses. Section three presents our data and 
data sources. In section four we present descriptive statistics about shareholder 
proposals and our sample firms. In section five we perform our empirical analyses. 
Section six discusses our results and concludes. 
5.2  Economic Framework and Testable Hypotheses 
We conjecture that two important governance mechanisms influence the 
occurrence of shareholder proposals and the associated voting outcomes. The first 
channel is exogenous in nature and cannot be changed by shareholders, namely the 
competitive environment a company is acting in. As a proxy for the competitiveness 
of the industry we use the industry concentration level as measured by the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index based on the 3-digit SIC code. As a second channel, 
we argue that the firm’s governance quality determines a firm’s vulnerability 
towards shareholder proposals. We use the firm’s exposure to the takeover market as 
a proxy for the governance quality (i.e. the Governance Index as constructed by 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003; henceforth G-index). A higher exposure to the 
takeover market lowers managerial entrenchment and increases the extent of 
shareholder rights. We follow Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) and Giroud and 
Müller (2009) to classify companies as either “democratic” (G-index ≤ 5) or 
“dictator” (G-index ≥ 14) companies that are exposed to either a highly 
“competitive” or “concentrated” industry2. 
                                                          
2 Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) set up the G-index which comprises 24 antitakeover provisions 
(ATPs). The authors add one point for each ATP in place. They classify companies as “democratic” if the 
G-index is smaller or equal to 5. On the other hand, “dictator” firms are companies that have a G-index 
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We develop an economic framework to derive our testable hypotheses. This 
two-dimensional theoretical model illustrates how industry competition and the level 
of managerial entrenchment jointly influence the probability of being targeted by 
shareholder proposals.  
Figure 5.1: Economic Model 
This figure shows the economic model, which provides the theoretical foundation for our paper. We 
distinguish firms along two dimensions: shareholder rights and the degree of industry competition it is 
part of. In particular, we investigate dictatorship firms (G-index ≥ 14) and democracy firms (G-index ≤ 5) 
operating in highly concentrated (top quintile of the industry Herfindahl-Hirschman index) or highly 
competitive industries (bottom quintile of the industry Herfindahl-Hirschman index). Depending on the 
number of punishing devices companies have in place (“sticks”) the likelihood of being targeted by 
shareholder proposals varies. Most importantly, the upper right quadrant displays the highest likelihood of 
being targeted since other disciplining tools are absent.  
 
 
 
We follow Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) and Giroud and Mueller 
(2009 and 2010) to classify companies as either “democratic” or “dictator” 
companies that are exposed to either a highly “competitive” or “concentrated” 
                                                                                                                                        
larger or equal to 14. Firms are operating in a highly concentrated industry if the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) of the respective SIC 3-digit industry belong to the highest quintile. Correspondingly, firms 
are part of a highly competitive industry if the HHI of the SIC 3-digit industry belongs to the lowest 
quintile.  
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industry. Concerning our industry concentration measure, we adopt the same 
measure as Giroud and Mueller. Accordingly, industries in the top quintile with 
respect to the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the respective 3-digit SIC code are 
considered to be “highly concentrated”. Correspondingly, industries in the lowest 
quintile of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index are considered as “highly competitive” 
industries. Consequently, we differentiate between four different types of firms: 
dictatorship/concentrated industry (Q1: Poorly-governed firms), 
democracy/concentrated industry (Q2), democracy/competitive industry (Q3: Well-
governed firms) and dictatorship/competitive industry (Q4).  
Based on our model, we hypothesize the following. First, we hypothesize 
that firms in Q1 are highly prone to shareholder proposals because those firms are 
lacking disciplining forces from both the takeover market and competition. 
Shareholders realize that managerial discretion is highest in those firms and decide 
to file proposals which call for a change in governance structures or incentive 
policies. In contrast, firms which belong to Q2 or Q4 exhibit relatively lower 
vulnerability towards shareholder proposals because in either case at least one 
governance mechanism is effectively present. Firms in Q3 are least likely to be 
targeted by shareholders. The reason for this claim is that industry competition in 
this quadrant is high and those companies also exhibit more shareholder rights 
implying that both monitoring mechanisms are working properly, making it 
unnecessary for shareholders to file proposals. Hence, we conjecture: 
H1: Firms with low shareholder rights and weak industry competition (Q1 firms) 
are more likely to receive shareholder proposals.  
Firms located in the upper right quadrant should also exhibit steeper 
incentives in the form of option packages. This is because in the absence of 
punishing or disciplining devices from the takeover market and the industry, 
managers need to be given pecuniary incentives in the form of option incentives in 
order to exert effort: 
H1a: Firms, which face little industry competition and have low shareholder rights, 
will have steeper incentives in the form of options than their well-governed 
counterparts. As a response, shareholders will file proposals on internal governance 
and compensation. 
Thirdly, we posit that the outside shareholder base is an important 
determinant for the occurrence and frequency of shareholder proposals. The 
economic rationale is the following. A larger shareholder base – both in terms of the 
actual number of common shareholders as well as the density and structure of 
institutional shareholdings – increases the probability of one shareholder actually 
becoming active and file a proposal. Furthermore, if the ownership concentration 
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among institutional shareholders is high as well, collusion between those 
shareholders occurs more easily. Correspondingly, we claim that the probability of 
being targeted with shareholder proposals increases with a concentrated institutional 
ownership and a larger shareholder base: 
H1b: Higher institutional ownership concentration and a large shareholder base 
positively relate to the magnitude of filing shareholder proposals. 
Concerning the voting outcomes of admitted shareholder proposals, we 
argue that the internal shareholder base is a key determinant. Implicit collusion for 
insiders is simple because they share common interests, objectives and incentives. 
We hypothesize insiders to be reluctant to accept intervention into the corporate 
strategy or governance structure and indicate a preference to entrench. Hence, we 
argue that insiders of firms in concentrated industries with strong takeover 
protection will exploit their holdings of voting rights in order to actively vote against 
shareholder proposals. Management’s alternative to blocking shareholder proposals 
would be to propose compensation structures themselves via management proposals. 
In unreported tests on managerial-sponsored compensation proposals, we find that 
these proposals have an unconditional acceptance rate of more than 95%.  
H2: The voting outcomes of admitted shareholder proposals are negatively related 
to insiders’ equity holdings. 
5.3 Data  
5.3.1 Shareholder Proposals and Annual Meeting Information 
We use a unique dataset which provides information on all shareholder 
proposals brought forward to S&P1500 companies between 1997 and 2006. The 
data come from RiskMetrics (formerly IRRC) and consist of annual meeting dates, 
information about the proposal content, proposal filers, proposal status and 
corresponding voting results. In total, our dataset includes 9,082 shareholder 
proposals addressing corporate governance and corporate social responsibility 
issues. These proposals have been put to a vote, have been withdrawn prior to the 
annual meeting for private negotiations, or they have been omitted from the proxy 
statement because they violate SEC proxy rules. We argue that previous studies 
suffer from a selection bias in that they neglect withdrawn and omitted shareholder 
proposals. We circumvent this bias because we include withdrawn and omitted 
proposals in our empirical analysis to study the actual probability of being targeted 
by shareholders.  
140 
 
We manually classify both proposal topics and sponsors into different 
groups. The coarse classification is into four main categories: Corporate governance, 
corporate social responsibility (CSR), mixed issues and other proposals. In the 
following empirical analysis we focus on the former two categories only. Following 
Karpoff, Malatesta and Walkling (1996), Gillan and Starks (2000), Gompers, Ishii 
and Metrick (2003) and Becht, Bolton and Röell (2005), we break down corporate 
governance proposals into finer sub-classes. Corporate governance proposals consist 
of external corporate control proposals, internal governance proposals and takeover 
resolutions. External governance proposals mostly consist of resolutions related to 
anti-takeover devices and the market for corporate control in general. Most internal 
proposals deal with the board of directors, voting issues and executive 
compensation. Furthermore, we split up CSR proposals into social and 
environmental proposals, which deal with current buzzwords like human rights, 
health, diversity and climate change.  
Furthermore, we distinguish between four different sponsor groups: 
Individual investors (e.g. Evelyn Davis, the Rossi Family, etc.), institutional 
investors (e.g. asset managers, investment companies, pension funds, etc.), 
coordinated activists (religious and other interest groups) and unions (e.g. AFL-CIO, 
Teamsters, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, etc.) as proposal sponsors. Appendix 
A contains examples of each proposal topic and sponsor category. 
5.3.2 Insider Ownership Data 
A cornerstone of our study concerns the ownership structure of our sample 
companies. We are interested in the fraction of voting rights owned by corporate 
insiders (i.e. the board) and whether these voting rights are used to block shareholder 
proposals at annual meetings. Pieces of insider ownership information come from 
RiskMetrics which include detailed director information and amounts of voting 
rights owned by each individual director. However, when two or even more 
directors have voting power over a set of stock owned by a trust, foundation, or 
another company, RiskMetrics assigns the corresponding voting rights to each 
director sitting on the board. This means, that the insider stock ownership sometimes 
exceeds 100% because of multiple assignment of the stakes. Hence, we recalculate 
the ownership data if the holdings exceed a pre-specified threshold of 80% using 
proxy statements of the relevant companies in order to get a more accurate measure 
of director holdings. We employ the following three-step methodology to re-
calculate insider stock ownership which is based on Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) 
and DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985): (1) Shareholdings owned by a trust, 
foundation or another company are considered to be managerial holdings if directors 
and/or officers of the holding company are also sitting on the board of this particular 
company in which their company owns a stake; (2) To avoid double counting, we 
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assign the ownership owned by a trust, foundation or company to only the director 
with the highest hierarchical position in the sample company; (3) In cases where the 
positions of the directors are unidentifiable, we attribute the stock ownership to only 
one director. 
We then merge RiskMetrics’ data with COMPUSTAT’s Execucomp 
database to identify the incumbent CEO of the relevant companies. Following those 
steps we are able to calculate our proxies for insider holdings: Overall board 
ownership, the CEO holdings and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the board’s 
holdings of voting rights as a concentration measure of insider holdings.   
5.3.2 Shareholder Base Data 
Next to insider holdings of voting rights we are also interested in the effects 
of the outside ownership structure on both the occurrence of shareholder proposals 
and the outcomes of proposals that are put to a vote. We use Thomson Reuters 13(f) 
flings to retrieve data on the holdings of institutional investors and construct the 
following variables. We count the number of institutional 5% holders as well as the 
concentration of institutional ownership with the following measure: 
  XX162  ∑ T'62gU\'@= ,     (1) 
where HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of percentages held by institutional 
investors (as designated by the Thomson Reuters institutional holdings 13f database) 
of firm j in year t. We sum the squared percentages of each institutional investor i at 
time t across N investors in firm j. We use the average of four quarterly filings per 
company and investor. Naturally, the index is bounded between zero and one. We 
further have a ratio of total institutional share ownership, which is common practice 
in the literature. The economic logic behind counting the number of institutional 
blockholders is that more large shareholders are either more likely to disagree or to 
collude over shareholder proposals depending on the proposal content and sponsor 
identity. 
In addition to that we break down the institutional ownership structure 
further. Bushee (2008) has further sub-classified the Thomson Reuters database into 
eight distinct investor groups: (1) bank investors, (2) insurance companies, (3) 
independent investment advisors, (4) investment companies, (5) corporate pension 
plans, (6) public pension plans, (7) university funds and endowments, and (8) 
miscellaneous. Due to potential ambiguities we summarize group (3) and (4). We 
also compute the dollar values of the holdings in order to account for differences in 
market valuations and firm sizes. The economic intuition behind disaggregate 
institutional investor holdings is as follows. There are certain investor groups which 
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are more likely to suffer from conflicts of interest and are subject to higher 
disagreement. Other investor groups, as for example corporate pension funds and 
insurance companies, tend to outsource their proxy voting and are likely to vote with 
the management recommendation possibly because of existing business ties with 
target companies (cf. Cornett et al., 2007 and Chen et al., 2007). 
5.3.3 Firm, Industry and Governance Characteristics 
We obtain relevant firm level data from COMPUSTAT. This data include 
information about the company’s cash position, size, market-to-book ratio, dividend 
yield, past performance and leverage. We approximate firm age with the first listing 
date on CRSP. RiskMetrics is the source for the G-index, our measure for the 
governance quality, and the dual-class status of our sample firms. In our analyses we 
also control for managerial incentives. To do so, we use the “scaled wealth-
performance sensitivity” developed by Edmans, Gabaix and Landier (2009). This 
variable takes into account that managerial effort is multiplicative with respect to 
firm size. It measures the CEO’s wealth change (in U.S. dollars) for a percentage 
point change in firm value, irrespective of firm size and industry. To obtain a 
measure for the industry concentration level, we calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index for every 3-digit SIC industry, based on all COMPUSTAT firms. We 
calculate the HHI by summing all squared market shares (based on total sales) of all 
firms in the respective 3-digit SIC industry.  
5.4 Descriptive Statistics 
5.4.1  Shareholder Proposals over Time  
As our dataset covers the time period between 1997 and 2006 we can 
investigate the evolvement of shareholder activism over time. Figure II shows the 
number of proposals per year and per sponsor group over time. It also shows the 
average voting result in a given year. Several observations emerge from the 
evolution of proposals. Initially individual investors file by far the highest fraction 
of proposals, which gradually declines until 2006. Contemporaneously, activism by 
institutional investors has almost monotonically increased between 1997 and 2006. 
This result can be explained from a general increase in institutional ownership from 
50 to over 70% during our sample period (cf. Gillan and Starks, 2007) in U.S. stock 
markets. Further striking findings are the sharp increase of filed proposals by union 
funds after the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002 and the seemingly 
reduced importance of coordinated activist groups over time. Concerning the success 
of proposals, we recognize a steady increase in average voting results, indicating 
that shareholder activism through proxy proposals became more successful. 
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Investigating the voting results and success rates of the different subsets of 
shareholder proposals sheds further light on both the efficiency and effectiveness on 
shareholder activism. Eventually, proposals sponsored by individuals are less likely 
to be withdrawn from the actual voting process in contrast to institutional activism. 
The stems from the fact that institutional investors have more bargaining power in 
the negotiation process with management and insiders are more likely to have an 
incentive not to expose voting on e.g. takeover defenses. This result is also 
consistent with earlier research on negotiations on shareholder proposals (see for 
example Chidambaran and Woidtke, 1999). Further striking findings are the sharp 
increase of filed proposals by union funds after the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act in 2002. Moreover, these proposals also bear a remarkable withdrawal rate, 
which also points at strong bargaining positions of these types of investors. The 
significantly lower percentage of withdrawn proposals filed by individuals is either 
to be explained by their low ownership stake or by a tendency to pursue private 
objectives and to file frivolous proposals. 
Aforementioned investor groups can file proposals of various types. We 
follow a coarse subdivision of proposal topics into governance and corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), a division commonly used in the literature (cf. Campbell, 
Gillan, and Niden, 1999). Focusing on the types of proposals being filed and their 
success rates sheds further light on both the efficiency and effectiveness on 
shareholder activism. We also test for significance of trends over time. The results 
can be seen in Table 5.1.  
The number of withdrawn proposals increases over time. However, as the 
total number of observations increases disproportionately, we fail to observe a 
significant time trend. We observe the largest number of proposals from the area of 
internal governance. However, proposals with the highest success rate (both in terms 
of average votes in favor and fraction of proposals accepted) are those on external 
governance. This might be due to a higher awareness and the fact that takeover 
defenses are more pervasive and as such are easier to vote on since there is less 
disagreement. Even though the average percentage of votes in favor of 
compensation-related proposals has significantly increased (almost doubled) over 
time, only a tiny fraction eventually get accepted. This already gives a first 
indication of managerial preferences to set their own pay (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2001, Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, 2002). The lower part of Table 5.1 
shows that proposals on CSR (social- and environmental policy) only play a 
negligible role in terms of their effectiveness even though occurrence and frequency 
have increased over time. The low success rate might also be attributed to 
disagreement among shareholder groups and absent awareness among investors that 
CSR related proposals could affect shareholder wealth. 
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5.4.2  Governance and Industry Competition 
We investigate four extreme samples based on their prevalent level of 
shareholder rights and industry competition. We provide preliminary evidence to our 
empirical predictions based on Figure 5.1. In the following we take a closer look 
both at proposal- and company characteristics per quadrant to check for patterns. 
We note in Table 5.2 that there is the strongest occurrence of shareholder 
proposals in the quadrant with strong shareholder rights (a low G-Index) and high 
industry concentration (high HHI). This gives a first indication on whether 
shareholders experience activism via vote as a disciplining device or not. If they did, 
we would have expected to observe the majority of shareholder proposals to occur in 
the upper right quadrant (high G-Index and high HHI) of our economic model. In the 
first quadrant, which exhibits little shareholder rights and low competition a 
significant portion of compensation proposals are eventually withdrawn from the 
proxy forms. Remarkably, we also see that this quadrant also has the highest 
percentage of votes in favor of the proposal without controlling for other factors. 
Turning to company-, stock-, and ownership characteristics of these four 
quadrants Table 5.3 sheds further light on the economic conditions for shareholder 
proposals to be successful. In Panel A we only compare the extreme groups of firms, 
i.e. the quadrant where both disciplining devices are absent with those firms where 
both competition and external governance are well-developed. Most striking 
differences between those two groups lie in the level of stock option incentives. 
Managers of poorly-governed firms (Q1 firms) have significantly more option 
incentives than well-governed firms. This is in line with the empirical predictions of 
our economic model in Figure 5.1 (Q3 firms). According to Hall and Liebman 
(1998) and Chapter 3 of this dissertation, remuneration in the form of stock options 
has become the dominant form of explicit incentives for CEOs. Moreover, important 
differences with respect to the ownership structure are the outside shareholder- and 
the institutional investor base. Surprisingly, firms in the extreme governance and 
competition quadrant hardly have a dual class status and are fairly similar in market 
capitalization. Institutional ownership is the highest in this quadrant just like the 
average number of institutional 5% blockholders. With respect to the inside 
ownership structures, we see that dictatorship firms in low competition industries do 
not hold larger fractions of company stock, neither in percentage nor in dollar terms. 
We acknowledge that the institutional investor base is not homogeneous and 
different investment strategies also determine the extent to which these owners 
become active. In the following subsection, we investigate in how far these 
differences with respect to the investor base and governance characteristics of firms 
contribute the presence and effectiveness of shareholder activism in the form of 
proxy proposals. 
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5.4.3 The Heterogeneity of the Institutional Investor Base 
Institutional investors can be characterized and distinguished along their 
portfolio holdings and their investment strategies. We classify into transient (TRA), 
dedicated (DED) and quasi-indexers (QIX) based on their past investment patterns 
in the area of portfolio turnover, diversification and momentum trading. Investors 
from the TRA bracket hold small stakes in numerous firms and trade frequently 
basing their trades on signals.  
DED investors have large, long-term holdings, which are concentrated in 
only few firms. These investors stem more from Japanese and German origins 
(Porter, 1992). QIX investors use buy-and-hold indexing strategies, which are 
characterized by a high degree of diversification and low portfolio turnover (Bushee, 
1998).1 All of these institutions face a trade-off in enforcing either of the two 
governance mechanisms of “voice” and “exit”. The shape and the extent of this 
trade-off hinges upon the size of the investor type’s stake, the liquidity of the stock, 
the impounded effect of exit on stock prices and the expected costs of monitoring 
from free-riding of other investors. Under the assumption that “exit”, “voice” and 
“no action” are the only available options of shareholder activism, we would expect 
that “transient” institutions are more likely to use “exit” rather than “voice”. Its 
effectiveness on stock price is however mitigated by the small stakes that this 
investor group holds. By contrast, “dedicated” investors have stronger incentives to 
file shareholder proposals even though selling will depress share prices stronger 
because of large stakes. This is however mitigated by dedicated investors’ long-term 
horizons. Their strength of activism by voice is further mitigated by concerns that 
other investor groups will free-ride on their monitoring effort (Admati and 
Pfleiderer, 2009). Lastly, quasi-indexers are in essence restricted from exit strategies 
due to exogenously given portfolio strategies and investment policies. Moreover, 
exit actions have a limited price impact due to small stakes and are therefore less 
credible as a disciplining and control device. Since these investors are broadly 
diversified they have to carefully evaluate and monitor their portfolios to screen for 
activism targets. 
A closer look at Figure 5.3 confirms the result by Gillan and Starks (2007) 
of a steadily increasing institutional ownership in the U.S. Here, we further break 
down into the number of investor types and the fraction of institutional ownership 
by investor type k. The average number of quasi-indexers increases almost 
monotonously over time from less than 80 to over 150. More than doubling in 
quantity, transient investors also become more dominant market players, whereas 
the role of dedicated investors remains fairly unchanged. Focusing on ownership by 
                                                          
1 Please refer to http://accounting.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html for more details. 
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investor types, we see that the proportions shift more towards transient institutions. 
Still, the average fractional shares held by quasi-indexers constitute almost two 
thirds of total institutional ownership. 
In Table 5.4 we present univariate analyses of our two extreme groups from 
Table 5.2 along the degree of external governance and industry competition. Several 
observations can be made. Unconditional on the governance-industry competition 
quadrant we confirm that quasi-indexers constitute by far the largest fraction of 
institutional ownership – both in terms of the number of investor type k in the 
institutional investor base and in terms of the proportional holdings. If we subdivide 
groups into low (high) competition and high (low) score on external governance, we 
see that group 2 is held disproportionally by quasi-indexers and dedicated investors 
hold twice the proportional ownership in group 2. Panel B investigates the presence 
of dominant investor types. Most importantly we note that there are more transient 
institutions in group 2 however they surpass group 3 in terms of fraction of shares 
held. Group 2 is held disproportionally by quasi-indexers and dedicated investors. 
Given the fact transient investors only constitute a negligible fraction of proportional 
ownership in group 2, we would expect dedicated investors or quasi-indexers to 
become more active with voice due to their inability or unwillingness to follow the 
Wall Street Rule. 
5.5 Methodology and Empirical Results 
In this section we present our methodology of our empirical analyses and 
the corresponding empirical results. For the ongoing multivariate analysis, we 
restrict ourselves to a classification of investors by institutional type rather than the 
portfolio holdings and investment strategy from subsection 5.4.3. We do this to be 
more consistent in our second stage estimation. This is because we do not find a 
sound conceptual reason why investment strategies should be related to the outcome 
of shareholder proposals. Therefore we can use the same ownership structure 
variables in both regressions: the occurrence and magnitude and the outcome of 
shareholder proposals.2 
5.5.1  The Ownership Structure and Shareholder Activism 
5.5.1.1 Determinants of the Shareholder Base and Structure 
We hypothesize that ownership concentration of insiders plays a more 
relevant role in voting outcomes than the outside shareholder structure. The 
                                                          
2 For the sake of completeness we also ran the regressions with our TRA, DED, and QIX variables. 
Because the interpretation is more difficult and results are fairly weak in magnitude, we decided to 
suppress them. 
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economic rationale behind this expected relation is the following. On the one hand, a 
larger shareholder base – both in terms of the actual number of common 
shareholders as well as the density and structure of institutional shareholdings – 
increases the probability of one shareholder actually becoming active and file a 
proposal. On the other hand, this larger shareholder base also results in a higher 
likelihood of disagreement among shareholder groups and collusion becomes harder. 
Institutional blockholders are also unlikely to solve the collective action problem to 
overcome coordination obstacles since multiple blockholders will have multiple 
objectives and are more likely to disagree. By contrast, insiders have more common 
objectives and incentives. We hypothesize insiders to be reluctant to accept 
interventions into the corporate strategy or governance structure and indicate a 
preference to shirk or exert little effort. 
We evaluate the role, which the structure of corporate shareholdings plays 
in the occurrence, the frequency and the outcome of shareholder proposals. For that 
purpose we need to find suitable measures of 1) ownership stakes held by corporate 
insiders, 2) the number of institutional investors that hold stock in the company, and 
3) the number of common shareholders in total. The problem with these variables is 
that they are strongly endogenous to firm- and stock characteristics. For the last two 
variables, we therefore follow the methodology by Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston 
(2004) and Bodnaruk and Östberg (2009) and extract the residuals from the 
following regression. We regress the skewness-adjusted number of common 
shareholders (COMPUSTAT item #100, measured in millions) on firm age, market 
capitalization, return on assets, market-to-book ratio, the inverse of share price, the 
stock’s liquidity (monthly average trading volume), past year return and past year 
volatility. These variables are chosen because firm- and stock characteristics attract 
different groups of investor clienteles and therefore cause different degrees of 
ownership concentration. As an example, an established NYSE blue-chip firm with 
low volatility attracts more (institutional) investors than a young and risky firm with 
little profitability record. We control for exchange listing and industry grouping 
according to Fama-French 12-classification. The same regression is run for the 
number of institutional investors with the same control variables. Results of the 
regression are below. 
Consistent with the literature on ownership structure we note that larger and 
more liquid firms are more likely to have a broader base of common shareholders. 
Surprisingly, we find that price matters for the base of common shareholders but 
turns out insignificant for the institutional shareholder base. Transaction costs seem 
to matter more for the common shareholder base than for institutional investors 
which is in line with economic intuition. We find that glamour stocks are more 
likely to have a large investor base and have more institutional investors. Being very 
liquid in terms of trading volume plays a significant role both for the common as 
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well as for the institutional shareholder base. From this regression we extract the 
residual values and use them for ongoing analysis in later stage regressions of 
shareholder proposal occurrence, frequency and outcome. 
Table 5.5: Determinants of Shareholder Base 
We regress the logarithm of the number of common shareholders (in millions) on the following variables: 
logarithm of market capitalization (number of shares outstanding times share price), logarithm of firm 
age, return on assets (operating income before depreciation divided by total assets), logarithm of market 
to book ratio, the inverse of the share price, the firm’s liquidity of the stock (monthly trading volume), its 
past year return and volatility (standard deviation of monthly returns). We control for exchange trading 
status and have NYSE as the base variable. We incorporate industry dummies according to the Fama 
French 12 industry classification. Our estimation technique is OLS and we adjust standard errors for 
heteroskedasticity. Significance at 10, 5 and 1% level are denoted with *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Variables Log(1+Number of Common Shareholders)  
Log(1+Number of 
Institutional Investors) 
 Coefficient t-Statistic  Coefficient t-Statistic 
      
intercept -2.603*** -20.584  0.550*** 11.574 
      
Firm Age 0.148*** 10.047  0.137*** 27.415 
Market Capitalization 0.314*** 21.740  0.336*** 64.715 
ROA 0.004 0.492  0.002 1.529 
Market to Book 0.194*** 13.154  0.054*** 10.364 
1/Price 0.061** 2.113  -0.002 -0.283 
Liquidity 0.164* 1.850  0.215*** 5.140 
Past year return 0.000 0.184  0.000*** 6.107 
Volatility -0.942*** -8.197  -0.471*** -10.625 
      
AMEX traded -0.061 -0.965  0.071** 2.423 
NASDAQ traded 1.568*** 4.471  -0.749*** -2.835 
      
Industry FF 12 controlled yes  yes 
      
Adjusted R2 0.420  0.758 
Number of Observations 14537  15195 
 
  
157 
 
Table 5.6: CEO and Director and Officer Holdings 
We regress the dollar value of CEO and director and officer holdings on a number of firm-, governance, 
and ownership variables. All variables are as defined previously. Separate chair equals 1 if the function of 
CEO and chairman of the board is separated. Board size and percentage of independent directors is 
obtained from the RiskMetrics “board and directors” tape. Our estimation technique is OLS and we adjust 
standard errors for heteroskedasticity. Significance at 10, 5 and 1% level are denoted with *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
 Log(1+CEO dollar Holdings)  
Log(1+Director and Officer 
Dollar Holdings) 
 coefficient t-stat  coefficient t-stat 
intercept 7.585*** 22.415  9.736*** 28.772 
Firm Variables      
Firm Age -0.148*** -3.853  -0.262*** -6.630 
Market Capitalization 0.204*** 4.884  0.420*** 9.220 
ROA -0.018*** -3.114  -0.010* -1.644 
Market to Book -0.224*** -6.426  -0.276*** -7.288 
1/Price -0.854** -2.356  -0.986** -2.200 
Liquidity -0.658*** -8.118  -0.545*** -6.774 
past year return 0.002*** 4.468  0.002*** 3.823 
Volatility 0.318*** 3.648  0.424*** 4.578 
Debt-Equity Ratio 0.000 1.238  0.000 -0.348 
Governance Variables      
Dual Class 1.025*** 10.600  1.270*** 14.125 
Separate Chair -1.055*** -23.102  0.153*** 3.050 
G-Index -0.041*** -4.556  -0.049*** -4.965 
Board Size -0.142*** -12.880  -0.053*** -4.569 
% Independent Directors -0.021*** -14.904  -0.037*** -24.183 
Ownership Variables      
Institutional Ownership -0.556*** -4.709  -1.592*** -12.313 
Shareholder Base -0.317*** -13.548  -0.452*** -18.346 
Exchange control      
NYSE dummy 0.123 0.539  -0.338* -1.646 
Industry FF 12 controls yes  yes 
       
Adjusted R2 0.251  0.284 
Number of Observations 9052  9690 
 
As a third group of potential holders of voting rights we turn to the role of 
corporate insiders. In order to correct for biases in firm sizes, we multiply each 
director’s share of ownership with the year end stock price in order to arrive at share 
ownership corrected for dollar values. By construction, it is more difficult for CEOs 
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of large blue chip stocks to accumulate significant holdings at high share prices, 
which is why we account for market capitalization. There is a rich body of literature 
pointing towards the endogeneity of insider holdings and executive compensation 
(see for example Demsetz and Lehn, 1985 and Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). For 
that reason we decide to run the same regression as before for share holdings of 1) 
the CEO of the firms and 2) holdings of all directors and officers of the firm. We 
complement the set of stock- and firm characteristic by a list of governance 
variables, which were shown to have explanatory power on insider holdings (Core, 
Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999).  
We find that for insider holdings many of the previously observed 
coefficients of the shareholding structure are different. Insiders are more likely to 
hold larger fractions in value stocks and hold a larger fraction if the stock trades at 
low levels. Insiders also hold volatile stocks, which have performed well over the 
past year. With respect to governance variables we observe that a dual CEO holds 
more shares and thus controls more of the voting rights. A very strong variable is 
whether the firm has dual class status: in this case both the CEO and directors and 
officers hold a significantly larger fraction of the voting rights. Managers in firms 
with weak shareholder rights hold fewer shares. This is not necessarily in contrast to 
our empirical predictions where we expected poorly-governed firms to have steeper 
incentives as other corporate governance tools are absent. Our analysis is concerned 
with the degree to which managers use the voting rights they are bestowed with, not 
the absolute value of holdings. Moreover, we find that more independent directors 
on the board result in a lower degree of equity participation. This finding is 
indicative of the claim that independent directors are more likely to act in the 
interest of corporate shareholders and thus restrict the use of excessive equity 
incentive practices.  
From this section we conclude that there are significant stock and company 
characteristics affecting the internal and external shareholder base of a company. In 
the following we will evaluate the effects of this shareholder base on the occurrence, 
frequency and outcome of shareholder activism in the form of proxy voting. 
5.5.2  Empirical Results: Determinants of Being Targeted 
To shed light on the probability and the magnitude of being confronted with 
shareholder proposals of any kind, we adopt a pooled cross sectional specification of 
the following kind: 
# 8r BC8B8THYT'2   3'  5'sZCt'2   :'SoGDC'2  u'789DCGHGID'2   <8G_C8Y          (2) 
In this specification, the dependent variable is the number of proposals a company i 
receives in year t. It is important to note that the number of proposals of firm i in 
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year t refers to the total number of proposals received by the firm, including the 
withdrawn and omitted proposals.  Firm represents a vector of several firm 
characteristics. We include the firm’s cash position, age, total assets, market-to-book 
ratio, the dividend yield, past performance, leverage and the shareholder base as firm 
characteristics. Owner represents a vector of ownership variables. Here, we control 
for the institutional shareholder base and the disaggregate holdings of certain 
institutional investor types. Governance is a vector which comprises several 
different governance variables. This vector includes the variables of main interest: 
the governance index, managerial incentives and our industry concentration 
measure, the HHI based on the 3-digit SIC code. Furthermore, we control for 
industry (Fama-French’s 12 industries classification), stock exchange and year 
effects. In the following, we present the results of our Tobit specifications of 
equation 2.  
Table 5.7 presents the results of four different censored Tobit 
specifications. We examine subsets of proposals in order to distinguish the 
informational content of those proposals. We expect that different proposal topics 
cause different results regarding our variables of major interest. Model 1 uses all 
shareholder proposals in our sample (that is, corporate governance and CSR 
proposals); Model 2 includes corporate governance proposals only, while Models 3 
and 4 use external and internal control proposals, respectively. Recall, that we 
conjecture that the shareholder base and the governance quality are of particular 
importance for the filing decision of proposals on any topic. Hence, the variables of 
major interests are those on the shareholder base and the governance quality of 
firms. More specifically, Residual Shareholder Base and HHI (institutional) 
represent our proxies for the size of the shareholder base and the level of 
concentration of institutional holdings while the interaction term G-index*Industry 
HHI represents the most relevant variable concerning the governance quality of 
firms. 
The results in Table 5.7 support hypothesis H1: Weakly-governed firms are 
more likely to receive a shareholder proposal. In all four models, the effect of the 
interaction term G-index*Industry HHI on the mere number of filed proposals is 
positive. This indicates that companies which are not exposed to fierce competition 
and the takeover market are more likely to be targeted by shareholder proposals. The 
effect is significant in three out of four models. Only for external corporate control 
proposals, the effect is insignificant. This alludes to the fact that shareholders most 
likely recognize that the exposure towards the takeover market is hardly changeable 
for weakly-governed firms and hence, shareholders do not put forward proposals of 
this category.  
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Concerning the ownership structure of firms, we find a positive and a 
highly significant coefficient on Residual Shareholder Base indicating that a larger 
shareholder base increases the probability that a shareholder files a proposal. This 
result holds for all four models. Furthermore, we find that the concentration of 
institutional shareholdings is always positively related to the number of shareholder 
proposals a company receives in a particular year. Though the effect is insignificant 
in models 1 and 4, this result is suggestive of the fact that a higher concentration of 
shareholdings among institutions increases the likelihood that collusion on corporate 
issues between them occurs. This in turn, increases the probability that one 
institution submits a proposal. Overall, these results support hypothesis H1b which 
states that the structure of the shareholder base influences the occurrence of 
shareholder proposals. 
The coefficients on the remaining control variables are generally consistent 
with the extant literature on shareholder activism. We find that the likelihood of 
receiving shareholder proposals increases with poor past performance and firm size. 
Moreover, our results indicate that mature companies are more likely to be targets of 
shareholder initiatives. The effects of our disaggregate dollar holdings of institutions 
remain inconclusive. Except for the negative effect of shareholdings of insurance 
companies (significant in three models), no pattern in disaggregate institutional 
holdings is observable. 
We conclude from this section that the presence of shareholder activism 
crucially depends on the governance environment of corporations. More specifically, 
if the disciplining forces from the takeover market and industry competition are 
absent, the magnitude of shareholder activism increases. That is, shareholder 
activism can be seen as a substitute for other governance mechanisms that are 
entirely absent or have failed. However, the analyses so far only give an indication 
about the presence of shareholder activism; that is in how far shareholders become 
active at annual general meetings. The results do not show if other shareholders vote 
with “activist” shareholders or not. In other words, the results do not show how 
successful and efficient shareholder activism is or which factors influence the 
efficiency of shareholder proposals. We investigate this issue in the following 
section.  
5.5.3  Voting outcomes of shareholder proposals 
Having identified the determinants of being targeted by shareholder 
proposals we continue with the examination of proposals’ voting outcomes. Voting 
outcomes are of particular interest as they amplify managers’ abilities to “enjoy a 
quiet life” when fierce industry competition and the exposure towards the takeover 
market are absent. Table 5.8 presents the results of our analysis of the voting 
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outcomes. As before, we adopt a pooled-cross sectional approach. The models are 
estimated using ordinary least squares with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors. We adopt the following specification 
% 98_DT'2   3'  5'sZCt'2  :'SoGDC'2  u'789DCGHGID'2   <8G_C8YT   (3) 
where the dependent variable is the percentage of votes cast in favor of a 
particular shareholder proposal. The explanatory variables are defined as before. In 
this section, we are particularly interested in the effect of insiders’ holdings of 
voting rights on the voting outcomes of shareholder sponsored proposals, especially 
when other corporate governance tools are absent. Hence, the variables of major 
interest are: Board HHI, which measures the concentration of holdings among board 
members; Q1 dummy, which equals unity if the company is part of the upper right 
quadrant in our economic model; and the interaction term Q1 dummy*Board HHI, 
which measures the joint effect of poor governance quality in combination with 
equity holdings of board members. 
Overall, the empirical results of Table VII support hypothesis H2 as 
insiders’ equity holdings are negatively related to the voting outcomes of 
shareholder proposals: The coefficient on Board HHI is negative and significant in 
all four models. The economic magnitude, however, is largest for internal control 
proposals. This result implies that as more voting rights are concentrated among 
board members, the lower the voting outcomes get. In other words, insiders’ 
holdings of voting rights are voted against shareholder proposals of any kind; they 
significantly suppress the voting outcomes. This effect becomes even stronger when 
taking the governance quality of firms into account. Proposals submitted to firms 
that are poorly-governed in terms of their exposure towards the takeover market and 
industry competition, receive significantly less votes when insider ownership 
concentration is high. Voting results of external governance proposals, however, are 
not negatively related to the interaction term Q1 dummy*Board HHI.  
  Several other variables do influence the voting outcomes of shareholder 
proposals. In particular, the number of blockholders, # Blockholders, overall 
institutional holdings, Institutional ownership, and the ownership concentration 
among institutions, HHI (institutional), significantly influence the voting outcomes 
of proposals. These results stand in sharp contrast to Gordon and Pound (1993) who 
find that institutional shareholdings do not significantly affect voting outcomes of 
shareholder proposals. We further find a negative relationship between the scaled-
wealth-to performance measure (as developed by Edmans, Gabaix and Landier, 
2009) and the voting outcomes in all four models. As the scaled-to-wealth-
performance measure the incentives provided to managers, irrespective of firm size, 
it measures in our context how managerial incentives affect the voting outcomes. 
The significant negative relation between incentives and voting results could stem 
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from two sources. First, managers of poorly-governed firms are given more 
pecuniary incentives in the form of stock or stock options which are subsequently 
used to vote against shareholder proposals. Second, as a result of more incentives, 
managers’ and shareholders’ interests are well aligned so that there is no need for 
shareholders to vote on proposals.  
5.5.4 Robustness checks 
In this section we test if our previous findings are robust to different specifications 
of the empirical models. The corporate governance literature has pointed out that 
there are other direct measures for managerial entrenchment (see for example 
Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005, Bebchuk, Faleye, 2007, Cohen and Ferrell, 2009 and 
John and Litov, 2009). This stream of literature claims that the so-called 
entrenchment index (E-index) and the presence of a classified board are also 
appropriate measures for managerial entrenchment. Hence, we expect to find the 
same results when it comes to the determinants of being targeted by shareholder 
proposals. Tables 5.9 and 5.10 present the results for the occurrence of shareholder 
activism. In Table 5.9 we replace our initial measure for managerial entrenchment, 
the G-index, with an indicator variable which equals to one if the firm has a 
classified board and zero otherwise (classified board). As can be seen from the table, 
our results essentially remain the same. All variables in each specification display 
the same signs as in the initial analysis. In Table 5.10 we replace the G-index with 
the E-index. The E-index comprises a subset of “entrenchment” measures only 
which are also included in the overall G-index (Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, 2009). 
Again, we find the same results as before indicating that our results indeed show that 
poorly-governed firms have a higher likelihood of being targeted by shareholder 
proposals. 
Our main result with respect to voting outcomes of shareholder proposals 
holds even when controlling for different measures of insider holdings of voting 
rights. In Table 5.11 we replace our measure for ownership concentration within the 
board with the total percentage of voting rights owned by corporate insiders. The 
results in Table 5.11 show that our main conclusion remains the same: Insiders’ 
voting rights significantly reduce the number of votes cast in favor of shareholder 
proposals and is most pronounced for internal governance proposals. The voting 
outcomes of external governance related shareholder proposals are also negatively 
related to insider holdings. However, our variable of interest – the interaction term 
between Q1 and insider holdings is positive but insignificant implying that voting 
outcomes of external governance proposals at poorly governed firms are not 
significantly reduced by insider’s voting behavior at annual general meetings.  
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In an unreported further robustness test - inspired by Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1988) - we also use piecewise linear insider ownership variables. 
Specifically, following Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, we define three board 
ownership thresholds: below 5 %, from 5 % to 25 % and more than 25 %. The 
results display lower statistical significance but all coefficients confirm a negative 
relation with voting outcomes of shareholder proposals. We conclude that managers 
are blocking shareholder proposals.  
5.6 Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we shed light on the determinants of the occurrence and the 
efficiency of shareholder activism in the form of shareholder proxy proposals in the 
United States. Specifically, we investigate whether the presence of industry 
competition and shareholder rights are mitigating factors for the emergence of 
shareholder activism. Our results indicate that managers have steeper equity 
incentives as soon as the disciplining forces of the industry competition and takeover 
market are absent. Most importantly, we find that the odds of receiving a 
shareholder proposal significantly increase when industry competition and the 
exposure towards the takeover market are low. Hence, we conclude that poorly 
governed firms, in terms of the competitive environment and the vulnerability 
towards takeovers, are exposed towards shareholder proposals which strive for 
changes in governance structures. Lastly, managers in firms, which lack pressure 
from the takeover market and competition at the same time, are not able to shirk. 
These managers are frequently exposed to shareholder activism, which is costly to 
deal with. The voting outcomes of shareholder proposals at poorly governed firms 
are significantly suppressed by corporate insiders. As they have to vote actively 
against such proposals during annual meeting, we conclude that corporate insiders 
are not able to shirk. Concerning the number of withdrawn proposals, we do not find 
evidence that the number of withdrawn proposals is significantly higher for poorly-
governed firms. Our results are robust to other measures of shareholder rights or 
industry competition.  
Our results show that there is a positive relation between the firm’s 
governance quality and the likelihood of being targeted by shareholders. 
Furthermore, we find that insider holdings of voting rights are used to vote against 
certain shareholder proposal types. Essentially, our results support the view that 
shareholder proposals can be the last resort of monitoring and influencing 
managerial behavior or corporate governance structures. Which implications can be 
inferred from those results and how can we reconcile our results with the existing 
literature on corporate governance and shareholder activism? 
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Neither the probability of being targeted nor the voting outcome itself is 
consistently and significantly influenced by the institutional shareholder structure. 
Our results contribute to the existing literature on the efficiency of institutional 
shareholder oversight. Cornett, Marcus, Saunders and Tehranian (2007) show that 
only institutions without a business relationship with the target firm are efficient 
monitors of managers. Likewise, Chen, Harford and Li (2007) provide evidence that 
only independent institutional shareholders with a clear long-term focus can 
efficiently monitor management. Our results are different. In particular, we show 
that the heterogeneity of institutional shareholders causes neither a change in the 
probability of being targeted nor in the voting outcomes of the proposals brought 
forward at annual meetings. Overall, the findings regarding institutional 
shareholdings show that institutional investors are pursuing different interests when 
it comes to monitoring. Furthermore, as the relationship between institutional 
holdings and the likelihood of being targeted as well as the voting outcomes is very 
weak, we argue that institutional investors might rather pursue the Wall-Street Walk 
and vote with their feet to express their dissatisfaction with corporate managers 
instead of actively engaging at annual meetings (in the jargon of Parrino, Sias and 
Starks, 2003). Unfortunately, the “exit” option is outside of our framework.  
Our results are important for several parties. First of all, proxy advisory 
firms which advise shareholders on how to vote at annual meetings can make use of 
our results and shape their advices in such a way that even poorly governed firms are 
exposed to potentially successful shareholder activism in the form of proxy 
proposals. Second, boards of directors that are in charge of designing executive 
compensation contracts can use our results as a foundation for designing “optimal” 
contracts. In this respect, an optimal compensation structure would imply that 
managers are awarded with less stock option packages or other equity-based 
compensation. To prevent suppressed voting outcomes for shareholder proposals 
due to a substantial equity ownership by corporate insiders, it is necessary to reduce 
the share of equity based compensation and raise fixed salaries accordingly. Third, 
the importance of our paper for regulators offers promising further research avenues 
in this field. More specifically, our results do have implications for the SEC’s design 
of the proxy proposal process. In particular, as most of the shareholder proposals do 
not win a majority of votes, it is questionable in how far the proxy proposal process 
is an efficient monitoring mechanism in the first place. In combination with the fact 
the shareholder proposals are not binding for companies even if they receive a 
majority of votes, the economic rationale of this “monitoring” device is debatable. 
The SEC might consider a change in the voting rules for shareholder proposals, i.e. 
making shareholder proposals which reach a certain voting threshold binding for 
U.S. corporations. The enforcement of such a change will definitely change the role 
of proxy proposals as a corporate governance device.  
175 
 
Appendix A: Proposal Topics and Sponsor Categories 
Proposal topics (content) Topic examples 
Corporate governance 
Internal governance proposals 
Separate chairman/CEO, introduce confidential voting, 
repeal classified board, limit director tenure, introduce 
confidential voting. 
External governance proposals 
Redeem or vote on poison pill, eliminate supermajority 
provision, vote on takeover provisions, restore right to call a 
special meeting. 
Takeover Sell the company, reject merger, spin off division, spin off tobacco business. 
  
Corporate social responsibility  
Social proposals 
Label gene-engineered food, adopt sexual orientation anti-
bias policy, implement ILO standards and third-party 
monitoring, issue sustainability report, adopt code of conduct 
for China operations. 
Environmental proposals 
Endorse Ceres principles, report on global climate change, 
report on supplier environmental standards, reduce 
radioactive emissions, develop renewable energy 
alternatives. 
Proposal sponsors (identities) Sponsor examples 
Institutional investors 
California Public Employees' Retirement System, New York 
City Pension Funds, Calvert Asset Management Co., Domini 
Social Investments, LongView Funds, Connecticut 
Retirement Plans & Trust Funds, Northstar Asset 
Management, Trillium Asset Management. 
Individual investors Evelyn Davis, Davis family, Gilbert brothers, Rossi family, Lucian Bebchuk. 
Coordinated activists 
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, Medical 
Mission Sisters, Human Life International, Episcopal 
Church, Rainforest Action Network, People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals, Pro Vita Advisors. 
Unions 
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 
Service Employees International Union, Plumbers & 
Pipefitters National Pension Fund, Utility Workers Union of 
America, AFL-CIO, International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers, International Brotherhood of Teamsters. 
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Appendix B: Central Variables Used in the Analysis 
Variable Name Definition and Source 
# Common Shareholders Common shareholder base: defined as the number of common shareholders listed in COMPUSTAT in millions (item # 100) 
# Employees Number of employees employed by the firm as listed on COMPUSTAT (#29) 
Institutional HHI Institutional ownership concentration: sum of squared percentages held by institutional investors. (source: Thomson Reuters 13F) 
Board HHI Insider ownership concentration: sum of squared percentages of ownership of corporate insiders (source: RiskMetrics and 10K filings on SEC Edgar) 
Total Assets Balance sheet total assets from COMPUSTAT (item # 6) 
D&O Holdings ($) Dollar value of director and officer holdings at year end (percentage holdings times year end stock price) 
D&O Holdings (%) % of voting rights held by directors and officers (source: RiskMetrics and 10K filings from SEC Edgar) 
CEO Holdings ($) Dollar value of chief executive officer holdings at year end (percentage holdings times year end stock price) 
CEO Holdings (%) % of voting rights held by CEO (source: RiskMetrics and 10K filings from SEC Edgar) 
Debt-to-Asset ratio Long-term debt plus debt in current assets to total assets (COMPUSTAT item # 9 plus # 34 over # 6) 
Dual class status Equals unity if the firm has been incorporated with at least a dual class share (source: RiskMetrics) 
Market Capitalization Year end market capitalization: number of shares outstanding times stock price (COMPUSTAT item # 25 times # 199) 
Market-to-Book Market Capitalization over book value of equity (COMPUSTAT item # 60) 
S&P500 Listing Equals unity if the firm belongs to the S&P500 index 
CEO Equity Incentives 
Resembles the logarithm of the the dollar value that the CEO’s wealth 
increases with a 1% change in stock price. Constructed for his entire equity 
portfolio (“total”), his “option” portfolio, and his “stock” portfolio. Please 
refer to Core and Guay (1999, 2002)  
CEO Option Incentives 
CEO Stock incentives 
Scaled WPS Scaled wealth to performance measure from Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009). 
Institutional Ownership  Percentage of outstanding common stock held by institutional investors. (source: Thomson Reuters 13F) 
Res. Shareholder Base Residual of a regression of # Common Shareholders on financial and firm variables (see Table 5.6) 
# 5% inst. Investors Number of institutional investors that hold at least 5% of outstanding common stock 
Residual Inst. Inv base Residual of a regression of # Common Shareholders on financial and firm variables (see Table 5.6) 
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Chapter 6 
The Emerging Market for European 
Corporate Governance: The Relationship 
between Governance and Capital 
Expenditures, 1997-20051 
 
 
We examine European corporate governance with respect to the relationship 
between shareholder value and capital investment.  Based upon Europe’s largest 
listed companies, it is shown that Anglo-American conceptions of shareholder value 
are increasingly important for European firms whatever their home jurisdictions and 
inherited traditions. Using annual capital expenditures as a proxy for corporate 
managers’ commitment to shareholder value it is shown contra arguments to the 
effect that the map of European corporate governance regimes is fixed and virtually 
immutable, even large firms from paradigmatic stakeholder regimes believed 
focused upon long-term value increasingly act to maximize short-term shareholder 
value.  We divide Europe into three regions based on ownership concentration, legal 
systems, board structures, and the presence of corporate governance codes. In this 
multi-jurisdictional setting, we compare the effects of different elements of 
corporate governance on capital expenditures in each region. Our analysis shows 
that the overall effect of investor-sensitive corporate governance on capital 
expenditures is consistently negative notwithstanding differences in the formal 
nature and quality of governance standards between regions. We explain this finding 
by reference to the governance standards of United Kingdom: a market for corporate 
governance that has come to dominate its continental European neighbors.  
6.1 Introduction 
There is a growing European market for corporate governance. Large 
continental companies appear to be adopting shareholder-friendly practices more 
                                                          
1 This chapter is based on Bauer, Braun, and Clark (2008), published in the Journal of Economic 
Geography. 
178 
 
consistent with global financial market imperatives than their national traditions.  In 
particular, we argue in this paper that the market for corporate control is increasingly 
important in promoting short- and medium-term shareholder value.  Whatever the 
formal significance of concentrated ownership regimes in continental European 
countries, managers appear to be discounting long-term stakeholder value. Whereas 
Dore (2000) contrasts the Anglo-American approach of revenue and cash 
distribution to shareholders with the continental European (especially German) 
approach of retained earnings and investment, we seek to show that large European 
firms are more short-term oriented than hitherto acknowledged. 
By convention, there are two approaches to the study of corporate 
governance and shareholder value.  The first, believed practiced by continental 
European and Japanese firms, assumes concentrated ownership and capital intensity 
with investment focused on the generation of long-term value. According to Dore 
(2000, p. 187), in this type of regime “profits represent the cash available for 
investments or wage increases rather than the size of the capitalists ‘take’.”  This 
model of governance seeks to satisfy multiple ‘insider’ stakeholders assuming that 
short-termism would otherwise undermine long-term competitiveness.  By contrast, 
in Anglo-American governance systems investors and portfolio managers favor the 
short-term distribution of excess cash over retained earnings (Aguilera, Rupp et al., 
2007).  In part, this is due to a distrust of managers who are suspected of hubris and 
a propensity for empire-building.  Equally, investors might not be able to estimate 
the economic benefits of medium- and long-term investment.  These stylized facts 
have dominated research on comparative corporate governance over past few 
decades (see Gordon and Roe, 2004, Hopt et al. 1998, and McCahery et al., 2002). 
Case studies have challenged the robustness of these ‘facts’.  For example, 
it has been shown that when global investors demanded greater transparency and 
board independence at Royal Ahold, management responded with board reform 
(Clark, Wójcik and Bauer, 2006). Likewise, it is apparent that shareholder pressure 
led to Jürgen Schrempp’s resignation at Daimler Chrysler AG; his vision of a ‘world 
corporation’ was not realized with consequent poor rates of return for global 
investors.  As a result, the Chrysler unit was sold-off to the U.S. private equity firm 
Cerberus in May 2007. Global institutional investors including hedge-funds have 
routinely targeted large European blue-chip companies cross-listed at international 
exchanges.  In play are both the short-term trajectory of company stock market 
prices and the governance of those companies recognizing that board structure and 
performance are intimately related to the sensitivity of external constituents to 
targeted firms (Becht et al., 2003). 
In this paper, we argue that it is not plausible to assume an immutable 
European map of corporate governance regimes; in fact, there is evidence that the 
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management behavior of Europe’s largest firms is increasingly consistent with the 
market for corporate control (Clark and Wójcik, 2007).  In doing so, we go beyond 
case studies to a systematic analysis of 395 European firms testing for regime-
specific differences in the relationship between corporate governance, management 
behavior and shareholder value. To do so, we use annual capital expenditures as a 
proxy for manager behavior.  Research in the U.S. using this variable showed that 
lower capital expenditures lead to higher market valuation and stock market 
performance (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003).  In a related paper, Titman, Wei, 
and Xie (2004) showed that U.S. investors react positively to reductions in capital 
expenditures because investors infer that lower capital expenditures will produce 
higher distributed dividends in the future.  Basically, institutional investors are 
suspicious of managers of companies with weak shareholder rights, believing 
managers invest for their own benefit (see, for example, Bertrand and Mullainathan, 
2003 and Yermack, 2006). 
Here, we assume that manager commitment to shareholder value is 
manifested in the pattern of corporate capital expenditures.  This relationship is 
evaluated in relation to investor-sensitive elements of corporate governance while 
controlling for other factors influencing companies’ investment decisions.  
Disaggregate data is used to measure corporate governance based upon a proprietary 
database made available from a commercial rating agency.  In particular, we test this 
relationship across European governance regimes using three ‘regions’ based upon 
inherited legal traditions, market structure, and the prevalence of formal codes of 
governance.  In the empirical sections of the paper, we test for the existence of a 
continental European approach to shareholder value and capital expenditures. We 
hypothesize (1) there is a significant effect of corporate governance on management 
behavior, and (2) managers have adopted practices consistent with the preferences 
and actions of global portfolio investors. 
Our study contributes to the interdisciplinary literature on corporate 
governance and economic geography in two ways.  First, we provide evidence to the 
effect that corporate governance has an impact on management behavior and 
performance. We show that governance, and the range of takeover defenses in 
particular, can affect managers’ capital expenditures.2  Companies with a high score 
on overall investor-sensitive corporate governance and low takeover barriers invest 
less than their industry peers.  Second, we find that these results hold across Europe 
notwithstanding the historical significance attributed to three different regimes of 
                                                          
2 Throughout, we refer to the elements of corporate governance relevant to institutional investors and the 
formal models of governance embedded in nation-state rules and regulations. In effect there is a 
distinction made between the theory and practice of corporate governance, emphasizing the latter in 
relation to the former.  Hence, our study is relevant to debate in economic geography over the varieties of 
capitalism and path dependence (Peck and Theodore, 2007), and argument in governance studies over the 
political structure of national traditions (see Monk, 2008 and Roe, 2006). 
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corporate governance.  As a result, it is contended that managers are adopted 
practices consistent with the interests of global investors even if convergence 
between national models of corporate governance is less systematic than hoped for 
by global portfolio investors.  Even managers domiciled in countries with less well 
established governance codes and limited takeover markets appear to be adjusting to 
Anglo-American expectations regarding shareholder value.  In these ways, the 
United Kingdom is the litmus-test for European corporate governance.  
The paper is organized in the following manner. Section two presents 
theoretical aspects of the debate about corporate governance and convergence, and 
explains how governance and patterns of corporate capital expenditures may be 
related. We also summarize what is expected in terms of the empirical results.  
Thereafter, the data on governance and corporate financial performance are 
explained as is the methodology used to test the research hypotheses. Section four 
summarizes the empirical results, which are discussed in more detail in section five 
both in general and from the perspective of economic geography. Lastly, the 
conclusion draws implications for future research and notes possible short-comings 
in the analysis.  
6.2 Theory of European Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance differs across countries in terms of ownership 
concentration and board structures, legal heritage, and management authority.  
Nonetheless, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) distinguish between two generic regimes.  
Dispersed ownership regimes typically have an active market for corporate control, 
where short-term shareholder value is the company’s primary objective.  If typical of 
Anglo-American countries, continental Europe is characterized by concentrated 
ownership and controlling ‘insiders’ who directly monitor and discipline 
management.  In theory, companies in this type of regime embrace the concept of 
medium- and long-term stakeholder value (Burkart and Panunzi, 2008).  Unlike 
continental Europe, public companies in the United Kingdom and Ireland tend to 
have highly dispersed owners such that almost everyone is an ‘outsider’ such that 
the threat of being taken over is, presumably, the disciplining force on management.  
Continental Europe firms also carry the burden of more detailed and rigid 
regulations compared to the principles approach that holds sway in the UK.   
In response to the governance scandals of the first years of the decade, it 
appears that many larger European firms have adopted more shareholder-friendly 
practices.  Companies either signal increasing commitment to governance quality by 
cross-listing on international exchanges or by their voluntary compliance with 
higher transparency and investor-friendly standards.  It is often contended that 
superior systems of corporate governance are to be found in the United States and in 
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the United Kingdom; it is widely believed that as global capital markets become 
more integrated and more correlated in terms of performance, continental European 
companies are likely to converge to international best-practice standards of 
governance.3  According to Clark and Wójcik (2007, p. 34), it is also widely 
believed that best-practice is considered by market agents to be a “perfected version 
of Anglo-American corporate governance with its primary objective of maximizing 
shareholder value […] and firms’ access to external funds.” 
Just as European corporate governance has been changing in response to 
globalization, institutional investors through their corporate engagement strategies 
have become important in accelerating change.  In a number of cases, institutional 
investors have sought to influence the corporate governance and transparency of 
blue chip companies (Hebb, 2006). More generally, investors have become more 
explicit about their evaluation of corporate governance deliberately referencing 
international standards in the assessment processes.4  On the basis of governance 
best-practice, they have lobbied management to improve their practices and 
governments to develop national codes consistent with global standards.  
Consequently, the shareholder value perspective has become more significant 
irrespective of the legal environment in which target companies are headquartered.  
Given that Anglo-American standards of corporate governance are often invoked as 
representative of “best-practice”, we hypothesize that large continental European 
firms increasingly behave like UK-based companies with regard to capital 
expenditures and retained earnings.  
To illustrate, consider the recent history of Royal Ahold and Daimler 
Chrysler. Between 1998 and 2001, the Dutch retailer Royal Ahold engaged in 
worldwide acquisitions totaling 16.4 billion Euros (Wrigley and Currah, 2003).  
Most acquisitions took place in South America but were rather unsuccessful when 
judged by the return on capital invested.  Deficient corporate governance practices, 
lax internal controls, and media-hype had ceded the CEO considerable control over 
investment decisions.  A clinical study by de Jong et al. (2008) reveals that the 
company’s shareholders viewed most of these investments as indicative of CEO 
hubris and his penchant for empire building.  Another, more recent, instance is 
DaimlerChrysler AG. Its former CEO’s idea of a ‘world corporation’ involved 
global acquisitions and diversification into unrelated fields. Shareholder disapproval 
of this strategy and perceived excess investing resulted in inferior stock market 
                                                          
3 The idea of global best-practice is contested in economic geography, given the path-dependence of 
national traditions and institutions (see Gertler, 2001).  Here, we refer to a decision-relevant reference 
point for institutional investors rather than an absolute measure of institutional quality that dominates the 
design of national governance systems.  
4 We note that institutional investors tend to evaluate “good corporate governance” from the perspective 
of their equity holdings, thereby neglecting creditors. In this paper, we focus on the former evaluation 
process (see Cremers et al. 2007 on the relationship between bondholders and corporate governance). 
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performance in the years subsequent to the acquisitions.  Institutional investors 
became impatient with the strategy of global expansion and diversification; poor 
operating performance led to the disposal of the Chrysler unit in 2007. 
The cases of Royal Ahold and DaimlerChrysler demonstrate institutional 
investors’ skeptical views about corporate investment in fixed assets.  Assuming 
managers invest in order to create shareholder value, capital expenditures (CAPEX) 
and the value of earnings retained or distributed to shareholders are deemed 
indicative of incumbent managers’ approaches towards value creation.  Capital 
expenditures are, of course, vital for any company—in theory, CAPEX sustain a 
firm’s competitiveness assuming that discounted future cash flows exceeding costs.  
Here, we demonstrate empirically that there is a systematic link between the 
measured quality of the elements of investor-sensitive corporate governance and the 
relative value of CAPEX holding constant capital demand, cash flow, and cash 
availability.  If expectations of best-practice governance exert a disciplining 
influence on managers’ investment decisions and constrains the potential for empire-
building, by this logic managers should identify only profitable projects against 
rigorous internal controls.  
It is entirely possible, of course, that such discipline or the threat of 
discipline encourages risk-averse behavior resulting in chronic under-investment.  
This need not be beneficial over the long-term for investors and other stakeholders 
including employees (Stein 1988).  However, institutional investors typically 
manage such risks through portfolio diversification so that long-term investor 
commitment is unusual. As a consequence, local stakeholders may be the losers in 
these circumstances; managers face a trade-off between serving institutional 
investors, long-term competitiveness, and playing favorites with local stakeholders.5 
Our hypothesized relationships are explored with reference to three 
European governance regions or regimes.  We test for the existence of differences in 
the proposed relationship across regimes, consistent with those that suppose that the 
differentiated map of corporate governance produces systematic differences is 
financial structure and performance (see La Porta et al. 2002).  We also allow for the 
possibility that shared financial market imperatives drive manager behavior such 
that whatever the formal differences between European regimes of corporate 
governance, managers are increasingly sensitive to the significance of CAPEX for 
institutional investor expectations (the argument underpinning Clark and Wójcik 
2007).  If we can show that across European regimes of governance the sign on the 
relationship between corporate governance and capital expenditures is the same, this 
                                                          
5 Recent papers that have addressed companies’ relationship to local stakeholders and employees include 
Pagano and Volpin (2005) and Cestone and Cespa (2007) who provided evidence of managers exploiting 
their relationships with stakeholders. 
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will be used as evidence for convergence in management behavior.  Even though 
there are different types of governance codes across Europe, many of which are not 
equally legally binding, it could be observed that managers in companies from 
‘weaker’ governance regimes opt for behavior consistent with Anglo-American 
standards. 
Countries like France and The Netherlands have established, long-standing 
and firm governance codes. Disclosure on whether companies comply (mostly based 
on the doctrine of “comply or explain”) with these codes can be either a function of 
prevalent local listing requirements or embedded in national law. In other countries 
like Sweden and Norway, formal codes of governance that match or mirror 
international standards have only recently been introduced.  So as to capture these 
developments, we use three European regions designed to reflect differences in 
board structure, governance codes, and legal traditions.  This allows us to compare 
the effect of governance on capital expenditures across European regions before 
pooling the samples into continental European and pan-European samples.  That 
corporate governance codes may have an effect on firm investment has been readily 
noted in the literature. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) analyzed the 
consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for U.S.-listed companies’ share price 
performance and market valuation.  They concluded that the effect is positive for 
large-cap companies and less positive for small firms. Our analysis focuses on large-
cap stocks in Europe which are the subjects of governance strategies by investment 
institutions. 
Prior work by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) sought to explain the 
financial outperformance of well-governed U.S. companies over badly governed 
counterparts. They showed that well-governed companies engage in less capital 
expenditure and less acquisitions.  However, their estimate of governance quality 
was rather idiosyncratic.  Furthermore, it would be difficult to show that their 
measure is recognized as such in the actions of institutional investors.  Titman, Wei, 
and Xie (2004) also investigated the capital investment and return relationship 
concluding that shareholders view a reduction in capital expenditures positively.  
Here, by contrast, we take a direct approach to the issue of governance quality and 
use data provided by a dedicated governance rating agency.  In particular, we 
investigate four elements of investor-sensitive corporate governance plus an overall 
governance score: the rights and duties of shareholders, the range of takeover 
defenses, disclosure on corporate governance, and board structure and functioning. 
The rating database which we use is based upon the FTSE EuroTop 300 largest 
European companies. Large institutional investors use this database to inform their 
investment decisions. Hence, our analysis directly reflects elements that institutional 
investors believe important when considering investment strategies. 
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We motivate our analysis in the following way.  Firms with higher overall 
scores on investor-sensitive corporate governance should be more prudent on 
CAPEX.  The subscores on the range of takeover defenses and board structure and 
functioning should, in theory, also lead to more prudent capital investment.  If 
managers are entrenched and isolated from the market for corporate control, they 
will face less pressure to create short-term shareholder value.  Expectations about 
the direction of association on the rights and duties of shareholders and disclosure on 
corporate governance cannot be made a priori but we expect these variables to affect 
investment decisions. With more rights, managers may grant (minority) shareholders 
more power to influence corporate strategy.  Since disclosure on corporate 
governance includes the transparency of remuneration practices, this element helps 
investors hold managers accountable on investment.  Board structure and 
functioning is the fourth category in the database and refers to the quality and 
robustness of internal controls.  If managers face vigilant supervision and audits, 
they may invest more efficiently and be less prone to conceal perks. 
Most importantly, we expect the effect of investor-sensitive corporate 
governance variables on capital expenditures to be similar across Europe despite 
being tested in a multi-jurisdictional setting.  In continental Europe, controlling 
insider shareholders are supposed to be the disciplining force affecting management 
behavior whereas in the UK this influence is typically located in the market for 
corporate control. There is ongoing debate as to whether market agents view 
reductions in CAPEX positively or negatively.  Royal Ahold’s stock price had 
shown adverse movements before the actual date of earnings restatement, which 
indicates that some financial analysts had made negative assessments about the 
consequences of lavish corporate spending (see generally Yermack, 2006).  The 
problems of the continental European model of corporate governance were widely 
recognized in the late 1990s, even before they became apparent in Ahold and 
DaimlerChrysler.  Given the leverage of institutional investors, and empirical 
evidence to the effect that shareholders prefer lower capital expenditures, we expect 
managers to adopt Anglo-American practices even if nation-specific regimes remain 
wedded to political interests (compare Roe, 2006). 
185 
 
6.3 Study Data and Methodology 
6.3.1 Data  
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) Europe (formerly Deminor Ratings 
S.A.) provides scores on European corporate governance standards.6  The time 
horizon of the database is unusual in that no other European scoring system focused 
on investor-sensitive categories of governance covers the same period. Four broad 
categories sum to a Total governance score.  The first category “rights and duties of 
shareholders” (RDS) can be described as the extent to which (minority) shareholders 
are able to influence a company’s actions.  The second category “range of takeover 
defenses” (TD) charts the potential barriers to hostile takeovers thereby protecting 
management from the market for corporate control.  “Disclosure on corporate 
governance” (DCG) summarizes the availability and quality of financial and non-
financial information.  Lastly, “Board structure and functioning” (BSF) evaluates 
board diversity, experience and the independence of board members, as well as the 
insider/outsider mix and remuneration practices. 
 Scores range from zero to ten and are updated by Deminor on a yearly 
basis.  The available data used in our paper ranges from 2000-2005.  Excluded from 
the analysis are twenty companies from Austria, Greece, Portugal and Luxemburg 
since firms from those countries are not continuously rated.  In order to increase the 
time horizon and thereby upgrade the statistical validity of our tests, we extended the 
ratings backwards by three additional years by holding 2000 scores constant to 
1997.  Since ratings hardly changed over the period 2000-2002, we believe that this 
is a reasonable approach.  Deminor covered a total 395 companies over the six year 
period, which gave us a total of 3950 firm-level observations with the backward 
extension.  We are aware that using this database depends upon the skill and 
expertise of the rating agency.  But we contend that Deminor has proven to be an 
effective analyst both for individual companies and across European regions.  In any 
event, Deminor measures are more systematic and consistent on crucial issues than 
other similar approaches extant in the literature (compare with Gompers et al., 
2003). 
The main users of the database are institutional investors, who use the 
ratings as a baseline for their investment decisions.  Information gathered by 
analysts to produce these ratings is publicly available if sometimes difficult to 
collate and synthesize so as to reflect market information rather than inside 
                                                          
6 In the following we refer to the governance database as the “Deminor” database.  A detailed description 
of the database and its categories can be found in Appendix A (see also Clark and Wójcik, 2007 and 
Wójcik 2006).  
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information (Wilhelm and Downing, 2001).  The database is comprehensive and 
ratings do not place equal weight on the measured provisions as in Gompers et al.’s 
(2003) synthetic self-constructed G-score.  The Deminor rating algorithm takes into 
account approximately 300 characteristics to arrive at a weighted rating score.  
Bauer, Otten, and Günster (2004) have used the Deminor database to investigate the 
possible outperformance of well-governed over badly governed European 
companies. Renders and Gaeremynck (2006) used the same information to study the 
link between governance and operating performance from an accounting 
perspective. Lastly, Wójcik, Clark, and Bauer (2005) used the database to check for 
differences in governance ratings for cross-listed firms. 
The second database comes from Worldscope.  Capital expenditures (CAPEX) were 
derived from firms’ cash flow statements and counts as ‘additions to fixed assets’.  
Data was obtained on firm’s total assets (TA) and sales revenues (SR) with, as well, 
data for control variables including trailing three-year-sales-growth (SG3Y), the 
price-to-book ratio (PB), and Tobin’s q.  Additionally, we utilized cash flow to sales 
ratio (CFS), and firm’s cash ratio (CR) which is defined by Dittmar and Smith 
(2007) as the ratio of cash and cash equivalents over net assets (balance sheet total 
assets minus cash and cash equivalents).  Finally, we included a debt-to-assets ratio 
(DA) variable to capture capital-structure effects.  Tobin’s q is the market value of 
assets divided by the replacement value of assets.  Market value is approximated by 
the sum of the book value of assets and the market value of firm equity.  From this, 
the book value of equity is subtracted.  The replacement value of the assets is simply 
the book value of assets.  Although there are more sophisticated measures of 
capturing Tobin’s metric, we assume that this is a reasonable approximation.7  Log 
PB represents the natural logarithm of the ratio of the market value of equity and 
book value of equity (plus balance sheet deferred taxes). Since the variables are 
ratios, currency effects are not considered.  Even though a sizeable number of 
companies in the sample went through major restructuring during this period with 
name changes, merger activities, and bankruptcies our database remains robust over 
the sample period.  Table 6.1 shows how our sample is distributed across western 
European countries. 
  
                                                          
7 For a detailed discussion of different measures of Tobin’s q, we refer to Erickson and Whited (2001) 
and Perfect and Wiles (1993). 
187 
 
Table 6.1: Overview of countries in the sample and data size 
Note covered countries in the sample, average number of companies per country from 2000-2005 and 
regional belonging. Criteria of belonging to any of the three regions have been shown in section 3.2. of 
the text. The last row shows the total average number of companies in the sample and per region. The 
date of issuance of the prevailing governance codes was according to the index of codes and principles of 
the European Corporate Governance Institute’s website (www.ecgi.org). If two dates are stated in 
column two the most recent date refers to a revision. 
 
The heterogeneity of nation-wide corporate governance codes and 
prescriptions in the countries under investigation is illustrated by Column 2.  We 
investigate three distinct European regions in order to test for statistically significant 
differences in the relationship between corporate governance and investment.  The 
country with the most robust corporate governance code is the United Kingdom.  
Since the UK stock market is highly liquid and because ownership is dispersed 
takeover barriers are low, and the market for corporate control is active (Burkart and 
Panunzi, 2006).  Moreover, according to La Porta et al. (2002) the UK’s common 
law heritage plays a significant role in underpinning market liquidity.  Therefore, as 
suggested by Tirole (2001), firms in the UK are more likely to embrace the concept 
of shareholder value: it is the reference jurisdiction for much of continental Europe.   
Most continental European companies are located in civil law systems.  
Furthermore, continental Europe is often characterized as being bank-driven 
whereas the UK and Ireland are deemed governed by financial markets.  The broad 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Country 
date of issuance of first 
governance code 
average # of 
companies 
Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 
Belgium 1998 10 X   
Denmark 2000/2005 5  X  
Finland 2003 5  X  
France 1995/1998 40 X   
Germany 1998/2002 30 X   
Ireland 2000 5   X 
Italy 1999/2003 23  X  
Norway 2004 4  X  
Spain 1998/2003 12  X  
The Netherlands 1997/2003 20 X   
Sweden 2005 17  X  
Switzerland 2003 17  X  
United Kingdom 1992/2000 82     X 
TOTAL  270 100 83 87 
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concept of stakeholder society, which is prevalent in continental Europe, suggests a 
more complex objective function than that summarized by the phrase shareholder 
value (see Jensen, 2000).  Germany is often invoked as the best example of this type 
of governance system, where stakeholders like banks, labor unions, and community 
representatives sit with executives on companies’ supervisory boards (Dore 2000).  
As such, region one is comprised of two-tier structured systems, whereas both 
region two and the United Kingdom and Ireland have unitary boards.  As shown in 
column two of Table 6.1, the three regions have different histories of corporate 
governance codes and thus may function differently.  Formal differences in 
corporate governance are manifested in countries’ Deminor ratings as shown in 
Table 6.2.  The lower part also shows descriptive statistics on a regional level. 
As expected, the United Kingdom together with Ireland had by far the 
highest total scores on investor-sensitive corporate governance.  As noted above, this 
is due to the active market for corporate control and the limited significance of 
takeover defenses.  Consequently, scores on the TD category are very high.  The 
particularly low scores on TD in Italy, Spain, and Denmark are probably due to the 
frequent presence of golden shares and ownership ceilings.8  In columns 3 and 4, 
both UK and Ireland take leading positions.  Due to large supervisory boards and 
limited commitment to independent boards of directors, Germany scores very low 
on BSF.  Surprisingly, Germany scores high on RDS, which might be partly 
attributable to employee codetermination laws.  If we focus on the time-series 
behavior of our relevant corporate governance and capital expenditures variables, we 
can confirm the growing importance of governance in the raw data. Since we 
assume Deminor scores represent institutional investors’ awareness of corporate 
governance standards, we interpret an increasing score as growing importance. The 
TOTAL score strictly and monotonously increases in every corporate governance 
region, whereas the variable of scaled and adjusted capital expenditures does not 
increase. The industries covered in the sample are listed in Table 6.3.  The table 
reveals differences in corporate governance ratings among European industrial 
sectors.  Both telecoms and utilities score comparatively low on the range of 
takeover defenses.  One explanation is that governments frequently own golden 
shares in firms in these sectors which renders any takeover attempt as burdensome 
for the acquirer thereby protecting incumbent management. 
                                                          
8 A “golden share” is defined as the government having the final decision over changes in control (i.e. 
takeovers) or major financial decisions if it judges to endanger national interests (Damodaran 2002). 
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6.3.2 Methodology  
Capital expenditures are subject to both industry- and country effects and 
are sensitive to company size.9  Consequently, the dependent variable capital 
expenditures was standardized by sales revenue (SR) so as to account for firm size.  
This standardized measure of CAPEX is also held to the industry median value as in 
Gompers et al. (2003) since service and financial companies invest less in fixed 
assets than highly capital intensive basic industrial companies.  Industry 
classifications are based on the Global Industry Classification Standard of ten 
sectors retrieved through Worldscope.  A finer industry classification was not used 
so as to have more significant median adjusted values.  In addition to controlling for 
sector effects, we account for country differences using dummy variables.  
The association between CAPEX and investor-sensitive corporate 
governance measures is evaluated using the following pooled OLS model: 
∑ ∑
= =
+++=
J
j
K
k
ititkkitjjiit CGovCAPEX
1 1
,, εγβα ,        (1) 
where CAPEXit represents capital expenditures of firm i in period t and are scaled by 
sales revenue and net of the industry median value. C is a vector of i control 
variables in period t.  For the CAPEX regressions, these are the logarithm of price to 
book ratio (log PB), Tobin’s q, SG3Y, CFS, CR, one-year lagged CR and debt-to-
assets ratio (DA).  Furthermore, dummy variables capture country-specific 
differences and equal unity if a company is located in a specific country (zero 
otherwise).  Unlike Gompers et al. (2003) we opt for a pooled framework so as to 
utilize the database to the fullest extent.  The model also uses time-fixed effects and 
adjusts for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980). The reason behind incorporating log 
PB, Tobin’s q, and three-year sales growth is that all can be interpreted as proxies 
for growth opportunities (Tobin’s q), investment potential (log PB), and capital 
demand (SG3Y).  CFS and CR capture cash flow effects and excess cash disposal for 
investments.  On the other hand, Gov is the variable that captures the corporate 
governance dimensions of firm i at time t.   
                                                          
9 We note, for example, that the data for the United Kingdom (unlike rest of Europe) includes listed 
REITs (notably British Land, Land Securities, BAA, and others), whose very high CAPEX stand in 
contrast to the very low financial sector median value. There are also some privatized companies, notably 
Railtrack PLC, and very young companies, notably RyanAir, that have invested far more than mature 
firms in related sectors.  Inevitably, as we look closer at the data there are bound to be these extremes. 
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The four elements of corporate governance are highly correlated (see Table 
6.4) and this limits the value of simultaneous incorporation of the variables into the 
regression equation.  We observed a very strong correlation between the total score 
on corporate governance (Total) and the range of takeover defenses.  On this count, 
this might be caused by the fact that many European companies’ corporate 
governance are rated either lowly or very highly.  Thus, a high score in this category 
may strongly influence the total score.  Moreover, BSF and DCG correlate very 
highly with 0.83, possibly hinting at the fact that those scores measure fairly similar 
items. 
Potential concerns about endogeneity of corporate governance and capital 
expenditures are not apparent in the data. Even though one could assume larger 
companies (in terms of sales revenue or balance sheet total assets) would be more 
able to comply with international governance standards, correlations to firm size are 
below 0.1. Papers investigating the endogeneity of corporate board structures have 
focused on the CEO’s involvement in the selection process rather than the firm 
characteristics that may influence the selection process (see Hermalin and Weisbach 
1988, 1998). In order to ensure methodological robustness, we use a cross-sectional 
regression approach as in Fama and MacBeth (1973) with the following model: 
CAPEXit = αi + β1Govit + yitCit + εit  ,        (2) 
Where Gov and C are as outlined in the pooled OLS regression equation.  The 
significance of the time series average is tested with a t-statistic for eight degrees of 
freedom. Since the results are qualitatively the same, we opted for the more 
powerful pooled OLS setting and report only those results. 
6.4 Results of Empirical Estimations 
Having elaborated on the databases and methodology used to test the 
research hypotheses, we turn to the empirical results.  Table 6.5 below summarizes 
our expected results.  Note that for some sub-aggregate scores we cannot infer the 
direction of statistical association.  The results for the three regions are reported 
separately. If we observe similar effects despite different formal governance regimes 
and legal systems, this may be evidence for convergence in corporate management 
behavior in Europe. Region one including Belgium, France, Germany and The 
Netherlands is analyzed before we proceed to the one-tiered region two and the 
United Kingdom.  
194 
 
6.4.1 Findings for Region One 
This region is comprised of two-tiered systems of corporate governance and 
is made-up of countries with more established governance codes. Table 6.6 
summarizes the regression results. 
Table 6.5:  Research Objectives and Hypothesis Motivation 
Note: we list our expected/hypothesized statistical association of each corporate governance variable with 
the dependent variable (i.e. CAPEX) according to related prior studies or motivated from theory. We do 
not report our expected coefficients concerning the control variables since we are to our best knowledge 
the first to incorporate these to examine investment behavior.  
Category 
Expected   
relationship 
Actual 
relationship 
related literature/ 
hypothesis motivation 
1. Total ? - 
Offsetting effects within categories might blur the 
overall effect on CAPEX, no inference on direction 
of causality 
 
2. RDS - / + + / ? 
Related to Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003); 
difference is the European market and focus on 
RDS only. Therefore as such previously not 
investigated. 
 
3. TD - - 
More takeover defenses lead to less pressure to 
create shareholder value as a barrier to being taken 
over. More entrenched managers fear losing their 
job less. 
 
4. DCG - / ? - / + 
Not investigated before; no causality inferred. 
Directors more accountable for their decisions 
 
5. BSF - - / + 
Clark, Wójcik, and Bauer (2006); Wrigley and 
Currah (2003); notion that lax internal controls give 
leeway in CAPEX.  More frequent and rigid 
controls and audits lead to fewer investments in 
absolute terms. 
 
Regional  
differences 
no hardly 
Wójcik (2006), Coffee (2005) and Hebb (2006) 
show differences between governance systems and 
a trend towards convergence. 
Table 6.6 reveals highly negative and significant results for Deminor’s Total 
governance score, the range of takeover defenses (TD), disclosure on corporate 
governance (DCG), and board structure and functioning (BSF). This suggests that 
these elements of corporate governance negatively affect capital expenditures in 
excess of the industry median. Hence, companies with less takeover defenses, 
companies which are more transparent, and companies with better internal controls 
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invest less than their industry peers. Moreover, a high overall score on the quality of 
corporate governance contributes significantly to a reduction of CAPEX. What is 
remarkable, and contrary to expectations and prior research, is the positive 
coefficient on RDS. The multivariate regression involving all four governance 
variables confirms these findings. The lack of significance of DCG in model 6 is 
possibly attributable to a high correlation with BSF.  
6.4.2 Findings for Region Two 
Having observed the results of the two-tier region one, we turn to the 
results for region two. Section 4.1 revealed negative effects on almost all corporate 
governance variables using industry-adjusted CAPEX.  Recall that region two was 
constituted by one-tier governance systems drawn from continental European 
countries with recently established codes of corporate governance (see Table 6.1).  
Table 6.7 reveals that region one findings are shared, to some extent, with region 
two. The Total’s coefficient is not significant but is still slightly negative. The range 
of takeover defenses (TD) also bears a negative and significant effect in region two. 
This is manifested by the p-value which is below 5%. Remarkably, both DCG and 
BSF are positive and significant, which stands in stark contrast to region one. 
Results from the multivariate regression equation are somewhat different. Even 
though DCG is still positive, BSF is now negative and not significant whereas RDS 
is positive in this regression as it is in region one. We note that the model’s fit in this 
region is better than region one.  
6.4.3 Findings for the United Kingdom and Ireland 
We have noted the different effects of RDS, DCG and BSF on capital 
expenditures in region one and region two. The coefficients on the two latter 
variables are opposite to what was observed for region one. Here, the results for the 
United Kingdom and Ireland are summarized. If we observe similar effects on 
overall governance as in regions one and two, we could interpret this as evidence of 
European convergence in corporate behavior. Table 6.8 summarizes the results of 
the regressions. 
As observed in the previous results for the UK the Total coefficient is negative and 
significant. The coefficient on the rights and duties of shareholders is again positive 
but not significant. Confirming the findings from regions one and two, a high score 
on the range of takeover defenses has a negative impact on capital expenditures. 
DCG and BSF have negative and significant effects on capital expenditures.  
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Results from model 6 strongly confirm these results. RDS is positive and significant 
in the multivariate regression, even though DCG loses its significance. In sum, the 
results from region three are more similar to region one than to region two. 
Furthermore, the range of takeover defenses and the Total governance score have 
consistently negative effects on CAPEX. Given the similar effects on this coefficient 
in regions one and two, we can suggest that there has been pan-European 
convergence in management behavior with respect to shareholder value and 
investment.  
6.4.4. Robustness Checks 
In order to examine how the distinction between region one and region two 
may affect our results, we tested the model for the whole of continental Europe.1 
The results are shown in the following table. We observe that the same effects hold 
for regions one and two combined. The RDS coefficient appears to drop-out in this 
grouping since the effect is inconclusive and far from conventional significance 
thresholds. The significance of the range of takeover defenses persists with a very 
low p-value. DCG and BSF continue to be negative and significant. The overall 
coefficient on Total is also negative and significant. In model 6, we note that the 
RDS coefficient becomes more significant. Therefore, we conclude that the effects 
of region one dominate region two especially in the area of disclosure and board 
structure and functioning since the overall effect is negative. These findings are 
confirmed when the United Kingdom and Ireland are added to the sample.2  The 
effect of RDS between the regions is apparently cancelled-out, which renders this 
coefficient insignificant. TD still has a significantly negative effect, as does the Total 
coefficient. BSF and DCG are highly significant and negative. In the multivariate 
regression, the RDS effect becomes positive and significant again, while TD remains 
to be highly significant. 
As an additional check on the robustness of the aforementioned findings, 
the analysis was conducted excluding financial companies (every company in the 
sample with a GICS code of 40). Financial companies constitute a large part (~20%) 
of the dataset and might behave differently in terms of investment and some ratios 
are less straightforward to interpret (e.g. log BM). The financial sector invests less in 
fixed assets than most other industries. Nevertheless, excluding financials and 
conducting the same analysis as shown in Table 6.10 hardly changes the results.  
                                                          
1 We also tested to any differences in the results by subperiods.  This is difficult given the fact that 1997-
2000 would include three static years of governance data. Nevertheless, the results were negative but 
weaker for 1997-2000 compared to 2001-2005. 
2 We do not report results of this analysis but they are available upon request. 
T
ab
le
 6
.9
: P
oo
le
d 
O
L
S 
R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
R
es
ul
ts
 fo
r C
on
tin
en
ta
l E
ur
op
e 
(E
ur
op
e 
ex
cl
ud
in
g 
U
ni
te
d 
K
in
gd
om
 a
nd
 Ir
el
an
d)
 
 N
ot
e:
 T
hi
s 
ta
bl
e 
sh
ow
s 
re
su
lts
 o
f 
po
ol
ed
 o
rd
in
ar
y 
le
as
t 
sq
ua
re
s 
re
gr
es
si
on
s 
in
 c
on
tin
en
ta
l 
Eu
ro
pe
. 
M
od
el
s 
1 
un
til
 5
 h
av
e 
di
ff
er
en
t 
co
rp
or
at
e 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 s
ub
sc
or
es
 a
s 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
es
. T
he
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
C
A
P
EX
 is
 a
lw
ay
s 
ca
pi
ta
l e
xp
en
di
tu
re
s 
(‘
ad
di
tio
ns
 to
 fi
xe
d 
as
se
ts
’)
 s
ca
le
d 
by
 s
al
es
 r
ev
en
ue
 a
nd
 is
 n
et
 o
f t
he
 in
du
st
ry
 m
ed
ia
n.
 
Th
e 
co
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
 a
re
 th
e 
re
su
lts
 o
f 
th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
po
ol
ed
 le
as
t s
qu
ar
es
 r
eg
re
ss
io
n,
 w
he
re
 G
ov
it 
is
 e
ith
er
 o
f 
th
e 
fi
ve
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
sc
or
es
 a
nd
 C
it 
is
 a
 v
ec
to
r 
of
 c
on
tr
ol
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
, 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 o
ut
lin
ed
 b
el
ow
. I
n 
m
od
el
 6
 w
e 
in
cl
ud
e 
al
l f
ou
r g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
va
ri
ab
le
s 
si
m
ul
ta
ne
ou
sl
y.
 
∑
∑
=
=
+
+
+
=
J j
K k
it
it
k
k
it
j
j
i
it
C
G
ov
C
A
P
E
X
1
1
,
,
ε
γ
β
α
 
Lo
g 
P
B
 is
 th
e 
na
tu
ra
l l
og
ar
ith
m
 o
f 
th
e 
fi
rm
’s
 p
ri
ce
 to
 b
oo
k 
ra
tio
, a
nd
 Q
 is
 a
s 
de
fi
ne
d 
in
 th
e 
te
xt
. S
G
3Y
 is
 tr
ai
lin
g 
th
re
e-
ye
ar
 s
al
es
 g
ro
w
th
 a
nd
 C
F
S 
is
 th
e 
ca
sh
 f
lo
w
 to
 s
al
es
 
ra
tio
 o
f 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
. C
R
 (
ca
sh
 r
at
io
) 
is
 th
e 
fir
m
’s
 b
al
an
ce
 o
f 
ca
sh
 a
nd
 c
as
h 
eq
ui
va
le
nt
s 
ov
er
 n
et
 a
ss
et
s 
(t
ot
al
 a
ss
et
s 
m
in
us
 c
as
h 
an
d 
ca
sh
 e
qu
iv
al
en
ts
). 
C
R
-1
 is
 th
e 
la
gg
ed
 
ca
sh
 ra
tio
 a
nd
 D
A
 is
 d
eb
t-
to
-t
ot
al
 a
ss
et
s 
ra
tio
. T
he
 fi
ve
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
va
ri
ab
le
s 
ar
e 
as
 d
ef
in
ed
 in
 th
e 
te
xt
. P
-v
al
ue
s 
of
 th
e 
co
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
 a
re
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
. S
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
 a
t t
he
 1
0,
 
5,
 a
nd
 1
%
 le
ve
l a
re
 i
nd
ic
at
ed
 w
ith
 *
, *
*,
 a
nd
 *
**
, r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
 T
he
 m
od
el
 u
se
s 
co
un
tr
y 
an
d 
tim
e 
fi
xe
d 
ef
fe
ct
s.
 A
ll 
co
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
 a
re
 a
dj
us
te
d 
fo
r 
he
te
ro
sk
ed
as
tic
ity
 u
si
ng
 
W
hi
te
’s
 (
19
80
) 
di
ag
on
al
 c
ov
ar
ia
nc
e 
m
at
ri
x.
 A
SQ
R
 in
 c
ol
um
n 
(1
3)
 is
 th
e 
ad
ju
st
ed
 R
2  
of
 th
e 
re
gr
es
si
on
, w
hi
le
 n
 in
 c
ol
um
n 
(1
4)
 is
 th
e 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
. F
or
 p
ra
ct
ic
al
 
re
as
on
s 
w
e 
do
 n
ot
 re
po
rt
 th
e 
in
te
rc
ep
t a
nd
 th
e 
co
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
 o
f t
he
 c
ou
nt
ry
 c
on
tr
ol
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
. 
M
od
el
 
lo
g 
PB
 
Q
 
SG
3Y
 
C
F
S 
C
R
 
C
R
-1
 
D
A
 
T
ot
al
 
R
D
S 
T
D
 
D
C
G
 
B
SF
 
A
SQ
R
 
n 
 
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(4
) 
(5
) 
(6
) 
(7
) 
(8
) 
(9
) 
(1
0)
 
(1
1)
 
(1
2)
 
(1
3)
 
(1
4)
 
1 
0.
00
9 
0.
00
9*
 
0.
06
7*
* 
0.
01
3 
-0
.0
29
 
0.
06
2*
 
0.
12
4*
**
 
-0
.0
03
**
* 
 
 
 
 
0.
14
2 
13
65
 
 
(0
.5
17
) 
(0
.0
90
) 
(0
.0
11
) 
(0
.6
32
) 
(0
.1
42
) 
(0
.0
76
) 
(0
.0
00
) 
(0
.0
01
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
0.
00
9 
0.
01
0*
 
0.
06
7*
* 
0.
01
6 
-0
.0
28
 
0.
06
5*
 
0.
13
1*
**
 
 
0.
00
0 
 
 
 
0.
13
3 
13
65
 
 
(0
.5
24
) 
(0
.0
60
) 
(0
.0
13
) 
(0
.5
46
) 
(0
.1
58
) 
(0
.0
64
) 
(0
.0
00
) 
 
(0
.9
58
) 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
0.
00
9 
0.
00
8*
 
0.
06
7*
* 
0.
01
4 
-0
.0
28
 
0.
06
3*
 
0.
12
6*
**
 
 
 
-0
.0
03
**
* 
 
 
0.
14
0 
13
65
 
 
(0
.5
22
) 
(0
.0
88
) 
(0
.0
11
) 
(0
.6
16
) 
(0
.1
59
) 
(0
.0
70
) 
(0
.0
00
) 
 
 
(0
.0
00
) 
 
 
 
 
4 
0.
00
9 
0.
00
8*
* 
0.
06
7*
* 
0.
01
4 
-0
.0
28
 
0.
06
3*
 
0.
12
6*
**
 
 
 
 
-0
.0
03
**
 
 
0.
13
8 
13
64
 
 
(0
.5
63
) 
(0
.0
49
) 
(0
.0
12
) 
(0
.6
31
) 
(0
.1
56
) 
(0
.0
81
) 
(0
.0
00
) 
 
 
 
(0
.0
29
) 
 
 
 
5 
0.
00
8 
0.
01
0*
* 
0.
06
6*
* 
0.
01
6 
-0
.0
31
 
0.
06
4*
 
0.
12
7*
**
 
 
 
 
 
-0
.0
10
**
* 
0.
14
1 
13
64
 
 
(0
.5
50
) 
(0
.0
50
) 
(0
.0
15
) 
(0
.5
48
) 
(0
.1
19
) 
(0
.0
70
) 
(0
.0
00
) 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
06
) 
 
 
6 
0.
00
7 
0.
00
9*
 
0.
06
5*
* 
0.
01
3 
-0
.0
29
 
0.
06
1*
 
0.
12
5*
**
 
 
0.
00
3 
-0
.0
03
**
* 
-0
.0
02
 
-0
.0
07
* 
0.
12
8 
13
64
 
 
(0
.6
14
) 
(0
.0
77
) 
(0
.0
14
) 
(0
.6
33
) 
(0
.1
33
) 
(0
.0
78
) 
(0
.0
00
) 
 
(0
.3
83
) 
(0
.0
01
) 
(0
.6
33
) 
(0
.0
87
) 
 
 
2 
  
 
T
ab
le
 6
.1
0:
 P
oo
le
d 
O
L
S 
R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
R
es
ul
ts
 fo
r E
ur
op
e 
(E
xc
lu
di
ng
 F
in
an
ci
al
 C
om
pa
ni
es
) 
 N
ot
e:
 T
hi
s 
ta
bl
e 
sh
ow
s 
re
su
lts
 o
f 
po
ol
ed
 o
rd
in
ar
y 
le
as
t s
qu
ar
es
 r
eg
re
ss
io
ns
 in
 w
ho
le
 E
ur
op
e 
an
d 
ex
cl
ud
es
 f
in
an
ci
al
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 (
i.e
. a
ll 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 h
av
in
g 
a 
G
IC
S 
co
de
 o
f 
40
). 
M
od
el
s 
1 
un
til
 5
 h
av
e 
di
ff
er
en
t c
or
po
ra
te
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
su
bs
co
re
s 
as
 in
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
es
. T
he
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
C
A
P
E
X
 is
 a
lw
ay
s 
ca
pi
ta
l e
xp
en
di
tu
re
s 
(‘
ad
di
tio
ns
 to
 
fi
xe
d 
as
se
ts
’)
 s
ca
le
d 
by
 s
al
es
 re
ve
nu
e 
an
d 
is
 n
et
 o
f t
he
 in
du
st
ry
 m
ed
ia
n.
 T
he
 c
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s 
ar
e 
th
e 
re
su
lts
 o
f t
he
 fo
llo
w
in
g 
po
ol
ed
 le
as
t s
qu
ar
es
 re
gr
es
si
on
, w
he
re
 G
ov
it 
is
 e
ith
er
 
of
 th
e 
fi
ve
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
sc
or
es
 a
nd
 C
it i
s 
a 
ve
ct
or
 o
f c
on
tr
ol
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
, w
hi
ch
 a
re
 o
ut
lin
ed
 b
el
ow
. I
n 
m
od
el
 6
 w
e 
in
cl
ud
e 
al
l f
ou
r g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
va
ri
ab
le
s 
si
m
ul
ta
ne
ou
sl
y.
 
∑
∑
=
=
+
+
+
=
J j
K k
it
it
k
k
it
j
j
i
it
C
G
ov
C
A
P
E
X
1
1
,
,
ε
γ
β
α
 
Lo
g 
P
B
 is
 th
e 
na
tu
ra
l l
og
ar
ith
m
 o
f 
th
e 
fi
rm
’s
 p
ri
ce
 to
 b
oo
k 
ra
tio
, a
nd
 Q
 is
 a
s 
de
fin
ed
 in
 th
e 
te
xt
. S
G
3Y
 is
 tr
ai
lin
g 
th
re
e-
ye
ar
 s
al
es
 g
ro
w
th
 a
nd
 C
F
S 
is
 th
e 
ca
sh
 f
lo
w
 to
 s
al
es
 
ra
tio
 o
f 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
. C
R
 (
ca
sh
 r
at
io
) 
is
 th
e 
fi
rm
’s
 b
al
an
ce
 o
f 
ca
sh
 a
nd
 c
as
h 
eq
ui
va
le
nt
s 
ov
er
 n
et
 a
ss
et
s 
(t
ot
al
 a
ss
et
s 
m
in
us
 c
as
h 
an
d 
ca
sh
 e
qu
iv
al
en
ts
). 
C
R
-1
 is
 th
e 
la
gg
ed
 
ca
sh
 ra
tio
 a
nd
 D
A
 is
 d
eb
t-
to
-t
ot
al
 a
ss
et
s 
ra
tio
. T
he
 fi
ve
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
va
ri
ab
le
s 
ar
e 
as
 d
ef
in
ed
 in
 th
e 
te
xt
. P
-v
al
ue
s 
of
 th
e 
co
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
 a
re
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
. S
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
 a
t t
he
 1
0,
 
5,
 a
nd
 1
%
 l
ev
el
 a
re
 i
nd
ic
at
ed
 w
ith
 *
, *
*,
 a
nd
 *
**
, r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
 T
he
 m
od
el
 u
se
s 
co
un
tr
y 
an
d 
tim
e 
fi
xe
d 
ef
fe
ct
s.
 A
ll 
co
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
 a
re
 a
dj
us
te
d 
fo
r 
he
te
ro
sc
ed
as
tic
ity
 u
si
ng
 
W
hi
te
’s
 (
19
80
) 
di
ag
on
al
 c
ov
ar
ia
nc
e 
m
at
ri
x.
 A
SQ
R
 in
 c
ol
um
n 
(1
3)
 is
 th
e 
ad
ju
st
ed
 R
2  
of
 th
e 
re
gr
es
si
on
, w
hi
le
 n
 in
 c
ol
um
n 
(1
4)
 is
 th
e 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
. F
or
 p
ra
ct
ic
al
 
re
as
on
s 
w
e 
do
 n
ot
 re
po
rt
 th
e 
in
te
rc
ep
t a
nd
 th
e 
co
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
 o
f t
he
 c
ou
nt
ry
 c
on
tr
ol
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
. 
M
od
el
 
lo
g 
PB
 
Q
 
SG
3Y
 
C
F
S 
C
R
 
C
R
-1
 
D
A
 
T
ot
al
 
R
D
S 
T
D
 
D
C
G
 
B
SF
 
A
SQ
R
 
n 
 
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(4
) 
(5
) 
(6
) 
(7
) 
(8
) 
(9
) 
(1
0)
 
(1
1)
 
(1
2)
 
(1
3)
 
(1
4)
 
1 
-0
.0
24
**
* 
0.
01
3*
**
 
0.
07
1*
**
 
0.
02
0 
0.
00
1 
0.
06
4 
0.
23
7*
**
 
-0
.0
03
**
* 
 
 
 
 
0.
14
7 
15
00
 
 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
01
) 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.5
58
) 
(0
.9
83
) 
(0
.1
24
) 
(0
.0
00
) 
(0
.0
00
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
-0
.0
25
**
* 
0.
01
4*
**
 
0.
07
2*
**
 
0.
02
4 
0.
00
3 
0.
06
9 
0.
25
1*
**
 
 
0.
00
0 
 
 
 
0.
14
1 
15
00
 
 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
01
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.5
01
) 
(0
.9
16
) 
(0
.1
03
) 
(0
.0
00
) 
 
(0
.8
99
) 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
-0
.0
24
**
* 
0.
01
3*
**
 
0.
07
2*
**
 
0.
02
1 
0.
00
2 
0.
06
4 
0.
23
9*
**
 
 
 
-0
.0
04
**
* 
 
 
0.
15
3 
15
00
 
 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.0
01
) 
(0
.0
04
) 
(0
.5
49
) 
(0
.9
39
) 
(0
.1
20
) 
(0
.0
00
) 
 
 
(0
.0
00
) 
 
 
 
 
4 
-0
.0
25
**
* 
0.
01
4*
**
 
0.
06
8*
**
 
0.
02
0 
0.
00
3 
0.
06
8 
0.
25
2*
**
 
 
 
 
-0
.0
09
**
 
 
0.
14
6 
15
00
 
 
(0
.0
02
) 
(0
.0
01
) 
(0
.0
05
) 
(0
.5
69
) 
(0
.9
32
) 
(0
.1
08
) 
(0
.0
00
) 
 
 
 
(0
.0
32
) 
 
 
 
5 
-0
.0
25
**
* 
0.
01
4*
**
 
0.
06
9*
**
 
0.
02
3 
0.
00
1 
0.
06
9 
0.
24
5*
**
 
 
 
 
 
-0
.0
11
**
* 
0.
14
7 
15
00
 
 
(0
.0
03
) 
(0
.0
01
) 
(0
.0
07
) 
(0
.4
99
) 
(0
.9
77
) 
(0
.1
04
) 
(0
.0
00
) 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
07
) 
 
 
6 
-0
.0
25
**
* 
0.
01
3*
**
 
0.
06
7*
**
 
0.
01
9 
0.
00
2 
0.
06
5 
0.
24
0*
**
 
 
0.
00
5 
-0
.0
05
**
* 
-0
.0
04
 
-0
.0
05
 
0.
14
1 
15
00
 
 
(0
.0
03
) 
(0
.0
01
) 
(0
.0
06
) 
(0
.5
88
) 
(0
.9
37
) 
(0
.1
18
) 
(0
.0
00
) 
 
(0
.1
33
) 
(0
.0
00
) 
(0
.4
21
) 
(0
.2
58
) 
 
 

202 
 
The Total governance score still has a highly significant coefficient with a 
p-value below 0.1%. The same finding holds for the range of takeover defences and 
BSF with p-values below 1%. The CG coefficient is significant with a p-value 
between 1% and 5%. We observe a significantly positive coefficient the rights and 
duties of shareholders. Therefore, the inclusion of financial companies did not 
materially affect the results. Overall, the range of takeover defenses has a 
consistently negative and significant effect on industry adjusted capital expenditures. 
But we also observe different effects of DCG and BSF between the regions. The 
coefficient on the rights and duties of shareholders is positive but not significant.1 
6.4.5 Generalized Methods of Moments 
A potential concern in our analysis of the governance effect on capital 
expenditures is the of potential serial correlation in the residuals.2 This might cast 
doubt on the validity of OLS regressions since significance could be achieved by 
CAPEX hardly changing over time. In order to tackle this possible problem, we 
adopt an instrumental generalized methods of moments (GMM) approach as in 
Cochrane (2001) and Campbell, Lo, and MacKinley (1997). Unlike OLS or 
maximum likelihood estimation, GMM does not require the data generating process 
to be known. In order to estimate the parameters θ, GMM can infer from sample 
moments to population moments without requirements such as the absence of 
heteroskedasticity or serial correlation. Hence the adoption of GMM results in very 
powerful and robust estimates. The general equation that minimizes the criterion 
function q is as follows: 
)()( θθ mWmq n′= ,          (3) 
where W (weighting matrix) is proportional to the variance of the moments m. 
Hence, the optimal weighting matrix equals { } 1)](*[. −= θnGMM mnVarAsyW . As 
instruments, we chose lagged values of the control variables in order to overidentify 
the moment equations )(θm . As GMM weights we employed period weights and 
still account for heteroskedasticity using White’s correction. Using this approach 
does not materially affect our results.3  We conclude that our findings are robust 
with respect to potential serial correlation in the error terms. 
                                                          
1 We also conducted tests for the period of 2000-2005 and concluded that the backfilling procedure does 
not significantly statistically affect our results. 
2 We are grateful to Rik Frehen for suggesting this approach. 
3 Tables and results are available upon request. 
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 6.5 Practice of European Corporate Governance 
Do more transparent companies with better internal controls and less 
takeover defenses invest less than their industry peers? Our results provide evidence 
that these elements of investor-sensitive corporate governance have significant 
negative effects on the capital expenditures of European companies. Moreover, we 
find, by and large, the same effects across the three European governance regions 
that are used to test for systemic regime effects. For portfolio investors dependent 
upon global financial markets for management discipline, there is a significant 
negative coefficient on the range of takeover defenses across all regions and in the 
aggregate pan-European sample.  This particular score is more comprehensive than 
the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) G-score since it incorporates ownership and 
capital structure.  These findings are in-line with related findings by Daines and 
Klausner (2001) who point out that anti-takeover provisions increase agency costs.  
Moreover, they conclude that the return on investment is largest when the firm 
concerned has been subject to a hostile takeover.  By their assessment, openness to 
the market for corporate control induces management to operate more efficiently 
(hence the TD negative coefficient). 
Intriguing results were also found for the coefficients on disclosure and 
board structure and functioning (BSF): it was shown that these coefficients had 
persistently negative effects on industry-adjusted CAPEX in region one and region 
three.  While the former category refers to the transparency of firm governance, the 
latter variable captures the independence, the insider/outsider mix, and the 
committee formation of the board—consequently, the governance potential of a firm 
in relation to investment decision-making.  Recall that poor board functioning and a 
lack of internal control systems were the governance failures that allowed empire-
building at Royal Ahold.  Less transparent governance allows management to 
exploit the ambiguities inherent in any governance regime and can allow managers 
to conceal value-destroying projects and perks.  
Whereas our BSF’s result matched our theoretical expectations of a 
negative relationship, in Table 6.5 DCG’s negative coefficient was not inferred 
previously. Similarly, the positive coefficient on the rights and duties of 
shareholders is a finding that does not appear in prior research and may appear odd.  
Recent academic discussion reveals that the role that the rights and duties of 
shareholders may play in corporate governance is rather ambiguous.  Some legal 
scholars argue that “active investor involvement […] disrupts […] the centralization 
of essentially non-reviewable decision making authority in the board of directors” 
(Bainbridge 2006).  The coefficient on DCG is not significant in all settings and a 
deeper exploration is required in further research.  
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Most importantly, our results have significant implications for 
understanding the nature and performance of competing European regimes of 
corporate governance.  The study focused on three distinct European regions and 
investigated the relationship between corporate governance and shareholder value in 
each region and then across Europe. The overall effect of corporate governance (the 
Total score) on CAPEX is consistently negative.  Results are very similar across the 
regions and in the pooled sample even though the underlying formal structures of 
corporate governance are quite distinct by nation-state.  This result implies that 
managers of large firms tend to respond to common investor-driven standards of 
corporate governance irrespective of their home of incorporation.  Apparently 
European companies opt less for retained earnings and more for the Anglo-
American approach of distributing excess cash flow to shareholders with variable 
payout ratios (compare Dore, 2000).  
In effect, our results suggest that whatever the formal design and structure 
of a country’s model of corporate governance, portfolio investors are able to exert 
pressure on the managers of large firms to act in ways consistent with shareholder 
value rather than stakeholder value (short-term rather than long-term value).  This is 
an important finding since it tends to discount the significance of national rules and 
regulations in the face of global financial market imperatives (as suggested by Clark 
and Wójcik 2007). 
In this regard, the most important governance effect was found for the 
variable that is the least regulated among the four categories throughout Europe, 
namely the range of takeover defenses (TD).  Even though EU recommendations to 
abstain from the use of anti-takeover measures exist, regulations to this effect hardly 
ever appear in European countries’ corporate governance codes.4  The Spanish 
Aldama Report (2003), for example, points out that “the adoption of protective 
measures aimed at preventing takeovers […] should also require the approval of the 
Shareholders’ Meeting” (Section IV, 1.3).  This constrains incumbents’ ability to 
entrench but does not prohibit this behavior.  Likewise, the Dutch Tabaksblat code 
(2003) does not include “best practice provisions on the permissible use of anti-
takeover measures in (hostile) takeover situations” (Section 56-59).  Other 
governance codes of the countries in our sample do not address takeovers or merely 
recommend the procedures concerning the submission of takeover bids.  
                                                          
4 In the EU, the 2004 Directive on takeover bids (Official Journal L 142, 30/04/2004) seeks to encourage 
the "proper functioning of financial markets" requiring (Article 3) that company boards "must act in the 
best interests of the company as a whole" when considering takeover bids while (Article 11) denies the 
use of defensive measures in such circumstances. However, it is also widely appreciated that the Directive 
(Article 12) also allows member-states the right to not require companies to comply with these 
regulations. 
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Hence, the European market for corporate control is only loosely regulated 
but perhaps underestimated in terms of its effect on management behavior. That this 
result is strongest in region three is not surprising since the UK is characterized by a 
high degree of dispersed ownership and a relatively liquid stock market.  Therein, 
the market for corporate control is an important disciplining force for managers of 
this region. Region one is made up by countries where transparency and objective 
board functioning have been heavily promoted recently. This might explain these 
variables’ strong effects on CAPEX. 
A further surprising finding is the positive and significant coefficients on 
DCG and BSF in region two.  Apparently, companies incorporated in one-tier 
structured countries with recent governance codes invest more the more transparent 
they are and the more independent board and internal controls are managed.  This 
result is opposite to that in regions one and three. However, when combining region 
one with region two in a pan-European sample, we note that the negative effects on 
these variables dominate the positive effects.  Further, a negative effect for both TD 
and Total in a region with different board structures a different legal system and a 
less established governance code gives in our view even stronger evidence of 
convergence in the practice of corporate governance.  Returning to our question, 
whether the Anglo-American or the continental European approach dominates 
manager behavior, we clearly reject the latter. It seems that market-related elements 
of corporate governance have the effect of disciplining managers to distribute 
revenue rather than retain earnings.   
6.6 Conclusions 
Using a unique database on the governance ratings of European companies 
from 1997-2005 provided by Deminor, and combining it with financial data from 
Worldscope, we were able to establish a statistically significant negative relationship 
between investor-sensitive corporate governance and company investment.  This is 
stronger in the continental European region that comprises predominantly two-tier 
structured companies whereas the unitary board region has a weaker but still 
consistent result.  The results for the UK and Ireland are stronger in magnitude and 
were in the same direction.  Here, the disciplining effect of the market for corporate 
control is especially pronounced.  The effect still holds even if we pool all 
companies together into a pan-European dataset.  In effect, the Anglo-American 
governance system serves as a market-reference point for the governance of large 
continental European firms. Robustness checks such as excluding financial 
companies do not alter our results.  Moreover, we are able to show that our results 
are robust even in the case of serial correlation. 
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In light of the fact that European policymakers have sought to ‘reform’ 
companies’ governance structures by the introduction of governance codes, it is 
interesting that the least regulated element—the range of takeover defenses—is the 
most significant element disciplining corporate managers.  Companies adopting 
fewer anti-takeover provisions spend significantly less than their industry peers.  
This suggests that the global market for corporate control is underestimated in terms 
of its disciplining effect on corporate managers.  Equally, this suggests that theorists 
of corporate governance that emphasize the inherited governance traditions of 
nation-states may over-estimate the significance of formal regulatory structures.  In 
effect, our results suggest that as global financial markets continue to integrate, and 
as portfolio investment managers expand their interests to the four corners of the 
globe, market-standards of governance may come to dominate formal regimes of 
governance in ways that discount the significance of the latter.   
This conclusion, though tentative and obviously specific to our research, is 
underpinned by related findings with respect to companies’ disclosure practices and 
the quality of board structures and their functioning.  We are able to show that the 
more transparent are the governance practices of companies the less likely managers 
invest beyond the industry median.  Similarly, our results suggest that better-
functioning boards arrive at more market-sensitive investment decision-making.  
Therefore, the European market for corporate governance can serve as a substitute 
for national governance codes and regulations if companies converge to Anglo-
American practices so to appeal to the interests of institutional investors. Our 
analysis provides evidence to the effect that European companies increasing focus 
upon short-term shareholder value in ways consistent with Anglo-American 
practices. 
Of course, our results should be treated with some caution.  In their paper, 
Gompers et al. (2003) note that their G-score, which is constructed by enumerating 
entrenching- and anti-takeover devices, can be a symptom of corporate culture rather 
than management behavior.  Thus, a low score on corporate governance need not 
necessarily be a consequence of management’s intentions but can also be determined 
by (unknown) external variables.  The authors also note that there might be some 
“hardly quantifiable variable” that determines corporate governance structures apart 
from managers’ entrenchment motives.  Similarly, an omitted-variable bias might 
affect our results if the variable is correlated with either of the regressors under 
examination.  That is, CAPEX might also be driven by some other variable beyond 
being a value- or a growth stock (log BM), realizing growth opportunities (Tobin’s 
q), or satisfying investment demand (SG3Y). Since we followed prior researchers’ 
arguments and intuition, we are confident that we control for the most obvious 
factors. 
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Some critics oppose the increased reliance on commercial databases that 
quantitatively rate firms’ corporate governance structures and construct metrics out 
of qualitative information.  Sonnenfeld (2004) argued that rating companies rely on 
myths rather than evidence in arriving at objective judgments.  However, our use of 
the Deminor data is premised upon our own knowledge and experience with the data 
and our assessment of the skills and expertise of their team of specialists.  In any 
event, we note that the database is used extensively by institutional investors to 
make their investment decisions.  Even if the database were misleading on crucial 
issues, it is more robust than the method used by Gompers et al. (2003) and has the 
added virtue that it is, in fact, data which actually affects global investment decision-
making. 
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Appendix A - Description of Deminor’s rating algorithm 
The research enables the user to compare corporate governance standards and practices across companies 
with reference to four corporate governance categories (see Deminor Ratings S.A. Brochure, p. 5. 
Brussels, Belgium. Retrieved August 05, 2005 from the World Wide Web: www.deminor.org 
 
Rights and duties of shareholders (RDS) – Includes criteria concerning the respect 
of the one-share one-vote one-dividend principle, voting right restrictions, voting 
issues, shareholder proposals, voting procedures and maintenance of pre-emptive 
rights 
 
Range of takeover defenses (TD) – Examines the presence and strength of anti-
takeover devices such as poison pills, golden parachutes, core shareholdings, 
extensive cross-shareholdings and co-option systems that could be used to protect 
the company from a hostile takeover and to disenfranchise shareholders. Further to 
this, the dilution effects and economic barriers to such instruments are examined. 
 
Disclosure on corporate governance (DCG) – Analyses the transparency of a 
corporation as measured by the quantity and quality of  non-financial information on 
its governance structure such as diversity and independence  for board members, 
board committees, director remuneration, auditors’ fees and rotation, accounting 
standards, information on major shareholders of the company, environmental 
Information, etc. 
 
Board structure and functioning (BSF) – Examines all issues relating to the 
governance of a board such as independent directors, division of the role of the 
chairman and chief executive, election of the board, director remuneration, the 
workings and authorities of board committees, etc. 
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Appendix B - Description of Control Variables 
Note: we define the control variables that we use throughout our statistical analysis. All of the data was 
taken from Worldscope. Since the statistical analysis makes exclusive use of ratios, we do not have to 
tackle currency effects between the European countries under investigation. 
(1) (2) (3) 
Abbreviation Variable Description 
PB Price-to-book ratio 
Price-to-book current - Price-Current / Book Value Per 
Share 
SG3Y 
Trailing three-year 
sales growth 
3 YR ANNUAL GROWTH represents ((Current Year's Net 
Sales or Revenues / Net Sales or Revenues four years ago, 
reduced to a compound annual rate) - 1) * 100 
Q Tobin's q 
TOBIN’S Q - it is the market value of assets divided by the 
replacement value of assets. The market value is 
approximated by the difference between the sum of the book 
value of assets and the market value and the book value of 
equity. The replacement value of the assets is simply the 
book value of assets 
CFS 
Cash flow to sales 
ratio 
CASH FLOW TO SALES represents Funds from 
Operations / Net Sales or Revenues * 100 
CR Cash ratio 
Cash ratio - as defined by Dittmar and Smith (2007): cash 
and cash equivalents divided by net assets (total assets minus 
cash and cash equivalents) 
debt 
Balance sheet total 
debt 
TOTAL DEBT represents all interest bearing and 
capitalized lease obligations. It is the sum of long and short 
term debt. 
TA 
Balance sheet total 
assets 
TOTAL ASSETS represent the sum of total current assets, 
long term receivables, investment in unconsolidated 
subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and 
equipment and other assets. 
SR Sales revenues 
NET SALES OR REVENUES represent gross sales and 
other operating revenue less discounts, returns and 
allowances. 
CAPEX 
Capital 
expenditures 
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES – Additions to fixed assets 
   
Country controls   
Country dummy - variable equals one if company belongs 
to a particular country and is zero otherwise 
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Chapter 7 
 
Conclusion 
 
The insights of this doctoral thesis shed new light on instances of stock 
market manipulation. That is, the ability of market participants to make use of 
international securities markets for public corporations in the presence of 
asymmetric information. Much of the work has been inspired from the literature on 
signaling and from both early evidence on agency relationships between managers 
and shareholders and more recent support on conflicts of interest between firms and 
financial intermediaries, such as underwriting investment banks. The theoretical and 
empirical evidence on diverging interests between managers and shareholders is 
overwhelming. Still, the question whether this enables rent-seeking by corporate 
decision-makers or whether we observe permutations of optimal contracting remains 
by and large unanswered.  
The academic literature is largely divided on the question of managerial 
compensation. Whereas popular work by Bebchuk and Fried and most of David 
Yermack’s contributions condemn “pay without performance” (2004), “flights of 
fancy” (2006a), “golden handshakes” (2006b), and “deductio ad absurdum” (2009), 
respectively, a camp of researchers finds less unanimous answers. Since Gabaix and 
Landier (2008), Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009), and Edmans and Gabaix 
(2009) the discussion about optimal contracting in CEO compensation has been 
refueled. In a nutshell, CEO pay is simply a function of increasing firm size, 
growing competition in the market for managerial talent, or ramifications of 
managerial talent and human capital itself. As a consequence, CEO pay has not 
increased six fold since 1980 because CEOs are six times as greedy but more 
because corporations are six times larger and more valuable. 
In order to be eligible for this compensation, managers have to comply with 
duties and to steer corporations for the maximization of shareholder value. In an 
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international context, other stakeholders also have to be taken into account – 
conditional on the prevalent governance system. This dissertation provides evidence 
on 1) how this shareholder (stakeholder-) value maximization done in an 
international context and which role institutional investors play and 2) the 
consequences of violations of fiduciary duties. Lastly, this research applies the 
setting of agency conflicts and asymmetric information to primary securities markets 
and explores the role of the investment bank and financial regulation. In the 
following subsection, I will reflect on every chapter’s result with respect to the 
broad implications and avenues for future research. 
7.1 Summary of Main Findings 
The consequences for managers violating their fiduciary duties or market 
participants acting in self-interest are an escalating degree of litigation risk from 
outside shareholders and external parties. How this behavior affects long-term 
performance and corporate behavior is the focus of this dissertation. In hypothesis 1 
of Chapter 2, I conjecture that individual directors can be disciplined by the filing of 
class-action lawsuits, whereas entire corporations cannot. This effect manifests into 
a long-term reversal of underperformance into outperformance for holding periods 
beyond 12 months. This effect is restricted to cases where individual directors have 
been sued for violation of duty of loyalty (insider trading, related party transactions). 
On average, the filing of a class-action lawsuit is a disruptive event but does this put 
the firm into financial distress? I do not find evidence of this to occur in hypothesis 
3. In fact, expected default probability decreases after the filing of a lawsuit even 
though this risk is still more pronounced than the unconditional probability 
established by prior researchers (Bharath and Shumway, 2008). My results are also 
not an artifact of firms in the sample, which have already been facing problems 
before the actual filing of a lawsuit. In hypothesis 2, I do not find evidence that 
performance effects differ substantially between firms experiencing triggering 
events and firms that do not. The chapter acknowledges that a naïve approximation 
of KMV’s distance to default is only one way of measuring bankruptcy risk, default 
probability, and possible financial distress. Bond and/or issuer credit ratings are 
supposedly more reliable with the drawback that they can only be implemented for 
two-thirds of my sample. Moreover, rating agencies face potential conflicts of 
interests as well due to the “issuer pays” system (Richardson and White, 2009). 
Chapter 2 therefore proposes and implements a cleaner and more unbiased solution 
to measuring financial health and solvency of corporations. 
Chapter 3 suggests a different interpretation to the occurrence of class-
action lawsuits: they are shareholders’ response to dysfunctional out-of-equilibrium 
behavior of managers. Concerning monitoring and executive compensation, 
shareholders face various trade-offs. Shareholders neither have the power to enforce 
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governance changes nor find more efficient compensation schemes than insiders 
themselves. Moreover, the benefits of remuneration in the form of stock options are 
pervasive. The consequence is that insiders find themselves in managerial discretion. 
Glitches in the corporate governance system and dispersed share ownership enable 
this purportedly problematic behavior of insiders to increase firm risk due to their 
stock option incentives. The solution to this problem is the existence of shareholder 
litigation: both as an ex ante threat and as an ex post “punishing” device. Since the 
filing of lawsuits is costly, the quest for more cost-efficient alternatives is intriguing. 
I find this in the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) personal liability section in 
2002. From that point onwards, CEOs could be held liable to a higher extent than 
before, which deters problematic behavior from option incentives in the presence of 
managerial discretion. On a macro level, compliance with SOX has been criticized 
for being increasingly burdensome and to put the U.S. stock market at a comparative 
disadvantage for newly listed (especially foreign issuers) vis-à-vis financial centers 
such as London, Paris, and Frankfurt (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2009). On a micro 
level, SOX bears advantages for shareholders to enforce corporate control and to 
curtail managerial self-interest. For managers and companies, a higher risk of 
personal liability and litigation risk could render the U.S. as a less preferred place of 
business. More research from the strand of literature from economic geography is 
needed for that. 
Chapter 4 switches from the agency relation between shareholders and 
managers to agency conflicts between companies and financial intermediaries. This 
is a timely and important research area. I adopt a setting of primary securities 
issuance markets and supposed cases of market manipulation during the hot issue 
market of 1998-2000. In the chapter I give an answer to the paramount degree of 
underpricing at the end of the 90s, which has exceeded levels far beyond what 
conventional models of IPO underpricing can explain. A suggestive answer is 
already provided in Loughran and Ritter (2004) but I look at the practice of 
“laddering” in greater detail. The underwriting investment bank makes use of its 
reputational capital and underprices in order to attract investors (“ladderers”) into 
tie-in agreements, which they can secure a bigger allotment with. This is also to 
transfer the role of aftermarket price stabilization to the ladderers. The underwriting 
financial conglomerate further provides reinforcing price stabilization through its 
asset management arms. Unfortunately, I cannot prove the existence of commissions 
in the form of kick-back schemes but is fair to assume that the generation of these 
“soft-dollars” exists. In summary, the paper gives answers to how financial 
intermediaries can use information asymmetry and agency conflicts in financial 
markets for their own benefit. Financial regulators are largely powerless in curtailing 
these practices because powerful market participants are likely to change the rules of 
the game in response to regulation. 
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Chapter 5 and 6 return to the shareholders’ perspective again. In Chapter 5, 
I study the extent and the triggers of shareholder activism in the form of shareholder 
proposals and proxy voting. Shareholders respond to the absence of discipline from 
the managerial labor markets and market competition with the filing of shareholder 
proposals. To a large extent, these proposals are on compensation and incentives. On 
the downside however, this equity participation gives insiders the voting rights to 
block shareholder proposals. Potentially, this chapter offers an explanation to the 
valuation discount of companies in companies with high takeover defenses and 
concentrated industries. These companies suffer from a lack-of-control discount due 
to insiders’ ability to block proposals, which inhibits shareholders’ effective control. 
In the last chapter, I argue for a convergence of continental European corporate 
governance towards Anglo-Saxon standards due to institutional preferences of 
institutional investors. The response from these stock market pressures are an 
increasing aptitude to short-term shareholder value creation. Ultimately, the 
consequence of these alleged institutional pressures for managerial myopia could be 
adverse effects for local stakeholders. Anecdotal evidence from Nokia and Opel in 
Germany is undeniably supportive of this view. 
7.2 Implications of Empirical Results 
My dissertation has important implications for several parties. The first 
group, which is likely to benefit the most from my research, comprises shareholders. 
Their ability to monitor and to control managers in the presence of asymmetric 
information is ultimately influenced by the corporate governance landscape and the 
mechanisms at their disposal. According to my study, shareholder litigation and 
shareholder activism from proxy proposals are two of such options, which can be 
effective under given circumstances. Shareholder litigation is a viable option if other 
mechanisms have failed or are unavailable – especially for dispersed shareholders. 
Still, it is costly and long-term benefits should be carefully evaluated against short-
term direct and indirect costs. As proclaimed groups of active participants in the 
primary issues market, institutional investors but also retail investors can benefit 
from my findings in this dissertation. This is because they are long-term institutions, 
which are preferred targets in the solicitation of demand for IPO shares and the 
eventual allocation process. They have to be aware of the fact whether there is a 
rational explanation for IPO pricing and performance in the market or whether they 
are the product of manipulation. 
For that reason, the regulator as a second group also benefits from my 
research. I do observe benefits from regulatory intervention in the form of the 
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This suggests that regulation in financial markets 
has been successful. But according to Chapter 4, this does not necessarily have to be 
the case across the board. Informational asymmetries and market frictions will 
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continue to enable regulatory arbitrage and potential enrichment of more informed 
parties. It is therefore unlikely that regulation of financial markets by augmenting 
transparency of corporations, enabling a level playing field for market participants 
or by setting caps on executive compensation will achieve the desired outcomes. 
I identify the third group of beneficiaries as corporate insiders and key 
decision-makers in financial institutions. The amount and the magnitude of litigation 
risk that they face in financial markets has substantial impacts to the decisions that 
they make. Especially, risk-taking propensity and the design of compensation 
schemes will be affected. Pre-IPO investors such as angel investors, venture 
capitalists, and manager founders can face the possibility that the commissioned 
investment bank acts in different interest. This will in turn affect the observed 
pricing of the IPO, the selling behavior and the post IPO performance. Chapter 4 
provides indicative evidence for these variables. 
The last group that my dissertation concerns is comprised of financial 
intermediaries in the market. Regulatory intervention by and large shapes the way in 
which investment banks are able to conduct their business. According to my study, 
there are consequences of litigation and there should be reputational penalties. The 
current financial crises and lessons from the past put serious challenges to the 
financial regulator and the social planner. The beginning of the millennium has been 
marked with governance scandals, which were followed by regulations on corporate 
governance. Although Sarbanes-Oxley was meant to curtail insider trading and 
concealment of material facts and to enforce disclosure rules and heighten personal 
liability of key decision makers, financial markets still witnessed subsequent cases 
of option backdating. It seems like regulated subjects behave in ways to circumvent 
and to mute the effects of regulation. Recent academic research has already 
unraveled the practice and the consequences of “lucky” option grants (Bebchuk, 
Grinstein, and Peyer, 2010) and option backdating (Heron and Lie, 2008, Cicero, 
2009). We are unlikely to observe exactly this form of manipulation in the near 
future. In my view this shows the importance of academic research in this area if the 
outcomes are communicated in the proper way to the world of practitioners. A 
prominent lead example must be the pioneering work 33 researchers of the 
Accounting, Economics, and Finance Departments of New York University’s Stern 
School of Business, which analyses the financial crisis and proposes solutions to 
prevent future systemic crises from happening (Acharya and Richardson, 2009). 
I stress one final point that pertains to all the chapters, which are closely 
linked to corporate governance themes. Nowadays research to a large extent on the 
concept called “equity governance”; that is, management tries to maximize the value 
of outstanding claims. Since debtholders have a flat claim on the company’s cash 
flows, this is not necessarily an issue. It does get severe in the case of subordinated 
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debt when there are risk-shifting activities from shareholders to bondholders. This is 
what I address in Chapter 2 and 3, when risk-taking activities due to equity 
incentives put the company nearer towards financial distress (cf. 12.09 vs 8.95% 
expected default probabilities for sued versus the universe of U.S. stocks, 
respectively). This underscores the importance of “debt governance” in the context 
of managerial risk appetite. A closer alignment with the interests of debtholders is 
therefore pivotal to deterring situations of excess risk-shifting (Sundaram and 
Yermack, 2007). Anecdotal evidence for a lack of debt governance can again be 
found in the ongoing global financial crisis where banks (whose default is 
systemically relevant) have taken on too much risk, neglected subordinated creditors 
and (in the case of financial firms) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) as claimholders. 
7.3 Suggestions for Further Research 
Under a common and related topic, Chapter 2 and 3 give important avenues 
for future research in light of the financial crisis with respect managerial propensity 
for risk-taking due to asymmetric compensation schemes. Table 2.1 in Chapter 2 and 
Figure 2.1 in Chapter 3 both expose steep increases over time in response to 
decreasing stock markets. Since monitoring is costly for shareholders, they will be 
indifferent to risk-taking in times of high stock market valuations. The question that 
emerges from my finding is which portion of managerial risk appetite (probably 
induced by the compensation scheme) is necessary and in shareholders’ interest and 
which component of this is “excessive”? Related to the effectiveness and potential 
of shareholder litigation in controlling managers, I have to acknowledge that the 
research presented in my dissertation is somewhat U.S.-centered. There are countries 
(e.g. Finland) in this world, where litigation risk from securities class actions is 
basically absent for companies. This does not mean that reputational risk from 
litigation risk is mute in those countries. A question deriving from these legal 
disparities is whether alternative mechanisms are more dominant in these countries. 
A research area, which receives mounting awareness centers on conflicts of 
interest and coordinated behavior of financial institutions and financial 
conglomerates. The academic research around “forensic finance” (Ritter, 2008), 
Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov (2009) but also Bodnaruk, Braun, and Massa (2009) 
from this dissertation is both amplified and corroborated by anecdotal evidence from 
the ongoing financial crisis. Regulatory arbitrage, the “leverage game” (Acharya and 
Schnabl, 2009) and the credit rating agencies’ roles are still largely unexplored 
(Richardson and White, 2009). More academic work on this is crucial for future 
research. From my perspective the most timely research avenues can be drawn from 
Chapter 4. The question about the legitimacy of tie-in agreements and the 
accompanying commissions business has not even been answered with the proposed 
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global settlement of 586 million USD, which releases issuers and investment banks 
from any further liability. We could expect that the cost of settling any litigation risk 
does not exceed the benefits that investment banks have made from manipulating 
IPOs. A more fundamental question however emerges from my findings, which 
pertains more to the ramifications of laddering on a macro-level. If insiders (with or 
without explicit collusion with investment banks) and selected institutional investors 
seem to benefit from laddering, will it impose a dead-weight cost in the market? In 
other words, do uninformed investors lose more because of inflated stock prices than 
what initial investors, investment banks and corporate insiders could potentially gain 
from price inflation/stabilization? Related to this, the questions of awareness of 
other parties (venture capitalists) and implicit/complicit collusion seem to be 
important subjects to pursue further. Lastly, are tie-in agreements a practice, which 
involves the lead underwriter only, or is the entire syndicate involved? The answer 
to this question ultimately leads to acknowledging profit sharing and informational 
spillovers in financial markets. 
With respect to one of the most researched subject areas in corporate 
finance, namely (the underpricing of) initial public offerings, my dissertation offers 
avenues for further research in the direction of conflicts of interest in the issuer-
underwriter relation. On the one hand, reputation in investment banking seems to be 
an important asset. On the other hand, this does not get eroded from scandals: the 
supposedly most “active” investment banks in forensic finance are still the most 
reputable underwriters in our time (with the exception of Lehman Brothers for 
different reasons). In my dissertation I do find strong reputation effects for the filing 
of class-action lawsuits for corporations and for individuals – how can malpractices 
be with a much lesser effect for financial intermediaries? 
Chapter 5 gives implications for future research with respect to the 
emergence of shareholder activism using shareholder proposals and proxy voting. It 
has to be acknowledged that the endogeneity of the (institutional) shareholder base 
is an incredibly tricky obstacle to overcome. Nevertheless, the ownership structure 
of a company has substantial effects on corporate decision-making (Bushee, 1998), 
takeover activity (Baker, Coval, and Stein, 2007), and even asset prices (Merton, 
1987; recently Greenwood and Thesmar, 2010). Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) and 
Edmans and Manso (2010) have given analytical solutions to the trade-off involved 
in the forms of activism. Because large investors face this trade-off between 
becoming active monitors by selling the stock or by shareholder proposals, it is 
imperative to give empirical answers to what influences the choice for either form of 
activism. With the increasing emergence of databases, my dissertation sheds some 
new light on this issue but certainly more empirical work on this is needed. 
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Chapter 6 focuses on international corporate governance. We can consider 
important avenues for future research with respect to corporate governance in 
emerging markets. Klapper and Love (2004) and Durnev and Kim (2005) have made 
considerable advances in this area but it is not clear yet in which direction corporate 
governance systems will develop. My research provides some evidence that the 
internationalization and the growing importance of the institutional investor base 
contribute to the fact that we are likely to see a convergence from bank-centered 
systems of corporate governance to market-based systems. It is however still 
uncertain which of the two systems firms from emerging markets will opt for due to 
differences in legal heritage and ownership rights (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998).  
In summary, “stock market manipulation” as defined in this dissertation is 
commonly occurring in securities markets. The answer to the question whether this 
has had forensic backgrounds or not, is outside of the scope of this dissertation. 
Some practices like option backdating could effectively constitute a victimless crime 
but still they constitute a criminal act, which is condemned by criminal law. In 
essence the question of legitimacy boils down to whether an informed party 
(“insiders”) benefits more than other market participants (“outsiders”) due to access 
to proprietary information and whether there is a potential to abuse it. Non-forensic 
backgrounds are simply the extent to which insiders and managers are able to 
accommodate investor preferences with their corporate decisions that “manipulate” 
the stock price. For this dissertation, public equity markets are the experimental 
setting in which there is information asymmetry. That the consequences of this are 
systemically relevant is amplified by the financial crises and its ongoing 
externalities. 
I close this section with a quote from a pioneering researcher in corporate 
finance. According to Jay Ritter (2008) “[…] researchers have to consider whether 
an empirical pattern has an innocuous explanation, or whether it represents a 
situation in which a small group of financial market insiders is benefiting at the 
expense of the broader investing public.” This also casts doubt on the notorious 
citation, which introduces this dissertation because it disregards transparency and 
fairness in financial markets. Unfortunately, any finding in this direction is highly 
politicized (see the Wall Street Journal article by Maremont and Craig, 2008). This 
public and economic interest can undermine the actual second-guessing of the 
results that academics are interested in. Upon completion of this dissertation, I hope 
to have contributed to the clarification and to understanding manipulation in 
financial markets.  
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Deutsche Zusammenfassung 
 
Die vorliegende Dissertation ermöglicht neue Einsichten in Bezug auf 
Situationen, in denen Marktteilnehmer internationale Wertpapiermärkte für 
Aktiengesellschaften vor dem Hintergrund von ungleicher Informationslage 
verwenden und eventuell ausnutzen. Weite Teile dieser Arbeit wurden durch die 
Literatur über Manager als Handelsbevollmächtigter der Aktionäre (der Eigentümer 
der Firma) und deren Interessenkonflikt inspiriert. Um sicher zu stellen, dass 
Manager im Interesse der Aktionäre handeln, gibt es das Konzept der 
verantwortungsvollen Unternehmensführung: kurz „Corporate Governance“. Ein 
weiterer Konflikt findet zwischen Firmen und Finanzinstituten statt; wie zum 
Beispiel Investment Banken. In Bezug auf ersteren Interessenkonflikt gibt es sowohl 
empirische als auch theoretisch-analytische Studien in reicher Zahl. Allerdings ist 
die akademische und politische Meinung über diesen Sachverhalt gespalten. Gibt 
das Verhältnis zwischen Aktionären (den eigentlichen Eigentümer eines Konzerns) 
und den Managern Anlass und Möglichkeit, Informationsvorteile auszunutzen oder 
stellt diese Situation bereits das optimale Vertragsverhältnis dar? Ein besonders 
politisiertes Thema, über das Uneinigkeit herrscht, findet sich insbesondere in der 
Frage der Vorstandsvergütung. Wohingegen berühmte und vielzitierte Werke von 
Bebchuk und Fried (2004), und die meisten Beiträge David Yermacks exzessive 
Vergütungen kritisieren und deren negative Auswirkungen auf die Firmenleistung 
und Profitabilität feststellen, findet ein weiteres akademisches Lager weniger 
eindeutige Antworten. Seit den Werken von Gabaix und Landier (2008), Edmans, 
Gabaix, und Landier (2009) sowie Edmans und Gabaix (2009) wurde die Diskussion 
über die Rechtmäßigkeit hoher Gehälter neu entfacht. Kurz zusammengefasst könnte 
zum Beispiel der Anstieg der Vorstandsvergütung ganz einfach eine Funktion von 
wachsender Firmengröße, größerem Wettbewerb um Managertalent oder einen 
allgemeinen Anstieg der Leistungsfähigkeit des Human Capital auf Marktebene 
sein. Als Konsequenz dessen habe sich die Vergütung des Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) in den USA seit 1980 nicht etwa versechsfacht, weil der repräsentative 
Manager sechs Mal so gierig sei, sondern weil die Firma, die er leitet, einfach sechs 
Mal so groß und sechs Mal so wertvoll und profitabel sei. 
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Damit Manager überhaupt in den Vorzug dieser Vergütung kommen, 
müssen sie mit gewissen Regeln im Markt konform gehen und Wert für die 
Aktionäre schaffen. Im internationalen Kontext müssen hierbei auch noch weitere 
Parteien (sogenannte „stakeholder“) mit einbezogen werden. Diese Dissertation 
liefert weitere wichtige Antworten auf die Fragen 1) wie Aktionäre im 
internationalen Kontext sicherstellen können, dass Manager in beidseitigem 
Interesse handeln, 2) welche Rolle dabei institutionelle Anleger spielen und 3) die 
möglichen Konsequenzen einer Verletzung der Manager-Pflichten. 
In Bezug auf den zweiten angesprochenen Interessenkonflikt (zwischen 
Firmen und Finanzinstituten) findet sich ein Forschungsbereich, der in der letzten 
Zeit stark ansteigenden Zuspruch gewinnt. Dieser befasst sich mit koordiniertem 
Verhalten von Finanzkonglomeraten in Finanzmärkten. Akademische 
Forschungsbeiträge im Bereich der forensischen Finanzwissenschaften von Ritter 
(2008), Bodnaruk, Massa, und Simonov (2009) aber auch Bodnaruk, Braun, und 
Massa (2009) aus meiner vorliegenden Forschungsarbeit werden exemplarisch 
verstärkt durch die Vorfälle der aktuellen globalen Finanzkrise. Die Möglichkeit des 
Ausnutzens von Lücken in der Gesetzgebung (im Fachjargon: „regulatory 
arbitrage“) von Seiten der Finanzinstitute ist bisher weitestgehend ungeklärt. 
Weitere Arbeit in diesem Bereich wird daher von großem Nutzen sowohl für die 
Kapitalmärkte als auch für die Finanzindustrie sein. 
Laut meiner Dissertation sind die Konsequenzen für Manager, die ihre 
Aufsichtspflicht vernachlässigen und verletzen, ein erhöhtes Klagerisiko von Seiten 
der Aktionäre. Der Fokus meiner Studie in Kapitel 2 befasst sich mit langfristigen 
Konsequenzen für den Aktienpreis, den Firmenwert, sowie dem Firmenverhalten im 
Anschluss an eine Aktionärsklage. Ziel ist es, herauszufinden, ob individuelle 
Manager durch Sammelklagen der Aktionäre disziplinarisch bestraft werden können, 
was sich über einen längeren Zeitraum in einer besseren Performance widerspiegeln 
kann. Ob dies der Fall ist, hängt davon ab, ob Manager das Klagerisiko als eine 
glaubwürdige Bedrohung empfinden, und ob eine Verhaltensänderung im Zuge 
dessen erfolgt. Aufgrund der Tatsache, dass sowohl persönliche als auch finanzielle 
Konsequenzen für Manager recht gravierend sein können, kann das Risiko als 
glaubhaft eingestuft werden. Für Unternehmen, denen Bilanzfälschung oder die 
Durchführung illegaler Geschäftspraktiken zu Last gelegt werden, stellen 
Sammelklagen in dieser Form, ein nachhaltig negatives Ereignis für den Aktienpreis 
und dessen Performance dar. Eine mögliche Outperformance geschieht jedoch nicht 
auf Kosten eines erhöhten Zinsausfallrisikos: in Form einer Annäherung des KMV-
Merton Modells der erwarteten Zinsausfall-Wahrscheinlichkeit finde ich, dass diese 
nach der Sammelklage eher sinkt als steigt. Die langfristigen Auswirkungen auf den 
Aktienpreis unterscheiden sich auch nicht zu den Firmen, die bereits vor Einleitung 
der Sammelklage, mit entscheidenden auslösenden Ereignissen konfrontiert wurden. 
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Daraus ist zu schließen, dass die Sammelklage an sich für die langfristige 
Aktienperformance verantwortlich ist. Die Verwendung des vereinfachten KMV-
Merton Modells birgt laut meiner Studie mehrere Vorteile. Zum einen haben Credit 
Ratings den Nachteil, dass diese nur für Firmen mit gehandelten Anleihen verfügbar 
sind, was die Stichprobengröße um ein Drittel schrumpfen ließe. Zum anderen 
werden Rating Agenturen oft wegen Interessenkonflikten kritisiert, was sich durch 
das „issuer pays“ (die Firma bezahlt die Rating Agentur, um eine Einstufung des 
Kreditrisikos zu erhalten) System ergibt. Somit hat eine Rating Agentur nur 
begrenzte Anreize, die Kreditwürdigkeit eines Unternehmens herabzustufen. 
Kapitel 3 interpretiert das Aufkommen von Sammelklagen eher in einem 
Corporate Governance Kontext im Vergleich zu anderen Studien, die diese mehr als 
Antwort auf (oder Auslöser für) schlechte Performance beziehen. Laut meiner 
Studie erfolgen diese Sammelklagen als Antwort auf dysfunktionales Verhalten von 
CEOs, welches durch falsche Anreize in der Vergütungsstruktur ausgelöst wird. Im 
Bezug auf Kontrolle und Managervergütung befinden sich Aktionäre in mehreren 
Zielkonflikten: Aktionären fehlt es zum einen an Koordinationsvermögen, die 
Corporate Governance Struktur der Firmen zu verändern, und zum anderen an 
nötigem Wissen und Abschätzungsvermögen für die Ansetzung der richtigen 
Anreizstruktur für Manager. Darüber hinaus bietet die Vergütung in Form von 
Aktienoptionen durchdringende Vorteile für alle Seiten. Als Konsequenz dessen 
verfügen Manager über ausreichende Diskretion, ihren Informationsvorsprung zu 
nutzen und die Vergütungsstruktur selber festzulegen. Im Zuge dessen wird der 
Manager einen Anreiz haben, das Firmenrisiko (zum Beispiel in Form von Cash 
Flow Volatilität) zu erhöhen und sich strategisch im Bezug auf Veröffentlichung von 
Informationen an die Finanzmärkte zu verhalten. Allerdings haben Manager in 
dieser Hinsicht nicht die freie Handlungsvollmacht, sich in eigenem Interesse zu 
verhalten. Die Lösung in dieser Situation ist die Option der Aktionäre, gegen Firmen 
und Manager vor Gericht zu ziehen. Die Bedrohung dessen ist wegen finanzieller 
und persönlicher Konsequenzen ausreichend, um abzuschrecken bzw. korrigierend 
einzugreifen. Allerdings sind Gerichtsverfahren und Sammelklagen für den Investor 
aufwändig: sowohl in direkter Form durch Anwalts- bzw. Gerichtskosten als auch in 
indirekter (meist auch höherer) Form durch den Zeitaufwand für Beobachtung, 
Bewertung, und Einschätzung der Informations- und Firmenlage. Als Alternative 
hierzu wurde in den USA 2002 der Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) verabschiedet, der 
Manager zu einem erhöhten Grad haftbar machen kann. Bisher wurde die 
Einführung des SOX auf Makro-Ebene kritisiert, da seine Befolgung sich 
insbesondere für ausländische Unternehmen als zu kostspielig darstelle. Des 
Weiteren benachteilige SOX die USA als internationalen Aktienmarkt gegenüber 
internationalen Finanzzentren wie London, Paris, oder Frankfurt. Auf Firmenebene 
jedoch ermöglicht SOX einen wichtigen Kontrollmechanismus für Aktionäre und 
drosselt exzessive Risiken der Firmen durch höhere individuelle Haftbarkeit. 
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Kapitel 4 hingegen nimmt eine neue Perspektive ein. Statt die Beziehung 
zwischen Aktionären und Managern im Bezug auf Interessenkonflikte zu 
beleuchten, ist der Fokus der Studie das Verhältnis zwischen Firmen und 
Finanzinstituten. Exemplarisch dargestellt wird dies in dem Kontext von 
Börsengängen (initial public offerings - IPOs), bei denen der Emittent eine 
Investmentbank mit der Platzierung der Aktien im Markt beauftragt. Investment 
Banken sind Finanzintermediäre, die den Handel auf Wertpapermärkten 
ermöglichen und vereinfachen. Zwischen 1998 und 2000 gab es in den USA eine 
Vielzahl von Fällen, in denen diese Börsengänge von Unternehmen mutmaßlich von 
der Investment Bank (dem „Underwriter“) manipuliert wurden. Als Konsequenz 
dessen lag der Marktpreis am ersten Handelstag weit über dem Ausgabepreis (der 
Unterschied zwischen den beiden Preisen wird als „underpricing“ bezeichnet). 
Dieses „underpricing“ überstieg seinerzeit Werte, die fernab jeglicher Theorie lagen 
und mit konventionellen Preismodellen nicht zu erklären waren. Auch 
Spekulationstheorien und Erklärungen durch Irrationalität der Marktteilnehmer 
greifen zu kurz. Eine Antwort zu diesem Underpricing-Phänomen liegt in der 
Möglichkeit der Investment Bank, die Aktien zum Ausgabepreis in Kombination mit 
einem Kopplungsverkauf (sogenannte „tie-in“ Geschäfte oder „laddering“ 
Verträgen) zu platzieren. Dabei bekommt ein Investor, der eine Aktie zum 
Emissionspreis zeichnet, diese nur zugeteilt, wenn er auch zustimmt, an einem 
bestimmten Datum in der Zukunft, weitere Aktien zum Marktpreis zu erwerben mit 
einem vorher festgelegten Faktor x. Die Investment Bank schafft es dadurch, sowohl 
den Ausgabe- als auch den Marktpreis der Aktien und die Platzierung selbst zu 
erhöhen. Die teilnehmenden Investoren erhoffen sich eine hohe Rendite der Aktie 
und somit ermöglicht deren künstliche Nachfrage eine Stabilisierung der Preise. 
Weitere Stabilisierung nimmt der Underwriter durch die Asset Management Teile 
des Finanzkonglomerates vor, zu dem er gehört. Leider ist es nicht möglich die 
Rückführung der Profite der Investoren an den Underwriter genau zu überprüfen. 
Allerdings gibt es Hinweise (Cliff and Denis, 2004) und Einzelberichte (red herring, 
2001), dass diese sogenannten „soft-dollars“ existieren. Somit zeigt diese Studie, 
wie eine Investment Bank als Marktteilnehmer Informationsungleichheit für den 
eigenen Vorteil ausnutzen kann. Gesetzgeber und Behörden sind weitestgehend 
machtlos, diese Praktiken zu unterbinden, da die betroffenen Parteien als Reaktion 
wahrscheinlich eine unauffälligere unterschiedliche Form der Manipulation finden. 
Kapitel 5 wechselt wieder auf die Aktionärsperspektive und fragt, 
inwieweit Investoren Kontrolle auf Firmen und Manager ausüben können. Wie 
reagieren Aktionärsgruppen, wenn ein Unternehmen schlechte Performance liefert? 
Der Aktionär wird aktiv. Generell unterscheidet man zwischen zwei Formen dieses 
Aktivismus: zum einen kann ein Investor mit großen Unternehmensanteilen bei 
Unzufriedenheit mit Strategie bzw. Managementleistung einfach die Aktien 
verkaufen und damit einen Preisdruck ausüben. Eine andere Form der Kontrolle ist, 
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auf Aktionärsversammlungen Vorschläge zur Änderung des Managements und zur 
Anpassung der Konzernstrategie vorzubringen. Beide Formen sind nur bedingt 
universell praktikabel, da der Investor für einen Preisdruck durch Verkauf einen 
Mindestanteil halten muss, um glaubhaft zu wirken. Da der aktive Investor, der 
Vorschläge auf Aktionärs- und Jahreshauptversammlungen vorbringt, die alleinigen 
Kosten und den Aufwand seines Aktivismus trägt, entsteht eine Situation des „free-
riding“. Das bedeutet, dass andere Aktionäre die vollen Vorteile des Aktivismus des 
Einzelnen genießen und somit durch seinen alleinigen Aufwand profitieren. Daher 
entstehen Koordinationsprobleme zwischen Investorengruppen. Der Erfolg beide 
Formen des Aktivismus bleibt darüber hinaus auch nur Investoren bestimmter Größe 
vorbehalten. Das bedeutet allerdings nicht, dass Aktivismus auf Hauptversammlung 
keine Form effektiver Kontrolle darstellen kann. Die Grundannahme der Studie ist, 
dass jegliche Art von öffentlichem Aktivismus an die Firma und an die 
Finanzmärkte ein negatives Signal sendet. Somit ergeben sich Kosten für den 
Manager, die vermieden werden sollten. Kapitel 5 erforscht dies anhand einer 
Situation, in der Firmen in einer weitestgehend konzentrierten Industrie mit wenigen 
Wettbewerbern operieren. Darüber hinaus ist das Unternehmen vor feindlichen 
Übernahmen geschützt durch sogenannte „Verteidigungsstrategien“, welche jegliche 
Form von Managementdisziplin unterbinden. Sowohl Produktmärkte als auch der 
Markt für Manager und Firmenübernahmen sind sogenannte „Marktmechanismen“, 
die sicherstellen sollen, dass der Manager im Interesse der Aktionäre handelt.  
Der Manager ist im Fall von Kapitel 5 durch zweierlei Arten der 
Positionsgefährdung geschützt, indem seine Firma a) weniger durch ein schwaches 
Produkt aus dem Markt getrieben werden kann und b) schwieriger durch eine andere 
Firma aufgekauft werden kann, weil der Marktwert durch schlechtes Wirtschaften zu 
niedrig getrieben wurde. Potentiell könnten Manager sich somit ihren Pflichten 
entziehen, da sie den Marktmechanismen nur begrenzt ausgesetzt sind. In dieser 
Situation ist die optimale Reaktion der Aktionäre, Anreize für den Manager in Form 
von Vergütungsvorschlägen zu schaffen. Dies birgt jedoch den Nachteil, dass 
Manager zu Eigentümer der Firma gemacht werden, und ebenfalls ein Stimmrecht 
erhalten. Dieses verwenden sie aktiv, um gegen Vorschläge der Aktionäre in 
anderen Bereichen zu stimmen. Allerdings schaffen es die Aktionäre mit den 
vorgebrachten Vorschlägen, ein öffentliches Signal schlechter Performance der 
Manager zu liefern, was eine disziplinarische Funktion haben kann. Dies ist 
unabhängig von der Erfolgsquote der Vorschläge. Die Einzigartigkeit meiner 
Datenbank ermöglicht es daher, Aktivismus von Aktionären in ein neues Licht zu 
rücken. Als Reaktion bringen Manager nun selbst Vorschläge hervor auf 
Versammlungen, die aufgrund von Koordinationsschwierigkeiten unter 
Kleinanlegern und institutionellen Investoren eine bedingungslose Akzeptanzrate 
von über 95% haben (Gillan und Starks, 2007). Zwar können Manager durch den 
Aktivismus der Aktionäre kein vermeintlich „ruhiges Leben“ genießen, allerdings 
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haben die Aktionäre auch keine effektive Kontrolle mehr über die Firma. Daraus 
ergäbe sich der Abschlag zum Marktwert des Unternehmens, der bereits durch 
Giroud und Müller (2009) erforscht und festgestellt wurde.  
Die vorhergegangenen Studien befassen sich ausschließlich mit dem U.S. 
Aktienmarkt. Auch wenn der amerikanische Aktienmarkt der größte Aktienmarkt 
weltweit ist, der am meisten liquide ist, lässt sich Corporate Governance als 
Kontrollmechanismus für Aktionäre nicht für internationale Märkte 
verallgemeinern. In amerikanischen Unternehmen muss der CEO primär Wert für 
Aktionäre schaffen. Dies ist allerdings keine global gültige Betrachtungsweise: das 
deutsche bzw. japanische System nimmt einen ganzheitlicheren Ansatz für 
Unternehmensführung unter Berücksichtigung von Mitarbeitern, Kunden, bis hin zu 
Versorgern. Welche der zwei Möglichkeiten Firmen wählen, hängt im Endeffekt 
vom Grad der Internationalisierung der Wertschöpfungskette, vom Listing-Status 
der Aktien, sowie von der Investorenbasis ab.  
Im letzten Kapitel der Dissertation untersuche ich, ob die zunehmende 
Internationalisierung der Investorenbasis dazu führt, dass Unternehmen anstreben, 
kurzfristige Werte für die Aktionäre zu erzielen. Dieses Ergebnis ist laut dem 
amerikanisch-/britischen Corporate Governance System bevorzugt. Einzelne 
Berichte über den niederländischen Konsumriesen Royal Ahold sowie die 
reaktionäre Trennung des Daimler Konzerns von Chrysler an den U.S. 
Finanzinvestor Cerberus in 2007 geben Anlass zu meiner Hypothese, dass sich 
Firmen aus Kontinental-Europa zunehmend dem amerikanisch-/britischen Corporate 
Governance System annähern werden. Mithilfe einer Datenbank, die die Corporate 
Governance Qualität der 300 größten gelisteten europäischen Unternehmen misst, 
finde ich in Kapitel 6 heraus, dass dies tatsächlich der Fall ist. Die Ergebnisse sind 
hierbei für einen Bereich stark ausgeprägt, der europaweit am wenigsten reguliert 
ist: nämlich der Art und Weise wie Unternehmen gegen feindliche Übernahmen 
geschützt werden. Als Schlussfolge hieraus ziehe ich, dass es einen Markt für 
europäische Corporate Governance für Firmen aus Kontinental-Europa gibt. 
Insgesamt zeigt die vorliegende Dissertation, inwiefern sich in den 
Finanzmärkten Informationsvorteile für bestimmte Parteien ergeben und wie mit 
diesen umgegangen wird. Das Management der Investorenbasis, das mögliche 
Ausnutzen von Informationsvorteilen sowie das Steuern des Aktienpreises geben 
meiner Arbeit den Titel: „Stock Market Manipulation“. Inwieweit diese 
Informationsvorteile zu forensischen Zwecken genutzt werden, ist Aufgabe für 
zukünftige Forschungsarbeit auf diesem Gebiet.  
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